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The ongoing shift from Defined Benefit (DB) pension plans to Defined Contribution
(DC) pension plans in private sectors has transferred investment risk and longevity
risk from pension providers to individuals. Professional advice on how to best gener-
ate retirement incomes from accumulated pension savings is therefore in great demand.
A common solution is buying an immediate annuity; however the immediate annuity
market has long been experiencing low demand. Another solution is following a safe
drawdown rate during retirement; however this exposes retirees to the risk of outliv-
ing their pension savings. In recent years, behavioral factors have been successful in
explaining individuals’ decision-making process, this thesis is therefore devoted to the
investigation of the low demand of immediate annuities by considering behavioral mod-
els; and the use of annuity products in optimal decumulation strategy designs. This
thesis has two major contributions. First, both Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT)
and Hyperbolic discount model can explain the low demand of immediate annuities and
suggest that people would be willing to purchase deferred annuities. This has laid a re-
search foundation for introducing and promoting the deferred annuity product. Second,
we provide an optimal partial annuitisation strategy involving deferred annuities in a
utility maximisation decumulation plan. In the proposed strategy the retirement period
is divided into two stages: a stage where pensioners use their savings to cover their
living expenses and a second stage where a payment stream from deferred annuities is
available. This strategy effectively helps retirees manage the longevity risk at advanced
ages and turns the drawdown plan from accumulated savings into an easier decision than
before – because of a fixed rather than unknown drawdown period.
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1
Introduction
There are two main types of pension schemes in operation across the world: Defined
Benefit (DB) pension plans and Defined Contribution (DC) pension plans. A DB pension
scheme is a scheme where the benefits provided on retirement are defined by a specific
formula and are not directly related to the contributions payable and the investment
performance of the scheme. A DC pension scheme is a scheme where pensioners have
their personal pension accounts; the benefits provided to an individual member depend
on the contributions paid into the account and on the investment return earned on
the accumulated fund. The two pension schemes mainly differ on who bears the risks
involved in saving for retirement and who needs to make up for any pension benefit
shortfall. In the DB system, the employers, pension providers, are exposed to many
types of risk that can lead to a lower asset value and a higher liability value. These
risks include longevity risk and investment risk (especially interest rate risk). However,
in the DC system, risks are transferred to individual pension scheme members.
During the past few decades, there has been a steady shift from traditional DB pension
plans towards DC pension plans in many countries. Between 1980 and 2013, the number
of participants in US private sector DC plans increased more than fourfold from 20
million to 92.5 million; while participants in US private sector DB plans only increased
from 38 million to 39 million ( US Department of Labor, 2013). Similarly in the United
Kingdom (UK), active membership of DC pension schemes increased from 0.9 million in
2007 to 3.2 million in 2014; while that of DB pension schemes decreased from 2.7 million
to 1.6 million during the same period (ONS, 2014). Moreover, based on data collected
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in DB and DC plans from 2000 to 2015 in OECD countries, the amount of assets in DB
pension plans either experienced a decline (Israel), stayed constant while assets in DC
plan increased (Australia, Iceland, Mexico and Sweden); or increased but at a slower
pace than assets in DC plans (e.g. Netherlands, New Zealand and the United States)
(OECD, 2016).
There are a number of reasons that lead to the growing importance of DC pension
arrangements and the decline in DB pension plans. First, a general trend of increased
life expectancy around the world contributes to an increased longevity risk and hence
increasing the cost of providing DB plans. Data from the Human Mortality Database
(2016) shows that male life expectancy at birth in England and Wales increased from
70.74 years in 1980 to 79.23 years in 2013, which indicates that DB providers need to set
a much larger asset base to support the same level of benefits over a longer retirement
period compared with decades ago. Using actuarial and financial information provided
by the U.S. Department of Labor, Kisser et al. (2012) predicts that for every year of
increased life expectancy, pension liability will rise by approximately 3% - 4%. Second,
we have been in a low interest rate environment in recent years, for example, the Bank
of England started Quantitative Easing (QE) in 2009 by lowering long term rates after
forcing short term rates down to almost zero, and this creates a large actuarial deficit.
Research from the Pension Protection Fund and other academic studies shows that for
every percentage point fall in long-term bond yields, a typical DB pension fund will have
a 18% - 20% rise in liabilities while its assets will only increase by 4% - 10% (Altman,
2013). A poor investment performance also leads to a decrease in the overall amount
of assets in DB pension plans; for example, the 2008 financial crisis led to a decrease
in the total amount of pension fund assets and the funding level of DB pension plans
deteriorated (OECD, 2015). Third, the regulatory changes (in the UK) have increased
the cost of guarantees in DB schemes. The UK Accounting Standards Board (2000)
issued an accounting standard, FRS17, requiring that companies should value their
pension assets and liabilities on a mark-to-market basis. This new fair value accounting
approach moves away from smoothing techniques and leads to a more volatile valuation
of pension liabilities and hence more volatile incomes for sponsoring firms.
From an individual’s perspective, unlike DB pension members, DC scheme members
have their own personal pension accounts and they can make decisions on how to man-
age the account. Prior to their retirement, DC members need to decide how much to
2
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contribute to the pension account and make investment decisions according to their own
risk appetite. At the time of retirement, they have access to the accumulated DC pen-
sion account balances and need to make decisions on how to spend the wealth to support
the entire retirement period. Therefore, the switch from DB to DC pension plans shifts
both the investment risk and longevity risk from the pension fund to individuals, posing
a big challenge to them. Advice from professionals and advisors on investment strategies
and consumption plans is therefore in great demand.
In the UK, the situation has become even more challenging for DC members after the
government announced a set of pension reforms to allow for greater flexibility in pension
provision. For instance, in 2011, the requirement of forced annuitisation by age 75
was removed; in March 2014, the policy of capped drawdown, which allows pensioners
to withdraw as much as 120% of an equivalent annuity each year in retirement, was
replaced by full discretionary access to pension savings (HM Treasury, 2014).
In this PhD thesis, we focus on the longevity risk in the decumulation stage and aim at
finding out the optimal annuitisation and decumulation solutions for the post-retirement
period.
An immediate annuity is is commonly used to hedge increased risks bone by individuals
in the retirement period. It converts a lump sum savings pot into a steady stream of
income in retirement for as long as the annuitant is alive, hence effectively protecting
retirees against the longevity risk of outliving their assets and the investment risk from
market downturns. Yaari (1965) initially demonstrates in a life-cycle model that a risk
averse individual without a bequest motive should convert all their available assets to an
immediate annuity. The main reason is that those who die earlier subsidise those who
live a long time. However, the empirical data from international annuity markets with
flexible pension policies has long reflected the fact that retirees are reluctant to convert
voluntarily any retirement savings into annuities. The disparity between the theoretical
recommendations and consumers’ real preferences leads to the so called “annuity puz-
zle” and there is a substantial literature that attempts to explain this puzzle. From a
rational perspective, reasons for the low demand of annuities include fees and expenses
associated with the annuity price (Brown and Warshawsky, 2001), the bequest motive
(Friedman and Warshawsky, 1990), the existence of social security and pre-annuitised
wealth (Dushi and Webb, 2004) and the worry about health care expenditure shocks
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(Sinclair and Smetters, 2004). From an irrational behavioural perspective, possible ex-
planations include people are loss averse rather than risk averse (Hu and Scott, 2007),
individuals’ behaviour depends heavily on the way in which available choices are pre-
sented (Brown et al., 2008) and regret aversion (Cannon and Tonks, 2008). To appeal
to the demand of consumers for increased flexibility, better value or better liquidity,
more complex features of annuity product design are proposed and the menu of annuity
products available is growing. It is recommended by OECD (2016) that individuals use
part of their assets accumulated for retirement to purchase a life annuity to protect
themselves from longevity risk.
Another stream of literature on post-retirement strategies aims at determining safe draw-
down rates so that pension savings can last for a certain number of years. The best known
one is the 4% rule from Bengen (1994). This rule suggests an initial withdrawal rate of
4% from the portfolio, with the subsequent withdrawal amounts being increased annu-
ally with inflation. According to Bengen (1994), 4% is the highest spending rate that
allows the portfolio to last for at least 30 years before being exhausted by withdrawals.
Based on this idea, Cooley et al. (1998) conduct a “Trinity Study”, where they use sim-
ulations to determine, for each spending rate, the success probability that a portfolio
will last for a certain number of years. A similar approach is adopted in current practice
to determine the appropriate spending rate that allows for some probability of running
out of money. The 4% rule has achieved wide acceptance among retirement planners
and financial advisers due to its simplicity. Nonetheless, it has been sharply criticised
by some scholars. For example, Scott et al. (2009) conclude that the strategy is subop-
timal since it suggests a constant spending plan while using a risky, volatile investment
strategy; the retirees therefore have unspent surpluses when markets outperform and
face shortfalls when markets underperform. Blanchett et al. (2016) argue that most
literature is based only on historical asset returns in the United States. Based on lower
expected returns in the UK, especially in the near term, Blanchett et al. (2016) suggest
that the safe initial withdrawal rate should be approximately 2.5% in the UK.
In approaching the research questions of post-retirement annuitisation decisions and
decumulation strategies, the expected utility maximisation approach, which takes into
account an annuitant’s attitude towards risk and the value to the annuitant of income
payments at different points in time, has been mostly used. Consider a decision making
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individual who will live for an uncertain number of years, the optimal strategy is deter-
mined by maximising the sum of discounted utility from a stream of future consumption.
The literature on this subject mainly consists of rational studies, and a standard as-
sumption is that individuals are rational utility maximisation agents with risk-averse
preferences. To be more specific, a rational framework needs to cover the following
assumptions involved with the discount function and utility function. The discount
function, which represents the degree of impatience to receive future utility felt by the
individual, needs to capture the rational inter-temporal consistency in decision making.
This is realised through geometric discount function, which assumes that the amount
of discounting per period is the same regardless of the starting point. For the utility
function, which converts the money amount to perceived value or level of satisfaction,
three assumptions need to be satisfied. First, the individual will always prefer to have
more consumption to less. Second, the individual is risk averse, which means that given
a choice of a certain amount of consumption or an actuarially fair gamble, then the indi-
vidual would always choose certainty. For example, a risk averse individual would prefer
receiving £100 than having equal chance of receiving either nothing or £200. Third, the
individual is ‘prudent’, which refers to how an individual respond to increases in risk.
In our context, prudent individuals would optimally increase their savings in the face
of future uncertainty. Economists commonly use the Constant Relative Risk Aversion
(CRRA) and Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) for the choice of the utility
function (Cannon and Tonks, 2008).
More recently researchers have become aware that these assumptions may not be ade-
quate in describing actual behaviour and so current research is more devoted to consider
what can be learnt form economic psychology. Ample evidence has been found showing
that actual behaviour is often irrational and departs from what we assume. Therefore,
this thesis look at the questions of annuitisation decision and decumulation strategy
in a behavioural way. Three behavioural factors are chosen in our study: Cumula-
tive Prospect Theory (CPT), the hyperbolic discount model and subjective mortality
rates. CPT introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) suggests that individuals’
behaviour is modelled better by loss aversion rather than risk aversion, and individuals
falsely perceive probabilities by overestimating the probability of low-probability events
and underestimating the probability of high-probability events. the hyperbolic discount
5
Chapter 1. Introduction
model captures the fact that people tend to act impulsively in the short term but be-
come more patient in the long term; hence the implicit discount rate varies inversely
with the length of the waiting time. Subjective mortality rate model introduces an indi-
vidual optimism index, reflecting that people’s perception of their own life expectancies
can be different from life expectancies of the average number of the general public. We
choose the three behavioral models for two main reasons. First, these models have been
widely discussed in literature and have been used to explain a wide range of behavioral
anomalies. For example, CPT is used to explain that people purchase unfair gambles
and simultaneously purchase insurance products. The hyperbolic discount model can
explain the puzzle of simultaneously having large credit card debts and pre-retirement
savings. Second, these three models have well deigned mathematical models to reflect
their properties, which gives us the chance to build a mathematical modeling framework
to approach the research questions in an analytical and quantitative way.
In the literature, the survey is also a popular methodology used to capture individuals’
decisions in a very straightforward way and it is often used to study factors that cannot
be easily quantified (see Brown et al. (2008) and Duxbury et al. (2013) for example).
However, in this thesis we do not conduct surveys to approach the research questions,
because we believe that, with a survey, it is hard to capture the impact of a single factor.
For example, when we aim to understand the impact of time-inconsistent preferences
on the annuitisation decision, it is hard to control for the fact that subjects may have
different levels of financial education and have different levels of risk aversion. Although
mathematical models experience some other problems such as using a representative
agent in calibrating the model, we have minimised the impact by conducting sensitivity
analyses to ensure the stability of our results.
Apart from the factors that we cover in this thesis, there are some other behavioural
factors that might influence retirement decisions. Brown et al. (2008) show that a
significant greater percentage of subjects prefer an annuity rather than a savings account
when the choice is framed in terms of consumption rather than investment. Warner and
Pleeter (2001) analyse data from the US military drawdown program of the early 1990s,
when most people selected a lump sum payment rather than an annuity, and conclude
that people adopt excessive discount rates when evaluating future payments. A collection
of the impacts of different behavioural factors on different stages of retirement decision
making is offered in Mitchell and Utkus (2004).
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In behavioural economics, behavioural biases can be categorised into two types: cogni-
tive errors and emotional biases. Cognitive errors refer to basic statistical, information-
processing, or memory errors that cause the decision to deviate from the rational deci-
sions of traditional finance; while emotional biases are a result of attitudes and feelings
that can cause decisions to deviate from rational decisions (Pompian, 2011). For exam-
ple, in our context, the framing effect belongs to cognitive error since it is the error in
information processing; on the other hand, loss aversion belongs to the emotional bias
because dislike of loss is embedded in one’s personality and it varies from person to per-
son. In order to bridge the gap between actual decisions and optimal rational decisions,
financial eduction is commonly suggested to fix the cognitive errors. In the context of
annuitisation decisions, financial education has two meaningful impacts. First, evidence
shows that there is a lack of understanding of the annuity product among the public, due
to the product’s complexity (Cannon and Tonks, 2008). Financial education would help
people better understand the structure of the product, hence improving the likelihood
of making a purchase. Second, financial education would teach people to process infor-
mation and assess probabilities in a better way, so that the cognitive errors in making
an annuity purchase decision can be minimised.
This PhD thesis considers both rational framework and behavioural framework and
contributes to the understanding of the annuity puzzle and the use of annuities in the
retirement strategy design. More specifically, the contribution of this PhD thesis is
twofold. First, in the course of analysing the annuity puzzle using behavioural models,
the thesis presents evidence for a high perceived value for deferred annuities. It has
laid a research foundation for introducing and promoting the deferred annuity product
in the UK market. The behavioural model and techniques that are implemented in
this thesis could also be adopted in the process of the annuity product design in order
to test for the desirability of some additional features in annuity products. Second, it
incorporates deferred annuities in the design of utility maximisation retirement strategy.
The proposed strategy effectively helps retirees manage the longevity risk at advanced
ages and turns the drawdown plan into an easier decision than before (because of a fixed
rather than unknown drawdown period). The proposed strategy may have an implication
on government policy as well (which we will elaborate in detail in the following chapters).
This thesis comprises four key parts. The first part uses Cumulative Prospect Theory
(CPT) to work out the subjective values of an annuity and so it can tell whether an
7
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annuity available in the market is desirable to purchase. The second part considers
the hyperbolic discount model in the valuation of an annuity. Both behavioural models
justify the low attractiveness of immediate annuities and suggest the high attractiveness
for deferred annuities. Therefore in the third part, we incorporate the deferred annuities
into a post-retirement decumulation plan. The proposed strategy suggests the optimal
allocation in deferred annuities and optimal drawdown rates to be followed. In the final
part, we test the impact of two behavioural factors, time-inconsistent preferences (as
represented by the hyperbolic discount model) and having subjective opinions on their
future mortality rates, on the strategy proposed in the third part.
This thesis is composed of four self-contained chapters stemming from four research pa-
pers. Being self-contained, each chapter has its own introduction, notation, conclusions
and references. In the end, the last chapter presents our overall conclusions and future
research perspectives.
A brief description of the contributions of each of the four key chapters follows.
Chapter 2: Cumulative prospect theory, deferred annuities and the
annuity puzzle
In this chapter, we analyse the “annuity puzzle” using an economic behavioural model,
Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT). According to CPT, individuals are loss averse
rather than risk averse; they also tend to overweight low-probability events and under-
weight high-probability events. We show that the two behavioural biases together can
explain the low demand for immediate annuities at retirement age and suggest the high
desirability of long-term deferred annuities purchased at retirement. By decomposing
the two behavioural factors in the CPT model, we further identify that the loss aver-
sion is the major reason that stops people from buying an annuity, while the survival
rate distortion is an important factor affecting the decision of when to receive annuity
incomes.
8
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Chapter 3: Why the deferred annuity makes sense
In this chapter, we use another behavioural model, the hyperbolic discount model, to
analyse annuitisation decisions. In the process of making an intertemporal choice, in-
dividuals may show time-inconsistency; for instance, the discount rate used to evaluate
intertemporal benefits varies with the length of the delay period, size and signs of the
benefits. This is captured in the hyperbolic discount model. We show that a typical
hyperbolic discount model can explain the reason why an immediate annuity is not at-
tractive and we find that both retirees and people at working age would be willing to
pay a higher-than-market price for long-term deferred annuities. Moreover, we argue
that the annuity take up rate would be higher if governments were to introduce a pre-
commitment device that requires individuals to make annuitisation decisions at working
age before retirement.
Chapter 4: Optimal decumulation strategy during retirement with de-
ferred annuities
After identifying the desirability of long-term deferred annuity in the previous two chap-
ters, in this chapter we turn our attention to a partial annuitisation retirement decision
based on deferred annuities. Following the standard literature (i.e. Yaari (1965)), we
aim at an optimal decumulation strategy in terms of utility maximisation. However, our
model is composed of a deferred annuity rather than an immediate annuity that has been
discussed in literature. Our strategy would suggest an optimal percentage of wealth to
be allocated to a deferred annuity and optimal drawdown rates to be followed before the
commencement of the annuity. Therefore, the investment decision during the retirement
stage is simplified from an uncertain period (the remaining lifetime after retirement) to
a fixed period (the deferred period of the chosen annuity product); and the majority
of longevity risk is hedged because of the lifelong guaranteed annuity payments being
delivered from a pre-specified age by the deferred annuity. With a set of benchmark
assumptions, we have two main suggestions: (i), a retiree who would like to retain a
certain level of liquidity should spend 21.6% in a 15-year deferred annuity or 9.13% in
a 20-year deferred annuity; (ii), a retiree who simply wants to maximise overall utility
from retirement consumption should spend 61.83% in a 6-year deferred annuity. These
suggested allocations are stable relative to pricing factors.
9
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Chapter 5: The impact of behavioural factors on retirement decumula-
tion strategies
In order to know whether people who are exposed to behavioural biases would like to
follow the same decumulation strategies as rational retirees, we extend the study in
Chapter 4 by considering two behavioural factors: hyperbolic discount models and sub-
jective mortality rates. Our modelling results suggest that hyperbolic discounters would
invest a similar proportion of pension savings in deferred annuity products, however
they would prefer inflation-linked payments rather than level payments. Moreover, by
adding a subjective factor to mortality rates, we identify that retirees who are optimistic
(pessimistic) about their life expectancies would find annuities attractive (not attrac-
tive) in general and they tend to allocate more (less) of their pension savings to annuity
products.
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Cumulative prospect theory, deferred annuities and the annuity
puzzle
Abstract
Although it has been proved theoretically that annuities can provide optimal consump-
tion during one’s retirement period, retirees’ reluctance to purchase annuities is a long-
standing puzzle. Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), which considers both loss aversion
and probability transformations, can explain the low demand for immediate annuities.
It also shows that retirees would be willing to buy a long-term deferred annuity at retire-
ment. By considering each component in CPT, we find that loss aversion is the major
reason that stops people from buying an annuity, while the survival rate transformation
is an important factor affecting the decision of when to receive annuity incomes.
Keywords: CPT, Deferred annuities, Annuity puzzle, Reservation price.
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2.1 Introduction
During the past few decades, traditional defined benefit (DB) pension plans have been
losing their dominance in private sector pension systems in many countries; there has
been a steady shift from DB pension plans towards defined contribution (DC) pension
plans. Between 1980 and 2013, the number of participants in US private sector DC plans
had increased more than fourfold from 20 million to 92.5 million; while participants in
US private sector DB plans only increased from 38 million to 39 million ( US Department
of Labor, 2013). A more extreme shift can be observed in the United Kingdom (UK)
where active membership of DC pension scheme increased from 0.9 million in 2007 to
3.2 million in 2014; while that of DB pension scheme decreased from 2.7 million to 1.6
million during the same period (ONS, 2014). It is widely anticipated that pensioners
will rely heavily on DC pension plans in the future.
Under DC pension plans, members have access to their accumulated individual pension
account balances rather than receiving a series of regular cheques for life at retirement.
In such a case, the longevity risk, the risk of outliving one’s assets, is transferred from
the corporate sector to DC members. Many scholars support using immediate annuities
as a solution for longevity protection. An immediate annuity pays out a periodic income
for as long as the annuitant is alive, in exchange for an initial premium charge. However,
a low volume of premiums of voluntary annuities has been found in many international
markets. Before a significant pension reform in 2011, in the UK, there used to be two
markets: a compulsory one and a voluntary one. According to the sales figure reported
in Cannon and Tonks (2011), the total compulsory annuity premium income grew to
around £11.5 billion in 2010, while the voluntary annuity premium only amounted to
£72 million.
The disparity between the theoretical optimal choice and the consumers’ real preferences
leads to the “annuity puzzle”. Since Yaari (1965) first demonstrated the benefit of
annuitisation in a life cycle model with uncertain lifetimes, the subsequent literature
on annuities has provided various reasons to explain the low demand for annuities.
Major reasons include the mortality risk-sharing among family members (Brown and
Poterba, 2000), the existence of provision through social security and DB pension scheme
membership (Dushi and Webb, 2004) and the possibility of health care expenditure
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shocks at an old age (Davidoff, 2009). We provide a detailed explanation of possible
reasons in next chapter.
While most conclusions are based on the assumptions that retirees are rational utility
maximisers with risk-averse preferences, some recent studies have moved beyond the
fully rational paradigm and proposed many behavioural factors that could play impor-
tant roles in determining how retirees spend their retirement savings. For example, the
decision to annuitise depends on the way in which the available choices are presented
(Framing Effect). It also depends on the level of financial education or the level of un-
derstanding about annuities. In this chapter, we seek to explain the unattractiveness of
annuities in the light of behavioural finance and we focus on the impact of Cumulative
Prospect Theory (CPT) which addresses flaws in the expected utility hypothesis and
risk aversion. This theory was initially proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) to
describe how individuals make choices involving risky outcomes. It states that investors
are loss averse rather than risk averse and a certain transformation is performed in eval-
uating probabilities. Using descriptive models for CPT, many authors have explained
economic anomalies that cannot be explained by rational models. For example, Benartzi
and Thaler (1995) and Barberis et al. (2001) apply CPT in the explanation of the eq-
uity premium puzzle. Kaluszkaa and Krzeszowiec (2012) use CPT as a method to price
insurance contracts.
Hu and Scott (2007) first adopt CPT in the analysis of annuities. They show that CPT
can explain the low demand for immediate annuities purchased at retirement; and the
probability transformation introduced in CPT makes people prefer deferred annuities
with the first payment delaying for a few years. We build on the work by Hu and Scott
(2007), extend their analysis and make the following contributions: (i) by conducting the
analysis on successive age points in retirement, we conclude that immediate annuities
are not attractive to purchase for retirees at all ages; however, preferences for deferred
annuities increase with the deferred period. (ii) the sensitivity analysis suggests that the
major reason for the unattractiveness of annuities is loss aversion. The overweighting of
low probability events would shift retirees’ preferences towards receiving annuity incomes
at a later stage. (iii) By conducting an elasticity analysis we conclude that loss aversion
is the most influential factor on the decision to purchase immediate annuities while the
probability transformation determines the decision to purchase deferred annuities.
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This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a detailed intro-
duction of CPT: the value function and the probability transformation model. Then
in Section 3, we measure the perceived value of an annuity using the CPT framework.
In Section 4, we present the results of relative price difference of annuities. Section 5
presents an extensive sensitivity analysis. Finally, Section 6 concludes the results and
comments on the limitations of the analysis.
2.2 Introduction to Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT)
CPT is a behavioural model that aims to capture decision making under risk and un-
certainty. It states that the overall value of a risky investment is determined by three
components: a reference point, a value function and a set of decision weights.
Being different from the utility function in expected utility theory, the value function
(v(·)) in CPT has three new properties. Firstly, the value function is based on the
distance (y) between the investment outcome and a reference point, rather than the ter-
minal investment outcome in the utility function. In a risky investment, the initial outlay
to enter the investment is often regarded as the reference point. Investors would not
simply consider the investment outcome as the gain; instead, they will deduct the initial
outlay from the investment outcome and their satisfaction gained from the investment
is based on this. Secondly, while the utility function describes simply a concave picture,
the value function is concave above the reference point (v′′(y) < 0, y > 0) and convex
below the reference point (v′′(y) > 0, y < 0). This can be illustrated by an example: the
satisfaction increase between a win of £100 and a win of £200 appears to be greater
than the satisfaction increase between a win of £1100 and a win of £1200. Similarly,
the increment in sadness that people feel between a loss of £100 and a loss of £200
tends to be greater than the increment in sadness between a loss of £1100 and a loss of
£1200, unless the large loss would compel people to lower current living standard such
as moving to a less desirable neighborhood. In other words, the value function yields the
property of diminishing sensitivity: the marginal value of both gains and losses generally
diminish with the distance from the reference point. Furthermore, the value function
captures an important characteristic of attitudes to changes in wealth: loss looms larger
than gains. Thus, most people are loss averse and the satisfaction gained from a £100
win cannot erase the sadness brought by a £100 loss. From an experiment conducted
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by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), people feel it unattractive to enter the symmetric
bet of winning y or losing y with equal probability, which justifies the assumption that
the value function for losses is steeper than that for gains (v′(y) < v′(−y) for y ≥ 0).
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) offer an explicit form for the value function as
v(y) =
 y
α if y ≥ 0
−λ(−y)β if y < 0
(2.1)
Here, λ reflects the level of loss aversion and α and β reflect diminishing sensitivity.
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimate that λ = 2.25 and α = β = 0.88.
Whereas expected utility theory weights the utility at different states with the objec-
tive true probability of each state, experiments conducted by Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) show that for both positive and negative prospects, decision makers always over-
weight low probability events and underweight high probability events. Therefore CPT
introduces a method to transform true probabilities to decision weights which reflect
perceived possibilities.
CPT introduces a capacity function w to express decision makers’ opinions of the per-
ceived likelihood of uncertain events. The capacity function w is a non-linear transfor-
mation of the real probabilities p. Two natural boundaries are certainty (w(1) = 1) and
impossibility (w(0) = 0). The principle of diminishing sensitivity applies to the capacity
function as well; it means that the influence of a given change in probability diminishes
with its deviation from the boundary. For instance, the change in probability of winning
a prize from 0.9 to 1 has more impact than the change in probability of winning a prize
from 0.6 to 0.7. Similarly, an increase of 0.1 in probability of winning a prize has more
impact when the probability changes from 0 to 0.1 than when the probability changes
from 0.3 to 0.4. Therefore, the capacity function w is concave near 0 and convex near 1.
In addition, the capacity function for positive and negative investment outcomes should
be different because risk-seeking for a small probability of gains is more pronounced
than being risk-averse for a small probability of losses. The capacity function is thus
assumed to have the following form:
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Figure 2.1: CPT capacity function w(p)
w+(p) = p
γ
[pγ + (1− p)γ ] 1γ
;
w−(p) = p
δ
[pδ + (1− p)δ] 1δ
.
(2.2)
Based on experimental results in Tversky and Kahneman (1992), γ is estimated to be 0.61
and δ to be 0.69. Figure 2.1 exhibits the shape of the capacity function. The inverted S-
shaped capacity function shows that people tend to overweight the probability of events
that are less likely to happen and underweight the probability of events that are highly
likely to happen. Furthermore, we can see that the weighting function for gains and losses
are quite close, although the former is slightly more curved than the latter. It reflects
the point that risk aversion for gains is more pronounced for risk seeking for losses, for
moderate and high probability events. Additionally, decision makers’ perceptions about
probabilities coincide with the true probabilities around 0.35.
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Let us define pt as the probability of having an outcome yt. We introduce the following
quantities:
pi−1 = w−(p1),
pi−t = w−(p1 + . . .+ pt)− w−(p1 + . . .+ pt−1), 2 ≤ t ≤ k,
pi+t = w+(pt + . . .+ pT )− w+(pt+1 + . . .+ pT ), k + 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1,
pi+T = w
+(pT ).
(2.3)
where the risky outcomes have been ranked as:
y1 < y2 < . . . < yk < 0 ≤ yk+1 < . . . < yT .
The ultimate decision weight associated with an outcome is defined as the marginal
value of the respective event. The decision weight pi+t , which corresponds to positive
investment outcomes, is the change in the value of w between two events: “the outcome
is at least as good as yt” and “the outcome is strictly better than yt”. The decision
weight pi−t , which corresponds to negative investment outcomes, is the change in the
value of w between the events: “the outcome is at least as bad as yt” and “the outcome
is strictly worse than yt”.
The value functions and the cumulative decision weights are combined to arrive at the
overall value of a risky investment under CPT:
V (f−) =
k∑
t=1
pi−t v(yt),
V (f+) =
T∑
t=k+1
pi+t v(yt),
V (f) = V (f−) + V (f+).
(2.4)
Letting pit = pi+t if t ≥ k + 1 and pit = pi−t if t ≤ k, Equation (2.4) can be reduced to:
V (f) =
T∑
t=1
pitv(yt). (2.5)
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2.3 Annuity Valuations under CPT
The annuity is initially designed as an insurance product that helps reduce longevity
risk. However, people tend to view it as a risky investment product. One reason might
be the lack of understanding of the operational details of annuity products. In a sur-
vey conducted by an American Council of Life Insurance task force, the findings of
consumers’ attitudes towards annuities showed that virtually no consumer fully under-
stands how an annuity product works; the least understood aspect of annuities is how
risk sharing is performed so that insurers can offer a lifelong guaranteed income (Brown
and Warshawsky, 2001). Because of this, consumers are more likely to focus on the risk
of dying early, while overlooking the possibility that they may live well beyond their
life expectancies and receive more than they have paid. They may also believe that
the odds in the gamble tend to favor insurance companies. In another similar survey,
the Society of Actuaries (2004) found that 49% of workers and 44% of retirees consid-
ered protecting against loss of value from a pension or annuity investment should they
die earlier than expected as very important. Therefore, within this mental accounting
framework, retirees tend to equate the lifetime annuity purchase with entering a gamble
on their lives. CPT can be applied here to determine the overall value of annuities.
Viewing an annuity investment as a gamble, investors gain if total discounted annuity
income exceeds the annuity price; whereas investors lose if total discounted annuity
income is below the annuity price. In other words, an annuitant gains if he outlives the
life expectancy assumed in annuity pricing and loses if he dies before he collects as much
income as he paid out. We assume that a retiree aged 65 purchases an immediate annuity
at an actuarially fair price A, then the annuity investment outcome if the annuitant dies
after t years (at age 65 + t) should be:
yt = −A+
t∑
i=1
Ψ 1(1 + r)i−1 (2.6)
where Ψ represents the annual annuity income that is paid in advance and is assumed
to be 1 unit in our study; r represents the assumed constant interest rate; A is the actu-
arially fair price of an annuity that pays 1 unit per year in advance until the annuitant
dies. No administrative fees or profit loadings are considered here.
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Figure 2.2: Probability of dying at different ages
The probability, pt, that corresponds to each annuity outcome yt, is the probability
that the 65-year-old retiree dies in exactly t years, at age 65 + t. With the input yt,
we can get the perceived value of the annuity investment according to Equation (2.1).
Furthermore, we can transform probabilities p to decision weights pi based on Equations
(2.2) and (2.3). The overall value of the annuity can be calculated according to Equation
(2.5).
To reveal the impact of CPT probability transformations on mortality rates, Figure 2.2
shows the distorted probability pi versus the original probability p when retirees are at
age 65, 75, 85 and 95. The results displayed are based on assumptions of an annual
annuity payment of 1, an interest rate of 3 percent and an actuarially fair annuity
price. It reflects that the ultimate decision weights will enhance the low probability of
dying shortly after annuity purchase and the low probability of surviving a very long
period after the annuity purchase. At the same time, it will decrease the probability
corresponding to intermediate outcomes.
The transformation of the real probabilities will change people’s perceptions of their
life expectancies. Figure 2.3 describes the differences between subjective complete life
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Figure 2.3: Complete life expectancies under the impact of CPT probability trans-
formations
expectancies and real complete life expectancies for male individuals aged between 65
and 95. According to the figure, the distorted probability of dying at each age leads to
the underestimation of life expectancies for young retirees and the overestimation of life
expectancies for old retirees.
Following Hu and Scott (2007), we use the maximum acceptable price as a benchmark
measure to determine if an actuarially fairly priced annuity is attractive. The maximum
acceptable price, also called the “reservation price”, is the highest price that a buyer
is willing to pay for goods or a service. In the context of an annuity purchase, it is
the price that would make an individual indifferent between purchasing an annuity and
keeping the money in hand. According to Equations (2.1) to (2.6), the overall value of
an annuity can be regarded as a function of annuity price. The maximum acceptable
annuity price is therefore the price that makes CPT value of an annuity equal to zero.
To facilitate our analysis, we calculate the ratio R, which is the relative difference be-
tween reservation price and fair price.
R = Reservation Price−Actuarially fair price
Actuarially fair price
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A positive R means people would like to pay a higher-than-market price for an annuity
and thus the annuity is attractive. On the other hand, a negative R indicates unattrac-
tiveness. The modeling results in terms of R can also be interpreted as how much more
or less than market price one would be prepared to pay for an annuity.
2.4 Results
Due to the fact that no closed form solution for R exists, we solve it numerically. In
our analysis, we consider cumulative prospect theory with probability distortion (using
pi) and without probability distortion (using p). For each one, we consider the situation
with loss aversion (λ > 1) and without loss aversion (λ = 1). Thus we can find out how
CPT influences people’s annuitisation decisions. In the following basic results, we have
assumed that each parameter value in the CPT model is based on the values in Tversky
and Kahneman (1992). That means λ = 2.25 and α = β = 0.88 for the value function
and γ = 0.61 and δ = 0.69 for the probability distortion function. In terms of the annuity
types, we are interested in both the immediate annuities that are purchased from age 65
to age 95 and the deferred annuities with deferred period from one year to thirty years
(all purchased at age 65). We assume a constant interest rate of 3 percent. The mortality
rates are calculated from the recent standard mortality table “S2PML1”, which contains
the mortality experience of male pensioners of self-administered UK pension schemes for
the period 2004 to 2011.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 respectively show the trends in the R values for immediate and
deferred annuities under different versions of the CPT models. In the simplest model of
linear value function with no loss aversion and no probability transformation, R remains
0 for both types of annuity. It reflects the fact that a risk-neutral individual who adopts a
linear value function should be indifferent between purchasing an actuarially fairly priced
annuity and keeping the money at hand. With the full CPT framework (CPT including
probability distortion and with loss aversion), we identify that immediate annuities are
generally not attractive for retirees between age 65 and age 95. Hence, CPT can be used
as a behavioral explanation for people’s not buying immediate annuities. In addition,
for a 65-year-old retiree, his/her preference for a deferred annuity is always increasing
1Source: Continuous Mortality Investigation (2013)
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Figure 2.4: The Relative Price Difference (R) under CPT for immediate annuities
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Figure 2.5: The Relative Price Difference (R) under CPT for deferred annuities
with the deferred period. In the following, we will analyse each component in the CPT
framework.
Comparing the values of R for CPT models with loss aversion to those without loss
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aversion, we notice that in both the immediate annuity case of Figure 2.4 and the de-
ferred annuity case of Figure 2.5, R shifts downwards significantly once the loss aversion
factor is incorporated. This shifts the results in terms of the relative price difference
from positive to negative for both immediate annuities and deferred annuities. There-
fore, immediate annuities are not attractive for loss-averse individuals who are afraid of
dying before reaching average life expectancies and deferred annuities are not attractive
for loss-averse individuals who worry about dying within the deferred period. Hence,
loss aversion is able to explain the low attractiveness of annuity products. Additionally,
comparing the results for the CPT value function with loss aversion in Figure 2.4 with
those in Figure 2.5, the magnitude of the change in R is much smaller for immediate an-
nuities than for deferred annuities. It indicates the behavioural obstacle of loss aversion
has greater impact on the choice of deferred annuities than immediate annuities. One
may notice that the conclusion relies heavily on the assumed value for the loss aversion
factor (which is 2.25); in the next section, we will discuss the stability of the results
under a range of values of loss aversion.
In Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5, we see the impact of probability distortion red(on immedi-
ate annuities and deferred annuities respectively) by comparing the values of R for the
“CPT value function (no loss aversion)” with those for the “CPT including probability
distortion (no loss aversion)”. The probability distortion does not lead to the vertical
shift of the Relative Price Difference (R); instead it creates a twist in the shape of R in
relation to the age of purchasing (x) or the deferred period (d). The probability distor-
tion makes immediate annuities become more preferable for older retirees than younger
retirees as R is increasing smoothly with the age of purchase. Given the fact that more
elderly retirees have a smaller possibility of surviving, they overestimate the survival rate
to a greater degree and would be prepared to pay a higher price for immediate annuity
products. The same reasoning applies for deferred annuities. Retirees who follow CPT
overestimate the low probability event of surviving for a long period to a greater degree
and therefore a longer deferred period is much more preferred. Overall, overweighting
of low probability events suggests that people buy annuities that provide income at an
older age.
Among all types of annuities discussed, a 30-year deferred annuity is predicted to be
the most attractive. Since the chance of surviving from age 65 to age 95 is very low at
0.068 (based on S2PML), the 30-year deferred annuities may be perceived as a similar
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product to a lottery ticket. Cumulative Prospect Theory has been used to explain why
individuals love buying classical lottery tickets which have negative expected outcome
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
2.5 Sensitivity Analysis
In the above calculations, we have assumed that each parameter value is based on the
values in Tversky and Kahneman (1992). The loss aversion factor λ equals 2.25; α
and β in the value function equal 0.88; γ is estimated to be 0.61 and δ to be 0.69 in
the probability distortion function. Although the results may have biases because the
annuity investment decision typically involves a much larger amount of money than the
gambles used in Tversky and Kahneman’s psychological experiments, they still provide a
good qualitative explanation for the attractiveness of different types of annuities. In this
section, we conduct several sensitivity analyses to find out the relative attractiveness of
annuities with regard to each parameter. The parameters we examine are: loss aversion,
λ, interest rate, r, the curvature of the capacity function, δ and γ, and the probability
of dying at exact age, p (by changing mortality tables).
2.5.1 Loss aversion sensitivity
The purpose of this sensitivity test is to discover whether retirees with different levels of
loss aversion would like to annuitise their DC account balances. We increase the degree
of loss aversion gradually from λ = 1 (no loss aversion) to λ = 5. Figure 2.6 displays
the shape of R under the CPT framework with regard to different annuity types and
different levels of loss aversion.
In both panels of Figure 2.6, the attractiveness indicator, R, shifts downwards signif-
icantly when the level of loss aversion increases; this confirms that loss aversion is an
important driving factor that stops retirees from buying an annuity. As people become
more loss averse, the losses arise from an annuity investment in the first few years will be
perceived to be greater than the real values; then individuals would like to pay a lower
price to enter an annuity contract. Additionally, comparing the two panels shows that
immediate annuities are less attractive than deferred annuities. Immediate annuities can
be attractive only when investors are not loss averse; on the contrary, a 30-year deferred
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Figure 2.6: The sensitivity of the loss aversion factor on the Relative Price Difference
(R) of annuities
annuity remains attractive even when investors’ loss aversion level increases to 2.25. As
explained in Section 2.4, the popularity of the 30-year deferred annuities could be due
to the “lottery ticket effect”. Thirdly, the sensitivity of R to the loss aversion degree is
greater for deferred annuities than for immediate annuities. It is mainly because, for a
deferred annuity purchaser, the annuity investment does not deliver any income until
after the deferred period. When compared with investing in an immediate annuity, a
deferred annuity investor needs to wait longer for the overall investment outcome to
become positive.
Many empirical studies have confirmed the importance of loss aversion and estimated
the degree of loss aversion. According to Benartzi and Thaler (1995), when making a
material economic decision, such as investing, it is appropriate to assume a loss aversion
of 2. In the annuity decision analysis, we find that the 30-year deferred annuity is
attractive if retirees’ loss aversion level is around 2.
2.5.2 Interest rate sensitivity
The interest rate is one of the most important factors to determine the price of an
annuity and thus it may affect investment decisions. When the interest rate increases,
both the annuity fair price and reservation price move downwards; it is therefore difficult
to directly judge its influence on the overall attractiveness of annuities. In this section,
we conduct an interest rate sensitivity analysis in order to explore whether retirees would
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Figure 2.7: The sensitivity of the interest rate on the Relative Price Difference (R)
of annuities
be willing to convert their DC account balances into annuities when they are exposed
to a range of interest rates from as low as 0.5 percent to as high as 8 percent.
Figure 2.7 shows the trend of R for the CPT framework for immediate annuities and
deferred annuities; we have the following findings. Firstly, the low vertical spreads in
R results demonstrate that the influence of interest rates on annuity attractiveness is
small. We expect this result since our benchmark of attractiveness is determined by
relative price differences in reservation price and fair price. Secondly, with regard to
immediate annuities, individuals are more prepared to make a purchase at retirement
when the interest rate is very high, so that they can lock in the current high returns. As
the interest rate falls, the immediate annuities become more expensive and it is better
to delay the purchase. Similarly for deferred annuities, they are relatively cheap and
attractive when the interest rate is very high; as the interest rate falls, deferred annuities
with longer deferred periods become more preferable.
Regardless of how we change the interest rate, only the 30-year deferred annuity remains
attractive among all annuity types. A major reason, as we have explained, is that
deferred annuities with very long deferred periods are highly likely to be regarded as
lottery tickets by retirees and thus may be attractive. Given the current low interest
rate environment, immediate annuities are not an attractive purchase while the long
term deferred annuities are predicted to be attractive.
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Figure 2.8: CPT capacity function w(p) under different levels of probability distortion
2.5.3 Probability distortion sensitivity
In this section, we intend to discover the sensitivity of an annuity’s attractiveness to
different levels of probability distortion. Both parameters in the capacity function (see
Equation (2.2)), δ and γ, which describe decision makers’ opinions of perceived likelihood
of uncertain events, are increased in steps of 0.1 from 0.4 to 1. Figure 2.8 shows the
capacity function of the real probabilities and we can see that, when γ and δ are kept
low, there is a high degree of twist in the probability values and thus one would assign
higher weights to extreme outcomes and lower weights to intermediate outcomes. When
both γ and δ are 1, there is no probability distortion.
Figure 2.9 illustrates how the attractiveness of immediate annuities and deferred annu-
ities is affected by weaker or stronger probability distortions. It clearly confirms our
previous conclusion that a heavier distortion in probabilities would lead to choices of
annuities that start paying at an older age. For immediate annuitants, it means buy-
ing an annuity at an older age; for deferred annuitants, it means buying one with a
longer deferred period. On the other hand, if decision makers do not show any biases in
probability estimation, the best annuity solution is an immediate annuity at age 65.
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Figure 2.9: The sensitivity of the probability distortions on the Relative Price Dif-
ference (R) of annuities
Many studies have examined the probability transformation and provided evidence on
the level of distortion which we should apply to large gambles. In the experiments con-
ducted by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), they allowed subjects to enter gambles with
final payoffs as high as twice the median monthly family income and they estimated
the γ to be 0.61 and δ to be 0.69. Furthermore, Dodonova and Khoroshilov (2006) pro-
vide evidence showing that smaller gambles normally have weaker probability distortion.
Therefore, both sets of empirical evidence suggest a greater probability distortion when
we evaluate annuity decisions which involve large investments. When γ and δ are around
0.4, annuities that are deferred for more than 20 years are attractive for investors.
2.5.4 Mortality rates sensitivity
By changing the mortality assumptions, we can compare the attractiveness of annuities
among different groups of people. In this section, we consider six different mortality
groups2. Our baseline results are based on S2PML, the mortality experience of male
pensioners of UK self-administered pension schemes for the period 2004 to 2011. S2PFL
is the mortality experience of female pensioners for the same period. SPML03 captures
the male pensioners’ mortality experience for a different period of time: 2000-2006. Addi-
tionally, to discover whether one’s pension amount would affect the decision to annuitise,
the whole population dataset is divided into three subsets: S2PMA-L, S2PMA-M and
S2PMA-H. S2PMA investigates the male pensioners’ mortality experience during 2004
2The source for the mortality table SPML03 is the Continuous Mortality Investigation (2008); all
other mortality tables come from Continuous Mortality Investigation (2013)
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Figure 2.10: A comparison of Mortality rates
Notes: S2PML is the mortality experience of male pensioners of UK self-administered pension
schemes for the period 2004 to 2011. S2PFL is the mortality experience of female pensioners
for the period 2004 to 2011. SPML03 is the male pensioners’ mortality experience between
2000 and 2006. S2PMA-L, S2PMA-M and S2PMA-H represent male pensioners’ mortality
experience during 2004 and 2011 by considering the size of pension savings: Light (L), Medium
(M) and Heavy (H).
Source: The source for the mortality table SPML03 is the Continuous Mortality Investigation
(2008); all other mortality tables come from Continuous Mortality Investigation (2013).
and 2011 by considering the size of pension savings. “Light” in S2PMA-L means that the
pension size exceeds a specified amount and hence retirees in this group have relatively
light mortality rates; “Heavy” in S2PMA-H means the pension size is lower than a spec-
ified amount and retirees in this group have relatively high mortality rates; “Medium”
in S2PMA-M describes the mortality rate when the pension size is intermediate.
Figure 2.10 shows the differences in mortality rates qx3, the probability of death at age
x, among the six groups of people that make up the populations for these standard life
tables. The improvement in mortality rates over time can be identified since male pen-
sioners during an earlier period 2000-2006 have the highest mortality rates. In contrast,
pensioners with a high pension size and female pensioners, during the period 2004-2011,
have the lowest mortality rates among the six groups. As a result, pensioners in SPML03
3For clarity, we plot the logarithm of mortality rates.
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Figure 2.11: The sensitivity of the mortality rates on the Relative Price Difference
(R) of annuities
Notes: S2PML is the mortality experience of male pensioners of UK self-administered pension
schemes for the period 2004 to 2011. S2PFL is the mortality experience of female pensioners
for the period 2004 to 2011. SPML03 is the male pensioners’ mortality experience between
2000 and 2006. S2PMA-L, S2PMA-M and S2PMA-H represent male pensioners’ mortality
experience during 2004 and 2011 by considering the amount of pension: Light (L), Medium
(M) and Heavy (H).
Source: The source for the mortality table SPML03 is the Continuous Mortality Investigation
(2008); all other mortality tables come from Continuous Mortality Investigation (2013).
have the shortest remaining lifetime, while those in S2PFL and S2PMA-L are expected
to live longer than other pensioners of the same age.
Figure 2.11 demonstrates the shape of R under these different mortality assumptions.
In the figure for immediate annuities, the shape of R in relation to the age of purchase
shows that individuals with better health conditions prefer buying an immediate annuity
earlier in retirement while those with worse health conditions tend to delay the purchase.
This is reflected by comparing S2PFL vs. S2PML and S2PML vs. SPML03. Moreover,
comparing R values under S2PMA-L, S2PMA-M and S2PMA-H demonstrates that re-
tirees with high pension benefits are more likely to purchase immediate annuities early
in retirement.
In terms of the deferred annuity, all groups find the 30-year deferred annuity the most
attractive to buy among all of the deferred annuity products considered. Moreover, it
is worth noticing that the 30-year deferred annuity is more popular among pensioners
with higher mortality rates. This is because, for pensioners who have a lower possibility
of surviving to age 95, a greater level of probability distortion is involved in the mental
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accounting process and the 30-year deferred annuity becomes more valuable to them. As
a result, male pensioners during the period 2000-2006 would be the most interested in
long-term deferred annuities while female pensioners and high-income pensioners show
the least interest.
2.5.5 A comparison of parameter sensitivity
In order to measure the responsiveness of the Relative Price Difference to the change
in each parameter, we calculate the elasticity of the Relative Price Difference, ER. It
addresses the percentage change in the Relative Price Difference for a given percentage
change in the parameter value and the formula is as follows:
ER =
Percentage change in R
Percentage change in parameter value =
4R
Raverage
4parameter
parameteraverage
(2.7)
In Equation (2.7), 4R stands for the absolute change in R and 4parameter stands
for the absolute change in the considered parameter values. Raverage stands for the
absolute value of average of R under different parameter values and parameteraverage is
the absolute value of the average of chosen parameter values. As the average value is
used to calculate the percentage change, the elasticity of the Relative Price Difference
can be regarded as a point mid-way among all of the R results. After we calculate
ER for all ages of immediate annuity purchases and for all deferred periods of deferred
annuities, we average the results and obtain the elasticity of the Relative Price Difference
for immediate annuities and for deferred annuities respectively. The results are presented
in Table 2.1. Please note that we use life expectancy at the age of annuity purchase as
an index for each mortality table.
If ER is greater than 1, the Relative Price Difference changes proportionately more
than the parameter value changes. If ER is less than 1, the Relative Price Difference
changes proportionately less than the parameter value changes, implying a less sensitive
parameter. Based on the results in Table 2.1, the following conclusions can be drawn.
First, loss aversion is a very sensitive factor for both immediate and deferred annuities.
It confirms our finding in the previous sections that loss aversion could be the major
reason for the low valuation of annuity products. Second, an interesting finding is that
probability distortions, reflected in γ and σ, have a great impact on the attractiveness
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Table 2.1: Elasticity of the Relative Price Difference (ER)
Immediate annuities
Parameters λ r γ & δ e˚
ER 1.5434 0.0252 0.7158 0.2694
Deferred annuities
Parameters λ r γ & δ e˚
ER 5.3152 0.1784 7.0907 6.1250
Notes: λ measures the level of loss aversion, r represents the interest rate, δ and γ determines
the curvature of the capacity function, e˚ represents the life expectancy corresponding to each
mortality table.
of deferred annuities, but a small impact on that of immediate annuities. It indicates
that people who have different levels of mortality rates transformation would have sim-
ilar preferences for immediate annuities but distinct preferences for deferred annuities.
Similarly, the deferred annuity have greater sensitivity to mortality parameters than
immediate annuities, which is as we would expect. Finally, the elasticity of the Relative
Price Difference for deferred annuities is in general much higher than that for immediate
annuities, which justifies our previous conclusion that CPT has a greater impact on
deferred annuities than immediate annuities.
2.6 Conclusions
Classical expected utility maximization theory suggests that annuities provide optimal
consumption during a retiree’s retirement period, and hence it does not explain why the
majority of retirees do not voluntarily convert their DC pension account balances into
annuities. In this chapter, we move beyond the rational paradigm that is assumed by the
expected utility theory, in an attempt to discover if behavioral factors may be able to
explain the way that people spend their retirement funds. We have applied cumulative
prospect theory (CPT) to calculate the overall perceived value of annuities, from which
we obtain the maximum price that individuals would like to pay for an annuity. By
comparing this with the annuity price, we are able to conclude whether annuities in the
market are attractive. We have also conducted several sensitivity analyses to study the
relative attractiveness of annuities with regard to each parameter in the CPT model.
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Our work is an extension of the paper by Hu and Scott (2007), who show that CPT is one
of the behavioural factors that prevent people from buying an annuity. After confirming
their conclusions, we have the following additional findings under CPT assumptions.
First, immediate annuities are in general not attractive for retirees aged from 65 to 95;
deferred annuities with a longer deferred period are more preferable. Second, loss aver-
sion is the major reason for not purchasing annuities; and distortions in probability shift
preferences towards an annuity that starts paying at an older age. Third, loss aversion
is the most influential factor for the purchase decision of immediate annuities; and the
mortality rate transformation determines the decision to purchase deferred annuities.
Based on our findings, some recommendations can be drawn for life insurance companies
to improve the demand for annuities. One recommendation is the launch of long-term
deferred annuities, which seem to have many competitive advantages. Firstly, making an
early purchase decision would give a lower price. Taking a 30-year deferred annuity as an
example, the price is only 0.64% of a comparable immediate annuity purchased at age 65.
Secondly, with the lower price, it actually provides a similar level of longevity protection
as an immediate annuity since longevity risk is concentrated in the tail. Moreover,
CPT suggests individuals tend to overestimate the small probability of surviving for a
long period. The popularity of lottery tickets may indicate the possible popularity of
long-term deferred annuities. In recent years, deferred annuities have aroused intensive
discussion in the literature as a retirement solution (Milevsky, 2005; Scott et al., 2011).
Another recommendation is to introduce some additional product features in existing
products to attract loss averse customers. Our research indicates that, the major reason
for low demand is that individuals are afraid of making a loss from an annuity investment.
This could be improved by providing a guaranteed period of payments that does not
depend on the survival of annuitants. In terms of deferred annuities, this could be a
return of a certain percentage of premiums if annuitants die within a certain number
of years. Of course, these additional features would make annuities more expensive;
however, they also reduce the possible high losses and could make it more attractive for
loss averse customers.
While we predict customer behaviors and recommend the design of possibly more at-
tractive annuity products, our study has one limitation. The values of parameters in
36
Chapter 2. Cumulative prospect theory, deferred annuities and the annuity puzzle
the CPT model are based on the work in Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Their exper-
imental design involves gambles rather than annuity purchases. Therefore the results
presented here are not precise quantitative predictions, but can only provide qualitative
explanations of the relative attractiveness of various types of annuities.
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Why the deferred annuity makes sense
Abstract
The low demand of immediate annuities at retirement has been a long-standing puzzle.
We show that a hyperbolic discount model can explain this behaviour and results in
attractiveness of long-term deferred annuities. We find that a 65-year-old male would
pay 24 percent higher than the fair price for a 30-year deferred annuity. Moreover, if
governments were to introduce a pre-commitment device which requires pensioners to
make annuitisation decisions 10 years before retirement, the take up rate of annuities
could become higher.
Keywords: Hyperbolic discounting, Deferred annuities, Annuity puzzle, Reservation
price.
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3.1 Introduction
Over the past few decades, the traditional defined benefit (DB) pension plan has been
gradually losing its dominance in private sector pension systems in many countries and
the defined contribution (DC) pension plan has become increasingly popular. Under
the DC pension scheme, members contribute towards their personal pension savings in
a way that enables them to make decisions on how to invest during the accumulation
stage and how to decumulate during retirement.
In the area of retirement, a constant focus is on whether retirees receive adequate protec-
tion against longevity risk, the risk of outliving one’s wealth. As an insurance product
that eliminates the longevity risk, a lifetime annuity is a good option for DC pensioners.
A lifetime annuity provides a stream of income payments for as long as the annuitant
is alive, in exchange for an upfront premium charge. Yaari (1965) demonstrates that
in a life-cycle model a risk-averse individual without a bequest motive should hold all
their assets in annuities. However, empirical data has shown that retirees are reluctant
to convert retirement savings into annuities. The disparity between the theoretical op-
timal choice and consumers’ actual preferences leads to the “annuity puzzle”. This can
be illustrated by low levels of voluntary annuitisation in the UK market. In the past,
the UK had two distinct annuity markets: a voluntary segment called the Purchased
Life Annuity (PLA) market and a compulsory section called the Compulsory Purchase
Annuity (CPA). Based on UK annuity sales figures for the 1994-2006, sales in the CPA
market had been consistently higher than that in the PLA market. By 2010, the CPA
market had grown to £11.5 billion worth of annuity premiums while the PLA market
only had £72 million worth of sales (Cannon and Tonks, 2011).
Recently, the UK government implemented pension reforms to encourage free choice of
the mode of pension distribution and, as a result, retirees’ real preferences on annuity
products could be clearly seen. The reform follows the international trend of greater
pension flexibility, which has been observed in countries such as the USA, Australia and
Switzerland. Prior to the 2014 UK reform, there were strict restrictions on accessing
pension savings at retirement. For example, if a pensioner had overall pension savings
of greater than £18, 000 but could not access a guaranteed retirement income of more
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than £20, 000 per year 1, the only two choices that could make were to either to buy
an annuity or enroll in a “capped drawdown”, which allowed them to withdraw as much
as 120 percent of an equivalent annuity each year during retirement. However, after
the above mentioned policy change, everyone will be able to choose a lump sum (full
withdrawal), an annuity or a drawdown, regardless of the size of their pension wealth
(HM Treasury, 2014). With this move towards greater freedom of choice on how and
when to access pension wealth, annuity sales have experienced a large decline. In Q2
2015, £990m was invested in annuities, showing a 44 percent decrease from the £1.8bn
invested in Q2 2014. Moreover, 18, 200 annuities had been purchased in the three months
after the pension reform, showing a 61 percent decrease compared to Q2 2014 when
46, 700 were purchased (ABI, 2015).
Many studies have suggested a number of reasons for the annuity puzzle, such as mor-
tality risk-sharing among families (Brown and Poterba, 2000) and the existence of social
security (Butler et al., 2016). A detailed list of reasons are covered in Section 3.2. Some
research has examined the possible influences of behavioural factors such as the fram-
ing effect, cumulative prospect theory and low level of financial literacy. The findings
conclude that the low demand for annuity could be simply due to irrational behaviour
(Cannon and Tonks, 2008).
Since the annuity is a product that involves a series of payments at different points of
time, one of the behavioural factors that affects decision making is the inconsistency of
intertemporal choices. More specifically, when people assign values to future payouts, the
discount rate used to evaluate intertemporal choice is not fixed, but varies in line with the
length of the delay period, size and signs of the benefits. This effect is called hyperbolic
discounting and is interpreted as “temporal myopia”. The concept has been widely used
to account for behavioural bias in savings, nutrition, healthcare, drug addictions, and
other problems of willpower (Frederick et al., 2002). Laibson et al. (2003) have used
the model to explain the puzzle of simultaneously having large credit card debts and
pre-retirement savings.
In this chapter, we use the hyperbolic discount model derived from experimental results
to analyse annuitisation decisions. We are interested in both immediate annuities and
deferred annuities. The deferred annuity is a contract that is purchased today but does
1A guaranteed retirement annual income of £20, 000 is equivalent as a total pension savings of around
£310, 000 , according to stylised assumptions and calculations in HM Treasury (2014).
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not pay until the annuitant survives to a pre-specified age. Compared with a conven-
tional immediate annuity, a deferred annuity has competitive advantages of a much lower
price and provides almost the same level of longevity insurance; therefore, it has aroused
much discussion in the area of retirement financial planning (see Milevsky, 2005; Gong
and Webb, 2010; Denuit et al., 2015). To uncover the annuitisation decisions of people
at different ages, two types of deferred annuities are studied: a working age deferred
annuity (WADA), which is purchased at working age and starts paying at retirement,
and a retirement age deferred annuity (RADA), which is purchased at retirement and
starts paying a few years later. To be more specific, we seek to explore four questions:
(a) Can we use the hyperbolic discount model to explain the low demand for immediate
annuities at retirement and at a more advanced age?
(b) Are pensioners at 65 years old interested in purchasing a RADA?
(c) Would people at working age have an interest in purchasing a WADA?
(d) How would working-age members respond to a question asking them to decide
today whether to buy an immediate annuity at retirement?
To seek the answers to these questions, we adopt the hyperbolic discount model to
evaluate the perceived value of an annuity, which enables us to work out the reservation
price. By comparing the reservation price with the theoretical market price we can
determine whether an individual would choose an annuity or not. We show that time
inconsistent preference is one of the factors that stops retirees from converting their DC
account balances into annuities at retirement. More importantly, we identify a high
willingness to purchase long-term deferred annuities for hyperbolic discounters, both at
working age and in retirement. As the deferred period increases, the relative difference
between reservation price and actuarial price increases considerably and at a much faster
rate. Furthermore, if members are simply asked to make a decision on annuity purchase
and could delay the action until the point of retirement, those with ten years until
retirement value the longevity protection the most.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review of
the explanation for the annuity puzzle from both the rational and irrational framework.
In section 3, a detailed introduction of the hyperbolic model is offered. In section
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4, we explain how the annuities in the four questions above are evaluated and how
the maximum acceptable price is derived. Major results and a sensitivity analysis are
presented in sections 5 and 6. Finally, in Section 7 we conclude with major findings and
limitations of this study.
3.2 Literature review
Yaari (1965) is the first to demonstrate the benefits of annuitisation in a life cycle
model with an uncertain lifetime. He shows that a rational investor should invest his
retirement savings in annuities rather than bonds to finance retirement. This result
rests on three fundamental assumptions: a complete annuity market, a specific utility
function (additive separability) and the absence of a bequest motive. The subsequent
literature on annuities has relaxed one or two of these assumptions in order to assess if
these factors lead to the low demand for annuities.
Annuities in a rational framework
Observing the annuity market from the supply side, a less competitive price could be
the reason for low demand. Brown and Warshawsky (2001) calculate the money’s worth
value of an annuity using average mortality rates of the population and find that an
individual could expect to receive only 85 pence per pound invested, thus justifying the
existence of adverse selection in annuity pricing.
Since an annuity stops paying once the annuitant dies, people with a motive to bequeath
part of their wealth obtain less welfare by purchasing a life annuity. A large literature
has focused on how the bequest motive impacts the demand for annuities and shows that
a strong bequest motive can eliminate the desire to purchase annuities (see Friedman
and Warshawsky, 1990; Vidal-Melia and Lejarraga-Garcia, 2006; Lockwood, 2012).
Intra-family mortality sharing can also be regarded as a substitute for an annuity. Since
families often share a common budget constraint, mortality risk sharing among family
members can offer a substitution for risk sharing in the annuity market. To an extent,
this resembles the bequest motive; an individual who dies early leaves his wealth to
subsidise other family members who are alive. Brown and Poterba (2000) find evidence
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showing that the utility gain from annuitisation for a couple is significantly lower than
that for single people.
An alternative explanation for the low demand for additional annuitisation is the exis-
tence of social security and private DB pension plans. According to Dushi and Webb
(2004), an exceptionally high proportion of a retired household’s wealth has been pre-
annuitised before retirement. Therefore, without purchasing an annuity in the open
market, these retirees already have a minimum level of income that will last for life.
Butler et al. (2016) also prove that the presence of social security reduces the value of
annuitisation.
A more recent discussion relates to the worry about health care expenditure shocks at
an older age and the fact that retirees may not need the smooth consumption that an
annuity provides. It is true that people have a higher probability of falling ill when they
become older; they may also have to make some age-specific investments in a house such
as installing a stair lift. Therefore we have reason to believe that a rational retiree might
want to live a very simple life in their early retirement period so that they can save for
unexpected health-related expenses (Sinclair and Smetters, 2004).
Lastly, while most research focuses on a comparison of full annuitisation aged 65 with the
alternative of never annuitising, in practice, a retiree can choose between annuitising now
and delaying the decision until the next period. They can also annuitise only a fraction
of their wealth and enter a drawdown of the rest. Gavranovic (2011) has demonstrated
that the optimal annuitisation strategy for a pensioner without bequest motive is to
gradually convert all pension wealth to annuities by around age 80.
Annuities in a behavioural framework
The literature mentioned above seeks to solve the annuity puzzle within a strictly rational
framework. In recent years, however, there is an extensive literature on the behavioural
economics of retirement savings. This moves beyond the fully rational paradigm and
proposes some behavioural factors that could play important roles in determining how
retirees spend their retirement savings.
One important issue is the flaws in the expected utility hypothesis that arise from risk
aversion. Hu and Scott (2007) have explained the annuity puzzle by assuming that
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retirees are loss-averse rather than risk-averse, and make annuity decisions based on
Cumulative Prospect Theory. They also extend the application of Cumulative Prospect
Theory to deferred annuities and guaranteed annuities, proving that the deferred annuity
becomes optimal only when the first payment starts at or after age 93. The framing
effect, which states that individuals’ behaviour depends heavily on the way in which
available choices are presented, is also one of the influencing factors considered by Brown
et al. (2008). They have shown that 72 percent of subjects prefer an annuity rather
than a savings account when the choice is framed in terms of consumption while 12
percent subjects choose an annuity when it is framed in terms of an investment. Other
behavioural factors include the poor financial education of retirees and regret aversion
(Cannon and Tonks, 2008).
3.3 An introduction to the hyperbolic discount model
In dealing with individuals’ annuitisation decisions and other economic decisions, which
involve outcomes occurring at different points in time, researchers often employ a dis-
counted utility function to model such decisions. In a normative framework, individuals
have stationary time preferences and use a constant discount rate between any two
consecutive periods. However, many empirical studies on time preferences have found
anomalies in the behaviour predicted by the stationary exponential discount function.
Three major anomalies are discussed in the following paragraphs.
• Decreasing Impatience While the exponential discount function predicts that the
preference between two delayed outcomes should be consistent given the same time in-
terval, researchers have found extensive evidence showing that preferences often switch.
Thaler (1981) illustrates this with a simple example. Subjects are asked to state their
preferences on two questions: “Would you prefer one apple today or two apples tomor-
row?” and “Would you prefer one apple in one year or two apples in one year plus one
day?”. According to the exponential discounting method, people who choose one apple
today would make consistent choice of one apple in a year. However, empirical results
show that a significant fraction of subjects that prefer one apple today would gladly wait
one extra day in a year in order to receive two apples instead. Therefore, people tend to
act impulsively in the short-term but become more patient in the long-term. In other
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words, the implicit rate at which people discount future rewards will vary inversely with
the length of waiting time.
• The Absolute Magnitude Effect It is universally accepted that waiting for a reward
requires some mental effort. If the required mental effort does not increase proportionally
with the size of rewards, the implicit discount rates with regard to different reward sizes
would not stay the same. In a survey conducted by Thaler (1981), subjects are told
that they would receive “a dinner worth $15”, “a trip to San Francisco worth $250” and
“a good used car worth $3000”. When they are asked what compensations they need
if these rewards are delayed for three months, most subjects answer “an extra dinner”,
“an extra day in San Francisco” and “a fancy model of the same car” respectively.
Therefore Thaler (1981) concludes that the subjects are indifferent between receiving
$15 immediately and $60 in a year, between $250 now and $350 in a year, and between
an immediate $3000 and $4000 in a year, which means large reward sizes have lower
discount rates compared with small reward sizes.
• The Gain-Loss Asymmetry Gain-loss asymmetry refers to the empirical phe-
nomenon that the implicit discount rates for losses are often lower than that for gains.
For example, Loewenstein (1987) finds that a group of subjects, on average, are indif-
ferent between receiving an immediate $10 and receiving $21 in a year; on the other
hand, these subjects are indifferent between paying $10 immediately and paying $15 in
a year. Similarly, the indifferent amount for receiving or paying an immediate $100 were
receiving $157 or paying $133 respectively in a year.
The anomalies introduced above can be addressed by a hyperbolic discount model, which
has been widely applied to explain the problem of addiction and self control. As an
example, people with low self-control often gain too much weight and find it difficult
to improve their health by doing more exercise and having a diet. These people often
vow to forgo all future temptations, in exchange for improved health in the future;
however, when they have their next meal, they cannot resist having unhealthy fried
food and sweet desserts. Presumably, they prefer this because the instant pleasure
delivered by delicious food is greater than the heavily discounted future rewards of
health. Therefore, the hyperbolic discount model is appropriate to describe the situation
that people simultaneously require immediate satisfactions and make commitments for
the future.
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Figure 3.1: A comparison of hyperbolic discounting and exponential discounting
Notes: Vertical axis, discount function, represents the present value of £1 to be received at
time t. We assume a constant interest rate of 3 percent for exponential discounting; α = 1 and
β = 0.19 for hyperbolic discounting.
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) collectively present the experimental evidence and pro-
pose an explicit hyperbolic discount model to address the effect.
δ(t) = (1 + αt)−
β
α with α > 0, β > 0 (3.1)
where δ(t) is a discount function; α and β determines how much the function departs
from constant exponential discounting.
To identify the parameter values that capture most people’s intertemporal preferences,
Abdellaoui et al. (2009) conduct a well-designed choice test and concluded that the
“Power discount model” with δ(t) = (1 + t)−β provides the best fit. Relying on this
result, we use β equals 0.19 for gains and 0.11 for losses in our analysis. Please note that
value of β would vary with country/cultural background of the selected group of subjects
and this limitation is embedded in the experimental design. Therefore, in section 6, the
sensitivity of the results to changes in the parameter β is explored, to show that the
conclusions do not entirely depend on the chosen value of the parameter.
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Figure 3.1 provides a comparison between the hyperbolic discounting and exponential
discounting models. The horizontal axis represents the waiting time to receive £1 and
the vertical axis is the present value of the £1 to be received. The present value follow-
ing hyperbolic discounting decreases at a much faster rate in early years than following
exponential discounting, which means that the hyperbolic discounters adopt a higher
level of discounting for benefits that come in the early years than exponential discoun-
ters. However, if the benefits are to be received after 20 years (the intersection point),
hyperbolic discounters believe it has a higher value than exponential discounters.
In addition to the discount function, a descriptive value function is also required in
a complete discounted utility framework. Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) discuss the
necessary characteristics of the value function without providing an explicit descriptive
model. Abdellaoui et al. (2009) design a parameter-free measurement of utility in in-
tertemporal choices and hence derive the value function which addresses the absolute
magnitude effect and the gain-loss asymmetry. The value function v(ct) is as follows
with γ being equal to 0.97 and θ being equal to 0.84. It is assumed to be separable and
additive over time as recorded in literature.
v(ct) =
 −(−ct)
γ if ct < 0
cθt if ct ≥ 0
(3.2)
where ct represents the consumption rate that would take place at a future time t,
which is defined on the interval [0,T], and v(ct) represents the value of the consumption
amount.
The discount rates and the value function are combined to arrive at the overall value of
consumption streams.
V (c0, c1, ..., cT ) =
T∑
t=0
(δ(t)× v(ct))
A standard approach in the literature has been to use the exponential discount model
for δ(t) and Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function for v(ct). In this
analysis, we instead use the hyperbolic discount model in Equation (3.1) and the value
function given by Equation (3.2) to analyse annuity purchase decisions by considering
the effect of subjective views on the underlying consumption streams.
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3.4 Annuity Valuation
In this section, we introduce four scenarios to address the questions of annuitisation
decisions for people at different stages. Two types of annuities, immediate annuities and
deferred annuities, are discussed in this chapter and they are priced at actuarially fair
rates. In order to make a fair decision, the overall utility, V , of the investment in each
scenario will be calculated. As we focus on people who show “temporal myopia”, the
amount of money is evaluated based on Equation (3.2) and time preference is modeled
by the “power discount model”, Equation (3.1). Let tpx denote the probability that an
x-year-old person can survive for t years and the maximum attainable age is set to be
120. Four scenarios are described in detail below and the corresponding valuation of the
annuity investment is introduced.
a. Immediate annuities for retirees
Consider a retiree at age x(x ≥ 65) who needs to make a decision on whether to spend
a lump sum amount A to purchase an immediate annuity which pays ψ per annum in
advance. The overall value of this investment for the x-year-old is:
V1(x) = v(−A) +
119∑
i=x
(δ(i− x)× i−xpx × v(ψ))
b. Retirement Age Deferred Annuity (RADA) for retirees
Consider a 65-year-old pensioner (x = 65) who has just retired. The individual is faced
with a wide variety of RADA products which have deferred periods (d) from 1 to 30
years. By investing the pension lump sum amount A in a d-year deferred annuity, the
pensioner is entitled to a lifelong guaranteed annual income of ψ in d years. However,
nothing is paid back if he dies within the deferred period. The overall value of this
deferred annuity investment at the time of purchase is:
V2(d) = v(−A) +
119∑
i=65+d
(δ(i− 65)× i−65p65 × v(ψ))
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c. Working Age Deferred Annuity (WADA) for working age individuals
An individual at age x (25 ≤ x ≤ 64) considers investing in a WADA which provides
annual incomes of ψ once the annuitant survives to retirement age 65. The overall
perceived value of this investment at the time of purchase is:
V3(x) = v(−A) +
119∑
i=65
(δ(i− x)× i−xpx × v(ψ))
d. Decision on purchasing an immediate annuity at retirement for work-
ing age individuals
In this scenario pension scheme members within the working age range (25 ≤ x ≤ 64)
are asked to make decisions in advance on whether to choose a pension lump sum A
at age 65 or a corresponding fair annuity starting at the same age. When evaluating
this annuity, the cash flows involved are exactly the same as the immediate annuity
purchased at age 65 (scenario a); however the perceived value may be different because
the decision is made at an earlier age. If an individual decides to convert the lump sum
A into an annuity at retirement, the overall perceived value of this investment for the
individual is:
V4(x) = δ(65− x)× 65−xpx × v(−A) +
119∑
i=65
(δ(i− x)× i−xpx × v(ψ))
To determine whether an actuarially fairly priced annuity is attractive to purchase, we
follow Hu and Scott (2007) to use the “relative difference between reservation price and
fair price”, R, as the benchmark measure:
R = Reservation Price−Actuarially fair price
Actuarially fair price
The “reservation price”, also called the “maximum acceptable price”, is the annuity
price that would make an individual indifferent to buying an annuity. According to
the valuation functions above, the reservation price is the initial price, A, that makes
the hyperbolic present value of an annuity, V , equal to zero. If the reservation price
is below the market price, the annuity would not be attractive for individuals to buy.
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Therefore, a positive R means individuals are willing to purchase a fairly priced annuity,
and a higher value of R implies greater willingness to purchase an annuity. R can also
be interpreted as the percentage more or less than the market price that an individual
would be prepared to pay for a product.
3.5 Results
In this analysis, we assume the annuity price is actuarially fair with no expenses or
profit loading. The price calculation is based on the UK mortality table “S2PML2”,
which describes the mortality experience of UK male pensioners of self-administered
pension schemes for the period from 2004 to 2011, and a constant interest rate of 3
percent. Annual income from annuity, ψ, is assumed to be 1 unit. Therefore, the fair
market price of the annuity and the reservation price that individuals would like to
pay can be calculated accordingly. In what follows, we provide results for the relative
price differences, R, under the four different scenarios, analyse the attitudes of investors
towards each type of annuity and discuss the trend of the relative price differences with
regard to investors’ age or the length of the deferred period.
a. Immediate annuities for retirees
The results of the Relative Price Differences (R) with regard to different ages of purchase
are presented in Figure 3.2. Two major conclusions can be drawn from the figure. First,
all the outcomes in terms of R are negative, which means that for a group of retirees
who are aged between 65 and 95, fairly priced immediate annuities are unattractive
to purchase. Thus, evaluating annuitisation decisions by assuming time inconsistent
preferences is indeed a powerful behavioural explanation for retirees’ not converting
their defined contribution account balances into annuities. Secondly, as a newly retired
pensioner becomes older, his preference for the immediate annuity declines at first and
then increases after he reaches age 85. However, the relative difference in price is small
with R lying in the range of −3% and −10%.
The results presented appear to be inconsistent with more recent research carried out by
Schreiber and Weber (2015), who find that the expected present value of an immediate
2Source: Continuous Mortality Investigation (2013).
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Figure 3.2: the Relative Price Difference (R) of immediate annuities for retirees at
age (x)
annuity declines monotonically with the age of purchase. Although both studies use the
power discounting model for annuity evaluation, different groups of people are targeted:
Schreiber and Weber (2015) survey working age individuals while we focus on retirees
above age 65; and this may explain the inconsistency.
b. Retirement Age Deferred Annuity (RADA) for retirees
Figure 3.3 shows the attractiveness of RADA with different deferred periods for a 65-
year-old retiree. It can be seen that although recently-retired individuals are reluctant
to purchase immediate annuities, they are willing to pay a higher-than-market price for
annuities with long deferred periods. From our modelling results, annuities that are
deferred for more than 10 years are generally welcomed by 65-year-old retirees. Further-
more, we identify a positive relationship between the length of the deferred period and
the attractiveness of the corresponding deferred annuity. If an annuity has a deferred pe-
riod of 30 years, a 65-year-old individual would be prepared to pay 24% greater than the
fair price3. This is a much higher margin than that for an immediate annuity. It implies
that such a product would have commercial potential since insurance companies could
add a greater loading in deferred annuity products without changing its attractiveness.
3Please note the choice of 30-year deferred period is for the purpose of illustration. In reality, the
product may be available.
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Figure 3.3: the Relative Price Difference (R) of d-year retirement age deferred annu-
ities (RADA) for 65-year-old retirees
The popularity of deferred annuities have also been identified in other works. Hu and
Scott (2007) adopt Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) to evaluate deferred annuities
with deferred periods of 0, 10, 20 and 30 years and find that the 30-year deferred annuity
is the most attractive to buy. In Chapter 2, we also show that the attractiveness of
deferred annuity increases with the length of the deferred period, according to CPT.
c. Working Age Deferred Annuity (WADA) for working age individuals
If individuals at working age are given the opportunity to enter a deferred annuity
contract that promises retirement incomes depending upon survival, their reactions are
examined and reflected in Figure 3.4. It can be seen that although people who are retired
are unsure of handing over a lump sum of money to insurance companies in exchange
for a longevity protection, most people at working age tend to find a WADA attractive
to buy. Another interesting point worthy of note is that the decision maker’s age has
a negative effect on the attractiveness of this type of deferred annuity. For hyperbolic
discounters younger than 30-year-old, they appear even to be willing to pay double the
price of the WADA.
We know that as the length of deferred period increases, the actuarially fair price of
a deferred annuity which provides the same level of protection becomes cheaper; hence
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Figure 3.4: the Relative Price Difference (R) of d-year working age deferred annuities
(WADA) for working age individuals at age (x)
younger individuals would be less hesitant to purchase a WADA which involves a smaller
initial outlay. In addition, given the assumption that people have time inconsistent pref-
erences, a young individual tends to overvalue all the annuity incomes that come in the
distant future; however for an older individual, some of the deferred annuity payments
are highly likely to be undervalued. The results are consistent with our conclusions in
scenario b. Purchasing the pension annuities at an earlier age means a longer deferred
period, and in both scenarios an annuity with a longer deferred period is more attractive.
The magnitude of R is much higher in scenario c than in scenario b because a longer
deferred period is considered.
Some of our findings mirror those suggested elsewhere. Shu et al. (2016) have conducted
a choice-based stated-preference survey of adults aged between 45 and 65 and find that
younger subjects report a higher likelihood of purchases for annuities beginning at age 65
than older subjects who are closer in age to the start date. DiCenzo et al. (2011) have
also discovered that pre-retirees have stronger preferences for annuities than retirees
based on online experimental research with 1,009 subjects aged between 45 and 75.
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Figure 3.5: the Relative Price Difference (R) of an immediate annuity purchased at
retirement for working age individuals at age (x)
d. Decision on purchasing an immediate annuity at retirement for working
age individuals
Similar to the third scenario, we aim to discover the attitude of working age pension
scheme members towards an annuity with the first payment starting when pensioners
retire at age 65. Although the annuity investment payoffs are exactly the same, the
purchase is made at different points. In scenario c, the price is paid now at age x while
in scenario d, pensioners simply make a decision at age x but delay the purchase action
until age 65. If an individual dies prior to the time of retirement, his financial status
remain unchanged in scenario d but he faces an absolute loss of the price paid in scenario
c. Therefore, scenario d effectively deals with the decision to buy an immediate annuity
rather than a deferred annuity.
Comparing the results of R in Figure 3.5 with those in Figure 3.4, we identify a different
pattern. For individuals below age 55, the attractiveness of the annuity increases slightly
with age. However for individuals above age 55, the attractiveness declines sharply with
age and becomes unattractive when individuals reach age 65. Therefore, we suggest that
policy makers who want to promote annuitisation in public ask individuals to make a
choice between lump sum and annuities 10 years before retirement. On the other hand,
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one may notice that the change in R is relatively small, varying between 4% and 8%. It
is similar to the results for immediate annuities in scenario a.
These findings confirm those in the survey by Schreiber and Weber (2015). In their
survey, subjects are asked to predict whether they will annuitise if they were at age
66. The total sample results show that the effect of age on the decision to purchase an
annuity is negative. However, observing the answers from a subsample of individuals
below age 51, the effect is no longer statistically significant. To some extent, it reveals
that people above age 51 have significant decreasing preferences towards annuities.
3.6 Sensitivity analysis
Previously, we assumed that each parameter value in the annuity calculations is based
on Abdellaoui et al. (2009). However, questions remain on whether the behavioural
biases would be stronger or weaker for people with different levels of impatience, dif-
ferent income levels or different health status. In this section, we test the sensitivity of
the power discounting parameter, the income levels and mortality rates (by changing
mortality tables).
Table 3.1 shows the results for R in Scenario a and Scenario b under different combina-
tions of assumptions. The row HB baseline lists the standard results that are based on
the benchmark assumptions in Abdellaoui et al. (2009). In the HB sensitivity analysis,
we change one factor listed in each row at a time so that we can observe the impact of
that factor on R. “Less” or “greater” is relative to the baseline results. Each column
represents different types of annuity products with the first payment starting at a dif-
ferent age. For example, an annuity starts paying at age 75 represents an immediate
annuity purchased at age 75 in Scenario a and a 10-year deferred annuity purchased at
age 65 in Scenario b.
The first factor that is of interest is the level of impatience, measured by β. Given
that the annuity pricing rate is deterministic, a higher β means that the decision maker
adopts a heavier undervaluation of earlier benefits and a lighter overvaluation of later
benefits. Reflecting on the curves in Figure 3.6, the intersection point between exponen-
tial discounting and hyperbolic discounting would come at a later stage as β increases.
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Table 3.1: Sensitivity analysis of the Relative Price Difference (R) in Scenario a and
Scenario b
R
Age of first annuity payment
65 70 75 80 85
Scenario a
HB baseline −3.60% −5.84% −7.51% −8.57% −8.99%
HB sensitivity analysis
Less impatience (β = 0.15) 4.82% 1.64% −0.97% −2.95% −4.28%
Greater impatience (β = 0.25) −14.76% −15.83% −16.33% −16.21% −15.45%
Lower income level (ψ = 0.0721) 34.08% 30.30% 27.06% 24.29% 21.86%
Higher income level (ψ = 3) −15.81% −17.55% −18.72% −19.22% −18.99%
Lighter mortality rates (S2PFL) −1.94% −4.57% −6.65% −8.11% −8.89%
Greater mortality rates (SPML03) −4.65% −6.63% −8.03% −8.82% −9.00%
Scenario b
HB baseline −3.60% −3.50% 0.09% 5.15% 11.10%
HB sensitivity analysis
Less impatience (β = 0.15) 4.82% 7.22% 12.47% 19.15% 26.80%
Greater impatience (β = 0.25) −14.76% −17.54% −15.94% −12.83% −8.87%
Lower income level (ψ = 0.0721) 34.08% 37.28% 42.40% 49.56% 58.06%
Higher income level (ψ = 3) −15.81% −16.71% −13.61% −9.25% −4.11%
Lighter mortality rates (S2PFL) −1.94% −1.27% 2.61% 7.92% 14.15%
Greater mortality rates (SPML03) −4.65% −4.98% −1.65% 3.17% 8.80%
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Figure 3.6: A comparison of hyperbolic discounting with different levels of impatience
Notes: We assume a constant interest rate of 3 percent for exponential discounting; α = 1 for
hyperbolic discounting.
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Comparing our baseline results with less/greater impatience for both immediate annu-
ities and RADA, we conclude that the attractiveness of annuity products is consistently
lower in response to a greater level of impatience. This makes sense intuitively since
an individual with a greater level of impatience would have stronger present bias; they
would gain much higher satisfaction from consuming now rather than converting the
lump sum into future cash flows and consuming regularly. According to Table 3.1, rel-
atively patient individuals (β = 0.15) are willing to pay a slightly higher price, 4.82%
and 1.64% respectively, for immediate annuities at age 65 and 70. It is because they are
patient to wait and assign more weights to future incomes. Investment opportunities
that convert current consumption into a future stream of cash flow are attractive to
them. The same reasons lead to the attractiveness of deferred annuities for this group
of people (see the row corresponding to β = 0.15 in Scenario b).
The effect of annuity income levels is examined to capture the variation in decisions of
people with different wealth levels. Two levels of annual income, 0.07214 unit and 3
units, are adopted to represent relatively poor people and relatively rich people. Based
on the value function in the hyperbolic discount model introduced above, people tend
to overvalue an amount that is less than one unit and undervalue an amount that
is greater than one unit. This is reasonable since people often place more values on
the initial accumulation of amount of money and this portion of money is intended
for the purchase of necessities such as food, utilities and rent. Therefore, the results
corresponding to ψ = 0.0721 and ψ = 3 in Scenario a and Scenario b show that wealthy
people who can afford an annuity providing a higher annual income are only willing to
pay a lower-than-market price, while poor people are willing to pay a much higher-than-
market price for annuities.
The mortality table in the calculation of baseline results is based on S2PML, the mor-
tality experience of male pensioners from 2004 to 2011. Two other mortality tables are
selected for comparison: S2PFL, the mortality experience of female pensioners during
the same period, representing a group with lighter mortality, and SPML03, the mor-
tality experience of male pensioners between 2000 and 2006, representing a group with
heavier mortality. Results in Scenario a show pensioners with the highest mortality rates
4The value is chosen as the annual income from converting one unit at age 65-year-old into an
immediate annuity.
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Table 3.2: Sensitivity analysis of the Relative Price Difference (R) in Scenario c and
Scenario d
R
Age of decision making
25 35 45 55 65
Scenario c
HB baseline 119.85% 70.90% 34.63% 8.88% −3.60%
HB sensitivity analysis
Less impatience (β = 0.15) 158.52% 99.11% 54.99% 23.17% 4.82%
Greater impatience (β = 0.25) 72.42% 35.90% 9.01% −9.46% −14.76%
Lower income level (ψ = 0.0721) 212.74% 143.11% 91.51% 54.89% 34.08%
Higher income level (ψ = 3) 89.74% 47.50% 16.20% −6.02% −15.81%
Lighter mortality rates (S2PFL) 127.53% 76.68% 38.95% 12.01% −1.94%
Greater mortality rates (SPML03) 125.75% 75.34% 37.96% 11.29% −4.65%
Scenario d
HB baseline 4.32% 5.41% 6.52% 7.15% −3.60%
HB sensitivity analysis
Less impatience (β = 0.15) 40.37% 39.12% 36.96% 32.21% 4.82%
Greater impatience (β = 0.25) 37.28% 35.26% 31.82% 24.40% −14.76%
Lower income level (ψ = 0.0721) 45.31% 46.85% 48.44% 49.33% 34.08%
Higher income level (ψ = 3) −8.97% −8.03% −7.07% −6.53% −15.81%
Lighter mortality rates (S2PFL) 7.65% 8.68% 9.69% 10.04% −1.94%
Greater mortality rates (SPML03) 6.84% 7.89% 8.92% 9.34% −4.65%
(SPML03) tend to find immediate annuities the least attractive. Similarly, female pen-
sioners with the highest life expectancies (S2PFL) show the greatest interest in RADA,
as is observed in Scenario b.
Table 3.2 shows the results in terms of R in Scenario c and Scenario d. In Table 3.2, we
can see the sensitivity of three factors: level of impatience, level of income and mortality
rates, on the annuitisation decisions.
By comparing results corresponding to β = 0.15 and β = 0.25, we find those at working
age see annuities as more valuable when they experience less impatience. In addition,
for decision makers with different levels of impatience, the effect of their age on the
WADA’s attractiveness is consistently negative. In other words, the longer the waiting
period to receive the first annuity income is, the higher the possibility of purchase will
be. The intuition behind these features is as follows: incomes that arrive further in
the future are more likely to be overvalued and thus the deferred annuity with a longer
waiting period has a higher maximum acceptable price.
In Scenario d where the real purchase of an immediate annuity is delayed until retirement,
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we have shown in the baseline results, which assume that β is 0.19 for gains and 0.11 for
losses in the power discount function, that people have the greatest interest in buying an
annuity around age 55. However in the sensitivity analysis when we let discount rates for
gains and losses be the same, the peak in the trend of R disappears and we see a gradual
decrease of value of R relative to the age of decision making. In such a case, governments
may simply encourage individuals to make annuitisation decisions earlier rather than 10
years before retirement. Whether people use different discount rates for gains and losses
and the resulting impact on annuitisation decisions needs future research.
Results corresponding to ψ = 0.0721 and ψ = 3 in Scenario c and Scenario d show that
wealthy decision makers who can afford an annuity with a high annual income tend to
find annuities less attractive. The impact of income levels on the annuity purchasing
behaviour is consistent for decision makers at all ages5.
The sensitivity of mortality rates in Table 3.2 indicates intuitively that annuities are more
attractive for individuals with longer life expectancies, regardless of the age of decision
making and the age of annuity purchase. Furthermore, for different mortality groups,
age presents a negative influence on the attractiveness of a WADA. If the annuitisation
decision needs to be made at working age and the actual purchases could be delayed
until retirement, those between 50 and 55 are the most likely to choose an annuity and
a strong decline in annuity preferences exists for pensioners older than 55.
3.7 Conclusions
Although purchasing an annuity at retirement can guarantee lifetime incomes, people
are reluctant to spend their retirement savings on annuities voluntarily. In the UK,
with fewer restrictions on accessing retirement savings, the demand for annuities has
decreased and thus insurance companies are making efforts to design more attractive
annuity products. This chapter discusses the implication of one behavioural factor, the
hyperbolic discount model, on the annuity purchase.
Based on the analysis, we have the following primary findings. First, for an 65-year-old
retiree, the reservation price of an immediate annuity is lower than the market price,
5The results presented here are a reflection of our model; hence highly depending on whether the
annual income is greater than one unit or not. This model does not consider other sources of income;
however the state benefit is considered in Chapter 4.
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and thus the hyperbolic discount method captures the low demand for annuities at
retirement, seen in practice.
Second, under the hyperbolic discount model, deferred annuities are attractive for pen-
sion scheme members at all ages. The attractiveness generally increases with the de-
ferred period. For instance, those below the age of 30 would pay more than double the
market price for the WADA. However, our model does not account for factors such as
affordability, a liquidity requirement and expected retirement living standards. While a
25-year-old man who wants to receive an annual annuity income of £40, 000 after retire-
ment might find a 40-year deferred annuity attractive; he will most probably not be able
to afford the annuity price of £150, 034.6 6 at this young age. With time passing, he
will accumulate wealth and set aside a portion for retirement protection. Often, there
will be a point when accumulated retirement savings equals deferred annuity price; this
is the optimal age of purchase.
We recommend using the deferred annuity contract as a retirement solution because it
requires a smaller initial investment than the immediate annuity and provides similar
longevity insurance. In addition, based on the fact that analytical cognitive function
ability declines dramatically for older adults, it would be wise to buy a RADA to protect
consumption at very advanced ages. For those in their 80s, it has been shown that 20
percent have fully diagnosed dementia and 30 percent have severe cognitive impairment;
and thus, it would be difficult for these individuals to make rational withdrawal decisions
if there were no income protection in place (Laibson, 2009).
In scenario d, we observe that individuals around the age of 55 are those who would most
likely commit to buying an immediate annuity at the point of retirement. Therefore, a
policy recommendation can be drawn. With the aim of promoting the purchase of annu-
ities among retirees and releasing the burden from social benefit claiming, governments
are advised to introduce a pre-commitment device asking people to make annuitisation
decisions 10 years before retirement. When they reach retirement, their original deci-
sions could be changed but some efforts, such as making a phone call or writing a letter,
are required. In fact, in Denmark, the decisions on annuity purchases can be made
during the accumulation period. As a result, about 50 percent of defined contribution
6The price is the actuarially fair annuity price based on assumptions of 3% annual real rate of return,
mortality table S2PML and zero profit loading.
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assets are used to buy WADA type products for those aged in their 40’s, 50’s and 60’s
(Andersen and Skjodt, 2008).
Although we have shown that inconsistent time preference could be one of the reasons for
the annuity puzzle, our study has one limitation. The model selected and the parameter
values used are based on experiments designed by Abdellaoui et al. (2009). In their
experiments, subjects were young university students who may have completely different
views about money and time discounting compared to older workers and retirees. Their
views may reflect a specific cultural or country background. Also, the money amount
in the experimental questions is much smaller than the size of one’s pension savings.
Therefore, the results provide a more qualitative rather than a precise quantitative
explanation of the relative attractiveness of annuities.
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Optimal decumulation strategies during retirement with deferred
annuities
Abstract
Since greater flexibility in accessing pension savings has been given to defined contribu-
tion pensioners, retirees are in need of advice on how to spend down their savings to
make retirement income last throughout their lifetime. Deferred annuities have been dis-
cussed extensively in recent years as a retirement solution and have been recommended
in the OECD Roadmap for the Good Design of Defined Contribution Pension Plans
(OECD, 2016). Assuming a world where deferred annuities are available, we propose
two utility maximising decumulation strategies comprising a deferred annuity purchased
at retirement and optimal consumption and savings before the commencement of the
annuity. A retiree who is concerned about longevity risk and wants to retain a certain
level of liquidity is advised to spend 21.6% on a 15-year deferred annuity or 9.13% on
a 20-year deferred annuity. A retiree who simply wants to use annuities to maximise
overall satisfaction from retirement consumption is advised to spend 61.83% on a 6-year
deferred annuity. We compare our strategies with other available decumulation strate-
gies in the market, hence verifying the merits of the design. Moreover, the stability
of our results are examined after allowing for consumption smoothness, social income
benefits, a target replacement ratio and a bequest motive.
Keywords: Deferred annuities, Decumulation strategy, Defined Contribution, Retire-
ment.
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4.1 Introduction
Over the past few decades, the traditional defined benefit (DB) pension plan has been
gradually losing its dominance in private sector pension systems in many countries in
favour of the defined contribution (DC) pension plan. In a DC pension scheme, members
need to accumulate retirement savings into their personal pension accounts and make
wise decisions on how to use the money to support their life in retirement. In the
process of the decumulation phase, the dilemma is that if individuals withdraw too
much, they may run out of money before they die; but if they withdraw too little,
they may have to bear lower living standards unnecessarily. Advice on a spending and
investment strategy is in great demand from professionals such as investment advisors,
pension providers, consultants and scholars, especially after the UK government recently
reduced the restrictions on accessing personal pension account balances.
A great deal of effort has been made to determine a safe drawdown strategy. The
best known one is the 4% rule from Bengen (1994), who suggests that an initial safe
withdrawal rate from a portfolio is 4% of the assets and subsequent withdrawals increase
annually with inflation rates. He described it as the highest spending rate that allows
the portfolio to last for at least 30 years before being exhausted by withdrawals. Cooley
et al. (1998) conduct a “Trinity Study”, where they use simulations to determine, for
each spending rate, the success probability that a portfolio will last for a certain number
of years. A similar approach is adopted in current practice to determine the appropriate
spending rate that allows for some probability of running out of money. The 4% rule
has achieved wide acceptance among retirement planners and financial advisers due
to its simplicity. Nonetheless, it has been sharply criticised by many scholars. For
example, Scott et al. (2009) illustrate that the strategy is suboptimal since it suggests
a constant spending plan while using a risky, volatile investment strategy. The retirees
therefore have unspent surpluses when markets outperform and face shortfalls when
markets underperform. Blanchett et al. (2016) argue that most of the literature is based
on the historical returns of assets in the United States; and hence it is not applicable to
other countries. According to Blanchett et al. (2016), given lower expected returns in the
UK, especially in the near term, the safe initial withdrawal rate should be approximately
2.5% in the UK.
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Another popular stream of retirement strategies is based on annuities and their use in
retirement planning. A lifetime annuity basically provides a steady stream of income
in retirement as long as the annuitant is alive, in exchange for an upfront premium
charge. Therefore it is effectively protecting retirees against longevity risk, the risk of
outliving one’s assets which would result in a lower standard of living. Yaari (1965) ini-
tially demonstrates in a life-cycle model that a risk averse individual without a bequest
motive should adopt a strategy of immediate full annuitisation at the point of retire-
ment. This has been discussed widely in the subsequent literature. Brown et al. (2001)
offer a conclusion regarding the operation of annuity markets and how annuities can
assist people in retirement to allocate resources over an uncertain lifetime. Chen et al.
(2006) and Ibbotson et al. (2007) demonstrate the benefits brought by an annuity as an
integrated part of lifelong financial planning. Despite the popularity at the theoretical
level, the empirical data from the annuity markets has shown that retirees are reluctant
to purchase voluntarily immediate annuities as a retirement solution. In the UK where
there were two distinct annuity markets, sales in the Compulsory Purchase Annuity
(CPA) market were consistently much higher than that in the voluntary Purchased Life
Annuity (PLA) market. By 2010, the CPA market had grown to £11.5 billion worth of
annuity premiums while the PLA market only had £72 million worth of sales (Cannon
and Tonks, 2011).
In recent years, the deferred annuity has aroused intensive discussion as an alternative
retirement solution (see OECD (2016) and Sexauer et al. (2012) for example). Similar to
an immediate annuity, a deferred annuity may be purchased with a lump sum payment1
and in exchange, pays a guaranteed income as long as the annuitant is alive. The
only difference is that the first payment from the deferred annuity will be delayed for a
pre-determined number of years. The competitive advantages of deferred annuities have
been discussed in Milevsky (2005), Gong and Webb (2010), Scott et al. (2007), and Scott
(2008). First, it requires a smaller initial investment compared to immediate annuities, as
its price incorporates the probability of surviving until the payment commencement date
and the time value of money. Since a deferred annuity product costs only a relatively
small proportion of lifetime savings, it overcomes a potential psychological barrier to
annuitisation. Second, in addition to the lower price, a deferred annuity provides almost
as much longevity protection as an immediate annuity product. Since the longevity risk
1Deferred annuity contracts are also designed with regular periodic premiums payable during part or
all of the deferment period.
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is concentrated at an advanced age, deferred annuities are specially designed to protect
the advanced lives. For example, a 15-year deferred annuity purchased at the age of
65 costs only 21.8% of the price of an immediate annuity purchased at the same age 2.
However, it provides the same level of income as the immediate annuity for life once the
annuitant reaches age 80. Third, the use of a relatively small fraction of one’s retirement
savings means that retirees can preserve some liquidity by purchasing deferred annuities;
hence allowing them to leave a bequest or save for unexpected health shocks. Fourth,
there is the risk of increasing cognitive impairment at advanced ages – for example,
Laibson (2009) shows that 20 percent of retirees in their 80s have been fully diagnosed
dementia and 30 percent have severe cognitive impairment. Therefore it would be wise
to purchase deferred annuities at retirement to protect consumption at very advanced
ages.
In the process of retirement financial planning, one challenge comes from the uncertainty
of one’s lifetime. The structure of the deferred annuity improves and simplifies the
process. With the deferred annuity providing income protection after a fixed period,
retirees simply need to determine how to invest and consume the rest of their income or
wealth across the fixed deferred period (or a shorter-than-expected period due to early
death). This is a much easier task and would be less likely to expose retirees to the risk
of living in poverty.
Bearing this in mind, we propose a utility-maximising decumulation strategy comprising
a deferred annuity purchased at retirement and optimal consumption and savings before
the commencement of the annuity. The strategy divides the entire retirement period
into two stages: one fixed period with active consumption and investment decisions to
be made; followed by an uncertain period with passive lifelong income from the deferred
annuity. We set up two models with different breakpoints between the two stages: one
in which the choice of the deferred period is exogenous (M1) and one in which it is
endogenous (M2). M1 assumes that retirees already have preferences for the age from
which they will be protected and they want to use that specific product to improve
retirement planning. The structure of this strategy is similar as the DCDB strategy
proposed by Sexauer et al. (2012), although the DCDB is a pure static model. M2
assumes retirees consider using the optimal deferred annuities to improve retirement
2This annuity price is calculated based on assumptions of 3% p.a. real rate of return, mortality table
S2PML and zero profit loading.
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planning. This involves identifying the most favorable annuity type, which is a research
question discussed in Scott et al. (2011).
Using numerical optimisation, given our chosen assumptions, we find the following strate-
gies. (i) A retiree who is concerned about longevity risk and wants to retain a certain
level of liquidity is advised to spend 21.6% in a 15-year deferred annuity or 9.13% in
a 20-year deferred annuity. Prior to the commencement of the annuity, a decreasing
drawdown plan is suggested. (ii) A retiree who simply wants to use annuities to max-
imise overall satisfaction from retirement consumption is advised to spend 61.83% in
a 6-year deferred annuity and to follow a decreasing consumption path until the start
of annuity payments. A sensitivity check shows that our recommended allocations are
stable relative to the desire for smooth consumption, the existence of state benefits and
the bequest motive. However, the existence of a target replacement ratio is an influential
factor on recommended strategies. If there is a target replacement ratio, retirees would
be willing to buy a deferred annuity that offers income close to the target.
In this chapter, Section 2 introduces the set up of the main models M1 and M2 and the
optimal results following these two strategies. In Section 3, M1 and M2 are compared
with a DCDB strategy and we comment on the major characteristics of these strate-
gies. Section 4 provides the results of four model extensions, which discuss a smooth
consumption requirement, state benefits, the target replacement ratio and the bequest
motive. Section 5 offers some concluding comments on our major findings.
4.2 Basic decumulation strategy
4.2.1 Model set-up
As an individual approaches retirement, she would gain access to her personal accumu-
lated pension account and needs to make a decision on how to allocate the lump sum of
money to support living during the retirement period. In this study, we assume without
loss of generality that the total wealth at retirement is w = 1.
Let cx denote the annual rate of consumption that would take place at age x. x is
defined on the age interval [65,119]. Suppose V is the overall expected discounted utility
of the entire retirement consumption stream cx and it measures retirees’ preferences of
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one strategy over another. Our objective is to find the consumption streams cx that can
maximise the value of V subject to the wealth constraint.
Following our strategy, the purchase of a d-year deferred annuity divides the process of
retirement planning into two stages. In the former stage, consumption before annuity
commencement, c65, . . . , c65+d−1, is met by simple drawdowns from unannuitised savings.
The investment option during this period is assumed to be a fixed savings account
where wealth accumulates at the risk free interest rate. At the point when the deferred
annuity commences, retirees move to the latter stage where consumption, c65+d, ..., c119,
is fully secured by an annuity provider. The optimal consumption stream during the
second stage enables us to identify the preferred annuity payment type and the optimal
allocation of wealth into the deferred annuity, α. The model of our strategy can be
expressed in the following form:
V = max
c65,c66,...
54∑
i=0
δ(i)× ip65 × u(c65+i)
subject to
d−1∑
i=0
c65+i × (1 + r)−i +
54∑
i=d
c65+i × (1 + r)−i × ip65 × (1 + L) = 1
where
α =
54∑
i=d
c65+i × (1 + r)−i × ip65 × (1 + L)
δ(i) may be interpreted as a subjective discount function for utility, ip65 as the probabil-
ity of surviving for i years for a 65-year-old, u(·) as the utility associated with the rate
of consumption, r as the real interest rate and L as the profit loading factor embedded
in the annuity price.
Here, we assume that the subjective discount function for the utility is the same as the
discount function for consumption rates. In addition, a constant real rate of return r
is assumed for wealth accumulation and annuity pricing. We follow the literature (e.g.
Gong and Webb (2010)) by assuming a time-additive constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) utility function of the following form:
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u(c) = c
1−γ
1− γ
where γ measures the coefficient of risk aversion.
In this analysis, we consider two different situations regarding the deferred period. In
model M1, the deferred period d is a fixed exogenous factor. This could be thought
of as a public policy rule which encourages retirees to allocate a certain percentage of
savings into a 15-year or a 20-year deferred annuity. In model M2, the deferred period
d is an endogenous factor that is determined optimally by the retiree. In the following,
we introduce the results from the two models respectively.
4.2.2 Results
The results we display are based on the following assumptions. A moderate relative risk
aversion of γ = 2 is assumed and profit loading on annuity product equals L = 10%. The
discount rate for both utility and money amount are based on exponential discounting
with a constant real interest rate of 3 percent. UK mortality table S2PML, which
describes the mortality experience of UK male pensioners of self-administered pension
schemes for the period from 2004 to 2011, is used to calculate the survival rate ip65 .
In what follows, we provide results for the optimal wealth allocation, α, in the deferred
annuity and the optimal retirement consumption path, cx for 65 ≤ x ≤ 109. The
sensitivity of the results is also explored by changing the real interest rate, profit loading
and risk aversion factors.
4.2.2.1 M1: The strategy with a predetermined deferred annuity
In the case that the recommended deferred annuity contract has a fixed deferred period,
we can find mathematically the closed form solution for the optimal consumption path
and optimal wealth allocation in the deferred annuity. Derivation is shown in Appendix
4.A.
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Table 4.1: Optimal investment percentage (α) in a deferred annuity (M1)
Interest rate (r) 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
Deferred period (d)
5 72.13% 69.88% 67.62% 65.38% 63.16%
10 47.02% 44.05% 41.19% 38.45% 35.85%
15 26.44% 23.92% 21.60% 19.47% 17.51%
20 11.97% 10.47% 9.13% 7.94% 6.90%
25 3.98% 3.36% 2.83% 2.38% 2.00%
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a risk aversion factor of γ = 2, a profit
loading factor of L = 0.1. Mortality rates are based on table S2PML.
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Figure 4.1: Optimal consumption paths with regard to different interest rates (M1)
Notes: Results are based on a 15-year deferred annuity and the following assumptions are used:
a risk aversion factor of γ = 2, a profit loading factor of L = 0.1. Mortality rates are based on
table S2PML.
c65+i = i
p
1/γ
65∑d−1
i=0 (1 + r)−iip
1/γ
65 + (1 + L)(1−1/γ)
∑54
i=d(1 + r)−iip65
for i = 0, . . . , (d− 1)
c65+i =
(1 + L)−1/γ∑d−1
i=0 (1 + r)−iip
1/γ
65 + (1 + L)(1−1/γ)
∑54
i=d(1 + r)−iip65
for i = d, . . . , 54
(4.1)
α = (1 + L)
(1−1/γ)∑54
i=d(1 + r)−iip65∑d−1
i=0 (1 + r)−iip
1/γ
65 + (1 + L)(1−1/γ)
∑54
i=d(1 + r)−iip65
(4.2)
Table 4.1 shows the results for the optimal annuity allocation α under different possible
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values of the interest rate and deferred period. It demonstrates that under a reasonable
assumption of a 3 percent interest rate, retirees would choose to allocate 21.6% in a
15-year deferred annuity that starts providing income at age 80, or to allocate 9.13%
in a 20-year deferred annuity that starts providing income at age 85. The results show
that our strategy is a practical plan as one needs to spend only a small proportion of
wealth to receive longevity protection and achieve utility maximisation at retirement.
Figure 4.1 demonstrates the corresponding optimal consumption paths when the chosen
deferred period is 15 years and the interest rates varies from 1 percent to 5 percent. For
example, a 3 percent interest rate suggests that individuals should spend 6.8% in the
first year at retirement and decrease the spending rate steadily in subsequent years. An
allocation of 21.6% in a deferred annuity allows them to receive a level payment of 6.5%
annually after age 80.
In terms of the sensitivity to changes in the interest rate, Table 4.1 shows that retirees
tend to invest less in deferred annuities when the interest rate increases. A smaller
allocation under a higher interest rate environment does not suggest that annuities
become less attractive; it is rather that annuities become cheaper. As an illustration,
the price of a 5-year deferred annuity would decrease by 38.53% when the interest rate
increases from 1 percent to 5 percent; while the recommended investment proportion of
wealth into an annuity shows only a 8.97% decrease, from 72.13% to 63.16% (in both
cases, a 10% profit loading is included). Therefore, deferred annuity products are more
attractive when the interest rate goes up. Figure 4.1 also shows that retirees would
have an increase of 0.005% in annuity income in response to a 1 percent increase in
the interest rate. From another perspective, as the interest rate goes up, retirees could
get higher returns from alternative investment opportunities such as equities and bonds.
Therefore, it is reasonable to see them allocate a smaller proportion of wealth in annuities
and invest the unannuitised proportion on their own. Figure 4.1 shows a parallel shift
of the optimal consumption path under different interest rates, which indicates that the
interest rate does not influence preferred spending patterns during retirement.
Figure 4.2 shows the value of the maximum expected utility, V , achieved from the opti-
mal consumption strategies under different levels of interest rate and deferred periods.
In order to have a higher level of satisfaction, retirees may prefer to choose annuities with
a shorter deferred period. However, this is at the cost of retaining low liquidity at the
point of retirement by investing a high proportion of wealth in annuities. In addition,
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Figure 4.2: Maximum attainable expected utility with regard to different interest
rates (M1)
Notes: d denotes the deferred period of the chosen annuity. Results are based on the following
assumptions: a risk aversion factor of γ = 2 and a profit loading factor of L = 0.1. Mortality
rates are based on table S2PML.
Table 4.2: Optimal investment percentage (α) in a 15-year deferred annuity (M1)
Risk aversion factor (γ) 2 3 4 5 6
Profit loading (L)
5% 21.21% 20.99% 20.88% 20.81% 20.77%
10% 21.60% 21.51% 21.46% 21.43% 21.42%
15% 21.98% 22.02% 22.03% 22.04% 22.05%
20% 22.35% 22.51% 22.58% 22.63% 22.66%
25% 22.70% 22.98% 23.12% 23.21% 23.26%
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a 15-year deferred annuity and a real
rate of return of r = 3%. Mortality rates are based on table S2PML.
under a high interest rate environment, retirees can achieve a higher level of satisfaction
from the deferred annuity investment than under a low interest rate environment.
Table 4.2 shows the impact of the profit loading and risk-aversion on the optimal wealth
allocation on a 15-year deferred annuity. Looking horizontally in the table, we note that
the risk-aversion factor has a very limited influence on the optimal decision of how much
to spend on a 15-year deferred annuity. Looking vertically in the table, it is optimal for
retirees to allocate a higher percentage of wealth on annuity products when insurance
companies charge a higher profit loading. However, the higher percentage is simply
due to the higher price rather than a higher attractiveness of annuity products. The
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Figure 4.3: Optimal consumption paths with regard to different profit loading rates
(M1)
Notes: Results are based on a 15-year deferred annuity and the following assumptions are used:
a risk aversion factor of γ = 2 and a real rate of return of r = 3%. Mortality rates are based on
table S2PML.
real wealth allocation that is used to pay for future payments, measured by α/(1 + L),
actually decreases with profit loading; thus indicating that an annuity becomes less
desirable as its price increases.
The change in the consumption path with regard to the profit loading factor, following a
strategy with a 15-year deferred annuity, is illustrated in Figure 4.3. While, as expected,
a higher profit loading makes the deferred annuity less desirable, it does not influence
much the withdrawal rates before the commencement of an annuity. This means an an-
nuity product which is poorer in value for money would lead to a smoother consumption
path at retirement. Therefore the profit loading is a component of the consumption gap
that is identified in Figure 4.1. When the profit margin required by insurance companies
is relatively low, the annuity as a longevity protection product is good value for money
and individuals should allocate a high proportion of wealth in it. A higher annuity allo-
cation leads to a greater consumption gap at the point when the annuity commences. As
the profit loading increases, the product becomes less attractive; an optimal plan advises
investing less into the annuity, thus achieving a more balanced and smooth consumption
rate during the entire retirement period.
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Table 4.3: Greatest consumption gap (g) in each optimal consumption path with a
15-year deferred annuity (M1)
Risk aversion factor (γ) 2 3 4 5 6
Profit loading (L)
5% 18.1% 11.7% 8.7% 6.9% 5.7%
10% 15.4% 10.0% 7.4% 5.9% 4.9%
15% 12.9% 8.4% 6.2% 5.0% 4.1%
20% 10.5% 6.9% 5.1% 4.1% 3.4%
25% 8.3% 5.4% 4.0% 3.2% 2.7%
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a 15-year deferred annuity and a real
rate of return of r = 3%. Mortality rates are based on table S2PML.
People tend to prefer smooth consumption so that they can maintain their living stan-
dards. However, the utility maximising strategy suggests a path with an obvious gap
at the transition point when the annuity payment starts. In order to understand the
driving factors behind the consumption gap, we derive the mathematical expression for
the greatest change between any two consecutive consumption rates during retirement,
g, following a strategy with the 15-year deferred annuity. The greatest gap always occurs
between the last consumption rate before the annuity starts and the annuity pay-out
rate, and the formula for this gap, g, is
g = (1 + L)
−1/γ − 14P 1/γ65
14P
1/γ
65
(4.3)
Equation (4.3) shows that the greatest consumption gap is influenced by the profit load-
ing factor, L, the level of risk aversion, γ, and the choice of the survival model. Table
4.3 shows the value of g for different profit loadings L and different risk aversion factors
γ. As we have explained, a higher profit loading factor encourages a smaller invest-
ment in deferred annuities, leading to a smaller consumption gap during the transition
point. Moreover, individuals who are more risk averse tend to prefer a more smooth
consumption path during retirement by investing a similar proportion in the deferred
annuities.
4.2.2.2 M2: The strategy with an optimal deferred annuity
In a perfect annuity market without any profit loading, the annuitised state should
always be preferable to the non-annuitised state. In other words, the best retirement
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Table 4.4: Optimal investment percentage (α) in a deferred annuity (M2)
Profit loading (L) 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Optimal deferred period 4 6 8 10 11
Risk aversion factor (γ)
2 73.20% 61.83% 51.54% 42.25% 38.20%
3 73.30% 62.07% 51.91% 42.71% 38.77%
4 73.35% 62.19% 52.10% 42.94% 39.05%
5 73.38% 62.26% 52.21% 43.08% 39.22%
6 73.40% 62.31% 52.28% 43.17% 39.33%
Notes: Results are based on a real rate of r = 3% and the mortality table S2PML.
planning strategy can be achieved by buying an immediate annuity at age 65. This is
because by buying annuities, individuals receive extra returns from mortality sharing,
which is effectively a subsidy from early deaths to survivors (i.e. later deaths). In a
more ideal world with profit loading charged by insurance companies, the optimal age
to receive the first annuity payment is
TA = min(65 + i : (1 + L)× ip65 ≤ 1) (4.4)
Due to this formula and with prior knowledge of the profit loading in insurance pricing
and the individual mortality rates, individuals can derive their optimal deferred period,
d. With this choice of d, the same analytical process will be implemented as in M1
to deduce the preferred consumption path and the investment allocation in deferred
annuities.
Note that if one can find an i such that the inequality in Equation (4.4) holds with
equality, then the jump size g defined in Equation (4.3) becomes zero. This means that
if i can be exactly chosen, the optimal deferred period implies no gap in the consumption
path.
Table 4.4 offers optimal results for model M2 with different assumptions for the profit
loading, L, increasing from 5% to 25%. With the assumption of a 10% profit loading and
risk aversion factor of 2, individuals would be better off by allocating 61.83% of pension
wealth in a 6-year deferred annuity. If annuity providers require a higher profitability on
annuity products, individuals would allocate less wealth to purchase an annuity with a
longer deferred period. Moreover, an analysis of the results under different levels of risk
aversion shows that retirees who are more risk averse tend to allocate a slightly higher
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Figure 4.4: Optimal consumption paths with regard to different levels of risk aversion
(M2)
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a profit loading factor of L = 10% and
a real rate of return of r = 3%. Mortality rates are based on table S2PML.
percentage in deferred annuities. Since the annuity effectively helps mitigate the risk of
outliving one’s wealth under uncertain lifetime, it is reasonable to see that people who
are more risk averse place higher values on the insurance product and hence invest more
in it. They also obtain a more smooth consumption path, which is illustrated in Figure
4.4.
4.3 A comparison of three decumulation strategies
In the previous section, we proposed two strategies that involve a utility-maximising
consumption withdrawal plan and the purchase of either a fixed long-term deferred an-
nuity (M1) or a flexible deferred annuity (M2). The two strategies are to some extent
similar to the DCDB decumulation strategy proposed by Sexauer et al. (2012). The
DCDB strategy includes a fixed 20-year deferred annuity as well; however it suggests
the purchase of laddered Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) prior to an-
nuity commencement in order to maintain the sustainability and purchasing power of
consumption. In this section, we will give a detailed introduction of the DCDB strategy
and compare it with our strategies M1 and M2.
81
Chapter 4. Optimal decumulation strategies during retirement with deferred annuities
4.3.1 DCDB benchmark
The DCDB benchmark proposed by Sexauer et al. (2012) is an investment strategy that
makes a Defined Contribution plan look more like a Defined Benefit pension plan. The
investment portfolio consists of two assets: a portfolio of laddered TIPS for 20 years and
a 20-year deferred nominal life annuity. For the first 20 years, the income paid out of the
TIPS should grow at the experienced rate of US Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation,
and the income rate has allowed for the principal payment so that the capital balance
of the portfolio is zero at the end of the 20th year. Beyond the 20th year, the nominal
deferred annuity starts providing income and it continues until the investor’s death.
As the first payment of the annuity (and also each of its subsequent payments) is set to be
equal to the last payment from the TIPS portfolio, the allocation in the deferred annuity
is easily calculated, given the initial payout rate from TIPS, the expected inflation rate
and the 20-year deferred annuity price. According to the market annuity price and the
TIPS yield curve as of 1 August 2010, Sexauer et al. (2012) suggest investing 88.3% of
wealth into the TIPS portfolio and the remaining 11.7% into the deferred annuity, for a
man entering retirement at age 65.
In designing this decumulation strategy, the authors claim to achieve a compromise
solution under the assumption that investors’ concerns about maximising returns and
minimising risk can be expressed in four “dimensions”. Firstly, longevity risk, the major
concern in retirement financial planning, is minimised by the inclusion of the deferred
annuity in the investment portfolio. Although annuity payments come at a later stage
in retirement, it provides income as long as the annuitant survives, hence converting the
uncertain lifetime financial planning into a fixed period financial planning. This is how
the authors make the DC plan look like a DB plan. Secondly, the liquidity risk is largely
reduced since the strategy does not suggest holding the entire portfolio in annuities
immediately after retirement. Much of the liquidity is preserved after investing only
11.7% in the illiquid asset. Thirdly, the investment risk and inflation risk are minimised
by investing in the lowest risk US government bonds. Moreover, counterparty risk is not
reduced to zero because the government can default and insurance companies may go
bankrupt; however, it is the lowest that can be achieved in an investment market.
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4.3.2 A comparison of three strategies
Before a comparison is made, we need to allow for strategies M1 and M2 in the context
of a world with positive inflation. In the presence of an inflation rate, the remaining
wealth during retirement would accumulate with a nominal rate of return, which is
a combination of the real interest rate and the inflation rate. Therefore the optimal
consumption stream c′x that we are looking for is in nominal term. However, only real
consumption rates contribute towards the overall utility, V , because they reflect real
purchasing power. The model of our strategy allowing for inflation can therefore be
expressed in the following form:
V = max
c′65,c
′
66,...
54∑
i=0
(1 + r)−i × ip65 × u
( c′65+i
(1 + f)i
)
subject to
d−1∑
i=0
c′65+i × (1 + rnominal)−i +
54∑
i=d
c′65+i × (1 + rnominal)−i × ip65 × (1 + L) = 1
where f represents the expected inflation rate and rnominal represents the nominal rate
of return.
Using the Lagrangian method, we derive the closed form solution for the optimal nominal
consumption rates and the optimal deferred annuity allocation as follows. For detailed
derivations please see Appendix 4.B.
c′65+i =
ip
1/γ
65 (1 + f)i∑d−1
i=0 (1 + r)−iip
1/γ
65 + (1 + L)(1−1/γ)
∑54
i=d(1 + r)−iip65
for i = 0, . . . , (d− 1)
c′65+i =
(1 + L)−1/γ(1 + f)i∑d−1
i=0 (1 + r)−iip
1/γ
65 + (1 + L)(1−1/γ)
∑54
i=d(1 + r)−iip65
for i = d, . . . , 54
(4.5)
α = (1 + L)
(1−1/γ)∑54
i=d(1 + r)−iip65∑d−1
i=0 (1 + r)−iip
1/γ
65 + (1 + L)(1−1/γ)
∑54
i=d(1 + r)−iip65
(4.6)
Comparing Equation (4.5) and Equation (4.6) with those displayed in Equation (4.1) and
Equation (4.2), we have two conclusions regarding the impact of the inflation rate. First,
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Table 4.5: A comparison of three strategies
Strategies Asset allocations
M1 9.13% in a 20-year deferred annuity
M2 61.83% in a 6-year deferred annuity
DCDB 92.02% in 20-year TIPS + 7.98% in a 20-year deferred annuity
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a profit loading factor of L = 10%, a
real rate of return of r = 3% p.a., an inflation rate of f = 2% and a risk aversion factor of γ = 2.
The DCDB investment percentage presented here is different from that in the paper by
Sexauer et al. (2012). For comparison purposes, we recalculate the DCDB investment
percentage using a different set of assumptions.
the inflation rate does not affect the real portion of optimal consumption; the nominal
consumption rates would simply increase in line with the inflation rate. Second, an
index-linked deferred annuity would be preferred in the presence of the inflation rate.
However, the optimal wealth allocation in the deferred annuities is not affected by the
inflation rate. The annuity is either priced using the real rate in a zero inflation rate
environment or priced using the nominal rate in a positive inflation rate environment.
In either case, the allocation would not be affected.
Now, all three strategies are allowed for in the context of a world with a positive inflation
rate. Based on the descriptions of our strategies and the DCDB, the remaining funda-
mental difference is the target. M1 and M2 focus on maximising utility from retirement
consumption; while the DCDB targets maximising returns and minimising risks. This
can lead to very different strategies and retirement consumption paths. Since the DCDB
benchmark has been proposed with a 20-year deferred annuity, we assume a fixed 20-
year deferred period in M1. The structure of the three plans is shown in Table 4.5 and
the corresponding nominal consumption paths are reflected in Figure 4.5.
Table 4.5 shows that strategies M1 and DCDB suggest investing a similar proportion
of wealth in a 20-year deferred annuity product. However, the retirement consumption
paths suggested by these two strategies have different shapes in the two stages, as shown
in Figure 4.5. In terms of consumption from age 85 onwards, M1 suggests buying
an index-linked deferred annuity while DCDB suggests buying a conventional deferred
annuity with level incomes. The real purchasing power of the annuity income is therefore
maintained by following M1 but it deteriorates by following DCDB. On the other hand,
prior to the start of the 20-year deferred annuity, consumption rates suggested by M1
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Figure 4.5: A comparison of optimal consumption paths under three strategies
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a profit loading factor of L = 10%, a
real rate of return of r = 3%, an inflation rate of f = 2% and a risk aversion factor of γ = 2.
fluctuate around 6.5% and have decreasing real value. The TIPS security adopted by
the DCDB would ensure that purchasing power is maintained at the same level as at
age 65. Overall, the DCDB strategy results in lower consumption compared with M1
for most of the time during retirement. It is because DCDB is a static model rather
than an optimised model like M1.
An interesting finding is that strategy M2, which suggests spending 61.90% on an index-
linked 6-year deferred annuity, achieves the highest spending rates among the three
strategies at all ages during the retirement period. As can be seen from Figure 4.5,
the consumption path following M2 dominates all other strategies in both stages. The
utility equivalent wealth in Table 4.6 illustrates the competitive advantage of strategy
M2 as well. Under the assumptions in the benchmark scenario, with the real rate of 3
percent and profit loading of 10 percent, the utility equivalent wealth of M2 is 0.8960
while that of M1 is 1 and that of DCDB is 1.0112. It means that in order to achieve
the same amount of utility, following M2 one needs to spend only 89.6% of the wealth
used when following strategy M1, or 88.6% (0.8960/1.0112) of the wealth used when
following DCDB.
Table 4.6 also shows the impact of the real interest rate and the profit loading factor on
the three strategies. In contrast with DCDB, M2 has a smaller utility equivalent wealth
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Table 4.6: Utility equivalent wealth of three strategies
Real rate (r) 3% 1% 5% 3% 3%
Profit loading (L) 10% 10% 10% 5% 15%
Strategy
M1 1 1 1 1 1
M2 0.8960 0.8854 0.9068 0.8725 0.9142
DCDB 1.0112 1.0128 1.0098 1.0118 1.0107
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions. A 20-year deferred annuity, d = 20, for
strategies M1 and DCDB. A risk aversion factor of γ = 2 and an inflation rate of f = 2%.
Mortality rates are based on table S2PML.
in a low interest rate environment than in a high interest rate environment. When the
interest rate is 1 percent, following M2 one needs to spend only 88.54% of the wealth
used when following strategy M1 to achieve the same amount of utility; however when
the interest rate is 5 percent, following M2 one needs to spend 90.68% of the wealth
used when following strategy M1 to achieve the same amount of utility. Therefore, the
competitive advantage of M2 is greater in a lower interest rate environment. Moreover,
the competitive advantage of M2 is greater in a low profit loading environment. This
is because the utility equivalent wealth of M2 decreases as the profit loading factor
decreases. When the profit loading factor is 5 percent, following M2 one needs to have
12.75% less wealth than if one were following M1 to achieve the same amount of utility;
however, when the profit loading is 15 percent, following M2 one needs to have 8.58%
less wealth than if one were following M1 to achieve same amount of utility.
We conclude that M2 is the best strategy among the three in terms of the consumption
to be achieved during retirement. However, this comes at a price: a much lower liquidity
would be preserved at hand in the beginning of retirement period. After the annuity
purchase, M1 followers have 90.87% left as cash while M2 followers have only 38.17%
left. Given that people dislike trading liquid assets for illiquid assets, deciding which
strategy to follow would be affected by personal preferences such as leaving a bequest
or making extra medical consumption at an advanced age.
To conclude, all three strategies have different characteristics. Table 4.7 provides a
summary.
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Table 4.7: Achievements of three strategies
M1 M2 DCDB
Reduce longevity risk * * *
Reduce liquidity risk * *
Reduce inflation risk * * *
Achieve higher utility *
4.4 Model extensions
4.4.1 A decumulation strategy to ensure smooth consumption
In economics, a widely accepted concept called “consumption smoothing” states that
people desire a stable path of consumption. The idea was initially introduced as Perma-
nent Income Theory by Friedman (1957). It says that individuals choose consumption at
each point in time to maximise a lifetime utility function that depends on both current
income and expected income levels in the future; therefore individuals spread out the
transitory changes in income over time and the predicted consumption pattern is smooth.
The life cycle model introduced by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) to address the in-
tertemporal consumption problem suggests that the trajectory of consumption should
be continuous in time; a consumption pattern with less discontinuity will increase utility
without an increase in the use of resources.
While our decumulation framework is based on the maximization of discounted utility,
in Model M1 there is a jump in the consumption path due to a predefined deferral
period. As introduced in Section 2, the recommended consumption path with a 15-year
deferred annuity contains a 15.41% jump at the point where the annuity starts paying.
This is because an annuity is a cost-effective product to improve retirement income and
a utility maximisation strategy recommends a high percentage of wealth to be allocated
in annuity products. In order to balance the desire for smooth consumption during
the retirement period and retain the benefits of annuity products, we now make an
adjustment to model M1. The modified strategy can be expressed as follows.
V = max
c65,c66,...
54∑
i=0
δ(i)× ip65 × u(c65+i)− κ
53∑
i=0
(c65+i+1 − c65+i)2 (4.7)
subject to
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Table 4.8: Optimal investment percentage (α) in a 15-year deferred annuity for dif-
ferent rough consumption penalties κ
κ 102 103 104 105 106
α 21.58% 21.43% 21.06% 21.00% 21.25%
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a 15-year deferred annuity, d = 15, a
profit loading factor of L = 10%, a real rate of return of r = 3% and a risk aversion factor of
γ = 2. Mortality rates are based on table S2PML.
Table 4.9: A summary of the consumption paths presented in Figure 4.6
κ 102 103 104 105 106
Max consumption 6.80% 6.79% 6.74% 6.56% 6.43%
Min consumption 5.66% 5.82% 6.07% 6.28% 6.38%
Max - Min 1.14% 0.98% 0.67% 0.28% 0.05%
Smooth consumption path ? No No No Yes Yes
Consumption gap 14.52% 9.99% 3.04% NA NA
• ∑d−1i=0 c65+i × (1 + r)−i +∑54i=d c65+i × (1 + r)−i × ip65 × (1 + L) = 1
• c65+i = ca for i = d, d+ 1, . . .
where κ controls the importance of smooth consumption to an individual; ca denotes
the income level from a conventional level deferred annuity.
Here we have introduced an additional term of first-order of finite differences in con-
sumption rates as a smoothness criterion. In the literature, this is a widely adopted
method to measure smoothness in the sequence of graduated values (London, 1985).
It is also an effective tool to be used to compare the relative degrees of smoothness in
several graduations. From Equation (4.7), we deduct the value of variations from the
overall utility, indicating that a less smooth consumption path would lead to lower util-
ity, so that the second term in Equation (4.7) can be thought of as a penalty for lack of
smoothness.
Table 4.8 shows the optimal results of α under a range of possibilities of κ. An increasing
level of the penalty for consumption changes does not influence the optimal results of
asset allocation. In other words, an individual with a high requirement on consump-
tion smoothness would be willing to invest a similar percentage of wealth in annuities
as another individual who has no requirement on consumption smoothness. However,
different attitudes towards consumption smoothness do have an impact on preferred
consumption pattern, as shown in Figure 4.6. As retirees apply a greater amount of
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Figure 4.6: Optimal consumption paths with regard to different levels of penalty (κ)
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a 15-year deferred annuity, d = 15, a
profit loading factor of L = 10%, a real rate of return of r = 3% and a risk aversion factor of
γ = 2. Mortality rates are based on table S2PML.
penalty to changes in consumption, they follow a less volatile path. When the penalty
factor κ is 102, optimal consumption rates during the entire retirement period vary in
a range of [5.66%, 6.80%]. When the penalty factor becomes 106, retirees choose a con-
stant consumption rate during the entire retirement period; an immediate annuity from
age 65 would be a better product in this sense.
We have also explored three other models to ensure smooth consumption. Detailed
results from these three other models are not included in this thesis but are available
from the author. One model introduces a limit on the greatest percentage change in
consecutive consumption rates,
∣∣∣∣ci+1 − cici
∣∣∣∣ ≤ g, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 54.
where g equalling 5% means that an individual expects the consumption level in next
year to be less than 105% and greater than 95% of the consumption level in the current
year. This second way of modelling smooth consumption requirement leads to the same
conclusion as we discussed above. Setting an upper limit on the consumption change
would not influence the wealth allocation; however, it suggests a less volatile consumption
path as g becomes smaller.
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The other two models dealing with the requirement on smooth consumption fail in some
ways. In one model, we assume that retirees require current spending to be less than or
equal to the spending in the previous year.
c65+i ≥ c65+i+1, for i = 0, 1, . . . , d− 1.
This effectively removes the jump in the consumption rate; the optimal consumption rate
is decreasing in the first few years and then stays constant. However, the optimal results
achieved in this framework are not efficient because the annual consumption rate falls
to the level of annuity payment before the start of the annuity. For example, a retiree
who purchases a 15-year deferred annuity is suggested to consume the same amount as
the annuity payment from age 73. In such a case, the retiree will be better off buying
an annuity that commences its payments earlier. However, this breaks the assumptions
of model M1.
The DCDB strategy introduced in the previous section assumes that the annuity pay-
ment is equal to the last payment of the TIPS portfolio. In light of this, we tried to
set the first annuity payment equal to the inflation adjusted amount of the previous
consumption level.
cd = cd−1 × (1 + f),
where f denotes the expected inflation rate. Results based on this framework show that
the additional constraint does not address the problem of consumption discontinuity
because the kink in consumption path remains. This is due to the fact that when the
change between the final consumption in stage one and the annuity income is constrained,
the gap moves one year forward. Therefore, this is not an effective framework to model
the requirement for smooth consumption.
4.4.2 A decumulation strategy with consideration of state benefits
The basic state pension is a regular payment that one can receive from the government
if he/she reaches state pension age. In the UK, this is part of the pension arrangement
alongside workplace pension schemes. Depending on whether an individual reaches state
pension age before or after 6 April 2016, he/she can claim either the basic state pension
or the new state pension. The full basic state pension is £119.30 per week and the
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full new state pension is £155.65 per week. The exact amount received is based on an
individual’s national insurance record and the rate increases every year. The increase
is given as the maximum of the following three values: average wage growth, Consumer
Price Index (CPI) and 2.5% (UK Government, 2016) 3.
The existence of the state pension guarantees a basic level of retirement income and
lessens the longevity risk to some extent. In the worst case when an individual spends
the entire pension savings, the state pension could support basic living expenses such as
housing, food and utilities. Therefore, the function of longevity protection from annuity
products becomes less important.
Noting that the existence of the state pension could influence demand for annuity prod-
ucts, we would like to explore the impact of the state pension on our proposed decu-
mulation strategies. Although the state pension provides the same amount to everyone,
people may have different views on the amount of money given their different wealth
levels. In this section, we introduce a factor sb representing the annual state pension
as a proportion of an individual’s total pension wealth. For instance, we assume that
the state pension is £5, 000 a year. A mid-income individual has total personal pension
savings of £138, 650 that can be converted into an immediate annuity offering £10, 000
a year 4. Therefore the state benefit constitutes a half of annuity income level and sb
equals 3.61% (5,000/138,650). To test the sensitivity of the factor, we assume a range of
wealth levels and corresponding values of sb are shown in Table 4.10. The interpretation
of sb can be in two ways. For example, a sb of 0.36% means either the state pension is
at a very low level, or the individual has a great amount of pension wealth so that the
state pension means little to him.
V = max
c65,c66,...
54∑
i=0
δ(i)× ip65 × u(c65+i + sb) (4.8)
subject to
• ∑d−1i=0 c65+i × (1 + r)−i +∑54i=d c65+i × (1 + r)−i × ip65 × (1 + L) = 1
• c65+i ≥ 0 for i = d, d+ 1, . . . , 54
3This thesis was written in February 2017, hence the information provided were the most up to date
at that time.
4Annuity price is based on 3 percent interest rate and S2PML mortality table.
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Table 4.10: Assumptions of sb, the state benefit as a percentage of total pension
savings
State pension Annuity income State pension as a multiple Pension Wealtha sbb
(£k) (£k) of annuity income (£k)
5 2.5 2 34.66 14.42%
5 5 1 69.33 7.21%
5 10 0.5 138.65 3.61%
5 50 0.1 693.25 0.72%
5 100 0.05 1386.50 0.36%
aPension wealth is the amount of money that can be converted into an annuity that offers required
annuity income. The rates are calculated based on a 3 percent interest rate and S2PML mortality table.
bsb is the annual state pension as a proportion of an individual’s pension wealth.
Table 4.11: Optimal investment percentage in a deferred annuity
sb 0 0.36% 0.72% 3.61% 7.21% 14.42%
S1(d=15) 21.60% 21.62% 21.63% 21.76% 21.92% 22.25%
S2(L=10%) 61.83% 61.79% 61.75% 61.44% 61.05% 60.28%
Notes: sb represents the state benefit as a percentage of total pension savings. Results for
model S1 is based on an assumption of a 15-year deferred period. Results for model S2 is based
on an assumption of 10 percent profit loading, under which case a 6-year deferred annuity will
be chosen. The rest assumptions are as follows: a real rate of return of r = 3%, a risk aversion
factor of γ = 2 and S2PML mortality table.
Since the state pension is provided annually as long as one is alive, this can be seen
as a source of annual consumption and contributes to the overall utility. Before the
commencement of the deferred annuity, withdrawals from pension savings, c65+i for
i = 0, . . . , d − 1, could be negative as one can make savings from the state pension
if necessary. However, consumption from period d onwards, c65+i for i = d, . . . , 119,
is supported by the annuity provider and must be positive. Based on this framework
(Equation (4.8)), we explore two models, S1 and S2, depending on whether the deferred
period is fixed or optimally derived. Similar to the construction of M1 and M2, S1
represents the case when the deferred period is an exogenous factor; while S2 represents
the case when the deferred period is optimally derived from the mortality rates and the
profit loading factor.
Table 4.11 demonstrates the optimal wealth allocation in a deferred annuity given a
range of values of sb. It can be seen that investment allocations are stable with regard
to different levels of sb. In other words, high-income individuals are recommended to
invest a similar proportion of wealth in deferred annuities as low-income individuals.
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Figure 4.7: Impact of state benefits on the optimal consumption path with a deferred
annuity
Notes: sb represents the state benefit as a percentage of total pension savings. Results for
model S1 is based on an assumption of a 15-year deferred period. Results for model S2 is based
on an assumption of 10 percent profit loading, under which case a 6-year deferred annuity will
be chosen. The rest assumptions are as follows: a real rate of return of r = 3%, a risk aversion
factor of γ = 2 and S2PML mortality table.
However, they would follow different consumption patterns, which are shown in Figure
4.7. The two panels show that high-income individuals (sb = 0) would prefer to have
a smoother consumption path than low-income individuals. That means high-income
individuals would start with a lower withdrawal rate from their total wealth than low-
income individuals, and choose an annuity that offers an income close to the starting
rate in order to ensure a smooth consumption path. One thing to note is that a smaller
initial withdrawal rate (i.e. the optimal consumption rate at age 65) does not necessarily
mean a smaller amount of consumption; a small withdrawal from high pension wealth
could be more than a big withdrawal from low pension wealth.
4.4.3 A decumulation strategy with target replacement ratio
A replacement ratio is an individual’s annual income during retirement divided by his
annual income before retirement. Assume for example that an individual earns £50, 000
per year. After retirement, his pension savings can support an annual consumption of
£35, 000. The replacement ratio for this individual is 70%. In general, an individual does
not require the same amount of annual income after retirement. This is mainly because
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of lower taxes, no need for retirement savings and reductions in work-related expenses.
With a less than 100% replacement ratio, an individual might still maintain the same
lifestyle after retirement. A replacement ratio study report from AON Consulting (2008)
reports that an employee with annual income of $60, 000 on retirement (age 65) in 2008
needs a 78% replacement ratio in order to maintain his standard of living.
In a traditional DB pension scheme, the target replacement ratio is part of the scheme
design and is used to calculate projected pension liabilities. With the DC pension
scheme, many studies use a target replacement ratio as the standard for assessing the
adequacy of pension wealth accumulations. Therefore, individuals may have a target
replacement ratio in mind when making investment and withdrawal decisions during
retirement. Typical advice suggests that the replacement ratio should be between 70 and
85 percent of pre-retirement income. High income individuals normally have a relatively
low replacement ratio while low income individuals are expected have a relatively high
replacement ratio. This is because prior to retirement, low income individuals pay lower
taxes and they save less amount of money for retirement. (Scholz and Seshadri, 2009)
We introduce a new parameter target representing the annual consumption target as a
percentage of total wealth. Here, we assume that an individual who has a pre-retirement
annual income of 1 unit has accumulated pension wealth of 13.865 units at retirement.
This can be converted into an immediate annuity that pays 1 unit annually until death5.
For example assuming that the individual requires a target replacement ratio of 0.7, the
value of target is 0.0505 (0.7/13.865). In this framework, any deviation of consumption
rates from the target will generate symmetric penalties on overall utility. The magnitude
of the penalty is controlled by κ. An increasing value of κ means that the individual
places a greater importance on achieving the target during retirement. The wealth
constraint remains the same as in the basic model.
V = max
c65,c66,...
54∑
i=0
δ(i)× ip65 × u(c65+i)− κ×
54∑
i=0
(c65+i − target)2 (4.9)
subject to
d−1∑
i=0
c65+i × (1 + r)−i +
54∑
i=d
c65+i × (1 + r)−i × ip65 × (1 + L) = 1
5The price is based on 3 percent interest rate and S2PML mortality table.
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Table 4.12: Optimal investment percentage in a 15-year deferred annuity
Replacement Ratio 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 1
target 0.0361 0.0433 0.0505 0.0577 0.0721
κ
0 21.60% 21.60% 21.60% 21.60% 21.60%
102 20.88% 21.05% 21.22% 21.40% 21.78%
103 18.72% 19.38% 20.07% 20.79% 22.32%
104 16.43% 17.66% 18.92% 20.20% 22.81%
105 15.83% 17.24% 18.65% 20.07% 22.92%
106 15.75% 17.19% 18.62% 20.06% 22.93%
Notes: target represents the annual consumption target as a percentage of total wealth. κ
denotes the magnitude of the penalty on deviations from target consumption. Results are
based on the following assumptions: a 15-year deferred annuity, d = 15, a profit loading factor
of L = 10%, a real rate of return of r = 3% and a risk aversion factor of γ = 2. Mortality rates
are based on table S2PML.
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Figure 4.8: Impact of target replacement ratio on the optimal consumption path with
a deferred annuity
Notes: target represents the annual consumption target as a percentage of total wealth. κ
denotes the magnitude of the penalty on deviations from target consumption. Results are
based on the following assumptions: a 15-year deferred annuity, d = 15, a profit loading factor
of L = 10%, a real rate of return of r = 3% and a risk aversion factor of γ = 2. Mortality rates
are based on table S2PML.
To explore the impact of the target replacement ratio on the decumulation decisions,
we test a range of replacement ratios increasing in steps of 10% from 50% to 100%.
Moreover, values of κ increase from 0 (no target for retirement consumption) to 106
(consumption target is of high importance).
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Table 4.12 shows the optimal wealth allocation in a 15-year deferred annuity follow-
ing different target replacement ratios and different levels of importance. Figure 4.8
demonstrates the optimal decumulation process during retirement with a 15-year de-
ferred annuity. Figure 4.8 (A) shows the impact of the target replacement ratio and
Figure 4.8 (B) shows the impact of the penalty factor κ.
Based on the paths when following different target levels in Figure 4.8 (A), the target
consumption rate determines the preferable income level from deferred annuity products.
An individual who has a target replacement ratio in mind would opt for an annuity that
provides the target level of income for life. This is also confirmed in Table 4.12. When
retirees see the target consumption as very important (corresponding to a high level of
κ), as the target consumption level is increasing, the allocation into a 15-year deferred
annuity increases significantly with the target replacement ratio. In addition, Figure 4.8
(A) reflects different patterns before the start of the 15-year deferred annuity. If a low
target is expected, the consumption rate is high in the beginning and decreasing as time
goes by. If a high target is expected, individuals have to bear a low rate of consumption
in the beginning and the situation gets better until they achieve their target.
The impact of κ is shown in Figure 4.8 (B). It again justifies our conclusion that the
target replacement ratio is very influential in deciding the decumulation process since
every process ultimately ends up at the target level of consumption (except for the case
when κ is zero). Different values of κ determine the speed with which the consumption
rate converges to the target level. An individual who sees the target as very important
would achieve the target sooner than others.
Based on the same framework as shown in Equation (4.9), we also explore the optimal
results when the deferred period, d, is optimally chosen rather than fixed. We find
that the impact of the target replacement ratio remains the same. First, the target
replacement ratio is an influential factor on the optimal consumption path. With a
higher target consumption rate, individuals prefer to spend less in the beginning of
retirement and then move towards the target consumption level at older ages. Second,
the target replacement ratio basically drives the wealth allocation in the deferred annuity.
A higher target means a higher allocation in the annuity product. Third, as people view
the consumption target as more important, the consumption path will converge to the
target level at a faster rate. Detailed results are available from the author.
96
Chapter 4. Optimal decumulation strategies during retirement with deferred annuities
We also have considered other ways to model the impact of target replacement ratio. In
one model, we assume asymmetric rather than symmetric penalties: individuals would
have reduced utility if the consumption rate does not meet the target level; however,
they have the full amount of utility increase if the consumption rate is above the target
level. Modelling results show that if the target replacement ratio is set too low, it does
not influence people’s decisions on asset allocation and the decumulation process. On
the other hand, if the target replacement ratio is set to be relatively high, the penalty
on utility applies and individuals would follow the same strategy as introduced above.
In another version of the model, we assume that retirees pursue a retirement consumption
target that is increasing in line with the inflation rate each year so that purchasing power
is maintained. The utility maximising consumption strategy shows that they would
consume at a low rate in the first few years and gradually adjust their consumption
rates in line with an increasing target. As consumption after a certain number of years
is supported by the deferred annuity, the preferred type of annuity for these people is
the inflation protected annuity product. Again, detailed results are available from the
author.
4.4.4 A decumulation strategy with consideration of the bequest mo-
tive
An annuity stops paying when the annuitant dies, therefore people with a motivation
to bequeath part of their wealth to the next generation may obtain less welfare from an
annuity investment. A bequest motive may give individuals an incentive to spend less
on an annuity product. In the literature, there has been discussion about the impact
of the bequest motive on the annuity purchasing decisions. While a bequest motive can
explain why people do not annuitise the entire pension wealth, they cannot explain why
people do not annuitise any pension wealth at all. Friedman and Warshawsky (1990)
is an example of the literature that calculates the impact of the bequest motive on
utility gains from the annuities. They show that the intention to buy an annuity can be
eliminated with presence of a strong enough bequest motive. Annuities have an impact
on the variance of the bequest amount; hence if people are risk averse regarding the
bequest amount, annuities have a positive effect on the bequest motive (Davidoff et al.,
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2005). In this section, we explore whether the bequest motive would influence optimal
decumulation pattern and annuity allocation in our strategies.
We model the bequest motive as an additional contribution towards the expected utility;
if the individual dies before the commencement of the annuity, all his remaining wealth
will be left as a bequest at the end of that year. Let u(c65+i) denote the utility of
consumption corresponding to age 65+i. b(Wi+1) is the utility function of the remaining
wealth to bequeath if an individual dies at age 65 + i.
q65+i represents the mortality rates at age 65 + i. Following Gerrard et al. (2006), we
introduce a non-negative factor n(·) as a weight assigned to the importance of the ability
to leave a bequest. The choice of n(·) can be associated with the size of the fund and also
the timing of making a bequest. In addition, we assume that the discount rate of the
utility of the bequest, δ(i), coincides with the discount rate of the utility of consumption.
More precisely we consider the following constrained maximization.
V = max
c65,c66,...
54∑
i=0
{
δ(i)× ip65 × u(c65+i) + (δ(i+ 1)× ip65q65+i × n(i+ 1)× b(Wi+1))
}
where:
α =
54∑
i=d
c65+i × (1 + r)−i × ip65 × (1 + L)
W1 = (1− α− C65)(1 + r)
Wi+1 = (Wi − Ci)(1 + r), i = 1, 2, . . . , d− 2
Wi = 0, i = d, d+ 1, . . .
subject to:
• ∑d−1i=0 c65+i × (1 + r)−i +∑54i=d c65+i × (1 + r)−i × ip65 × (1 + L) = 1
• c65+i = ca for i = d, d+ 1, . . . , 54
We will explore three different ways to measure the impact of the bequest motive.
B1: n(i) = n; b(Wi) = W 1−γi /(1− γ)
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B2: n(1) = n;n(i) = n(i− 1)/(1 + s); b(Wi) = Wi
B3: n(1) = n;n(i) = n(i− 1)× (1 + s); b(Wi) = Wi
where s(s > 0) denotes the speed that the weighting factor decreases/increases with age.
In B1, the weighting of the utility of the bequest is assumed to be a constant relative
to the utility of consumption over different ages at retirement. The utility function of
bequest is assumed to be the same as that of consumption and we can find the optimal
strategy when people are risk averse about the bequest. B2 and B3 follow the literature
by assuming that the weights assigned to the possibility of leaving a bequest change
during retirement period. In a life-cycle framework, Fischer (1973) and Yaari (1965)
assume that the parameter that reflects the value of the bequest is a hump shaped
function because individuals see the bequest as more important in the mid-years of life
when family members have a greater dependence on them. Focusing on the retirement
period, two different views exist in terms of the weighting of bequests. On one hand,
following a hump shaped weighting function for life, the weighting function after age 65
could be decreasing, as described in B2. This type of motivation for leaving a bequest
is called Altruistic, indicating that the pensioner simply wants to leave a bequest to his
family without expecting anything in return. On the other hand, the weighting function
after age 65 is increasing, as described in B3. This type of motivation is called Strategic,
indicating that pensioners want to promise their family a bequest so they have incentives
to take care of them during old age (Vidal-Melia and Lejarraga-Garcia, 2004).
4.4.4.1 B1: Constant weight of the bequest motive
Table 4.13 shows the optimal wealth allocation in a 15-year deferred annuity with differ-
ent assumptions of values of n. It shows that as people place a higher level of importance
on the bequest, they would invest a smaller proportion of wealth into annuities. This
is because the mean value of the bequest amount is higher when the annuity allocation
is smaller. The results are consistent with the literature in the sense that the bequest
motive has an impact on annuity investments. However, the impact on deferred annu-
ity investments is not as significant as that on immediate annuities because the price
of a long-term deferred annuity is much smaller than that of an equivalent immediate
annuity.
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Table 4.13: Optimal investment percentage in a 15-year deferred annuity (B1)
n 0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 1
α 22.17% 22.06% 21.73% 21.40% 21.06% 20.56%
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a 15-year deferred annuity, d = 15, a
profit loading factor of L = 10% and a real rate of return of r = 3%. Mortality rates are based
on table S2PML. Here, γ is assumed to be 0.5, which is different from what it is elsewhere. This
is to avoid the problem of negative infinitive utility when wealth is decumulated towards zero.
Table 4.14: Optimal investment percentage in a 15-year deferred annuity under B2
and B3
s 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
B2 - Altruistic motive 21.39% 21.40% 21.41% 21.42% 21.43%
B3 - Strategic motive 21.36% 21.35% 21.34% 21.32% 21.30%
Notes: s controls how fast the weighting of utility of bequest decreases/increases with age.
Results are based on the following assumptions: the initial weighting factor of bequest of
n = 50, a 15-year deferred annuity, d = 15, a profit loading factor of L = 10%, a real rate of
return of r = 3% and a risk aversion factor of γ = 2. Mortality rates are based on table S2PML.
Moreover, the bequest motive impacts the optimal consumption path, which is reflected
in Figure 4.9. For those who see the bequest as more important (a higher n), they
consume less in early years after retirement. Therefore the mean value of the possible
bequest amount will be higher and this contributes positively to the expected utility
that is to be maximized.
With the assumption of a fixed deferred period in the model, the consumption gap in
the decumulation process still exists, after incorporating the bequest motive into the
model. However, it can be seen clearly that as the factor, n, increases, the gap becomes
smaller, which indicates that an individual who sees leaving a bequest as more important
prefers to have a smoother consumption path during retirement. This is because people
with an intention to leave a bequest would spend less in the beginning of the retirement
period; they would also spend slightly less in deferred annuity products that require an
advanced payment of the premium, all of which lead to a narrower consumption rate
range during the retirement period.
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Figure 4.9: Impact of bequest motive on optimal consumption path with a 15-year
deferred annuity (B1)
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a 15-year deferred annuity, d = 15, a
profit loading factor of L = 10% and a real rate of return of r = 3%. Mortality rates are based
on table S2PML. Here, γ is assumed to be 0.5, which is different from what it is elsewhere. This
is to avoid the problem of negative infinitive utility when wealth is decumulated towards zero.
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Figure 4.10: A comparison of optimal consumption paths under B2 and B3
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: the initial weighting factor of bequest
of n = 50, the increasing/decreasing speed of the bequest weighting factor of s = 2%, a 15-year
deferred annuity, d = 15, a profit loading factor of L = 10%, a real rate of return of r = 3% and
a risk aversion factor of γ = 2. Mortality rates are based on table S2PML.
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4.4.4.2 A comparison of B2 and B3
Table 4.14 demonstrates the optimal investment percentage in a 15-year deferred annuity,
following two different models. Parameter s determines how fast the weighting of utility
of bequest decreases/increases with age. We have the following findings from the table.
Firstly, an individual who follows an altruistic motivation to leave a bequest tends to
allocate slightly more wealth in a deferred annuity than an individual who follows a
strategic motivation to leave a bequest. This occurs mainly because someone with an
altruistic motivation sees the bequest as less important as time goes by; they would be
more willing to spend more money upfront to ensure adequate support from deferred
annuities in their advanced ages. Secondly, as s becomes greater, the weighting of the
bequest increases or decreases at a faster rate, which leads to a greater difference in
the optimal annuity allocations for altruistic retirees and strategic retiree. For altruistic
retirees, the importance of the bequest decreases at a faster rate, and they therefore
would like to pay a higher proportion in advance for deferred annuities. On the other
hand, for strategic retirees, the importance of the bequest increases at a faster rate, and
they would spend less on deferred annuities to allow the possibility of leaving a greater
amount of bequest at a later stage.6
Figure 4.10 compares the decumulation processes under different motivations. Although
the starting point of the weighting parameter is chosen to be very high (n = 50 7, which
means the bequest motive is a major factor in decision making), we cannot identify
large differences between the optimal consumption paths. It suggests that the type of
motivation to leave a bequest, either altruistic or strategic, is not a major factor in
deciding consumption patterns.
6The conclusion is based on an important assumption that the initial weight of bequest is the same
for retirees with an altruistic motivation and those with a strategic motivation.
7One may notice that the choice of the value of n in B2 and B3 is very different from that in B1
(where n is smaller than 1). This is because the utility of bequest in B1 follows the CRRA utility
function, which is the same as the utility function of consumption; however, the utility of bequest in B2
and B3 is the absolute amount of the bequest. In all cases, n is simply used to adjust the importance
of bequest relative to the consumption. In B2 and B3, the choice of the utility function for bequest
does not matters too much. As our objective is to compare the altruistic motive and strategic motive
of leaving a bequest, we simply need to make sure the the utility functions of bequest are consistent in
both models.
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4.5 Conclusions
The question of how to determine investment and consumption choices in the distribu-
tion phase of a defined contribution pension plan has become more important given the
greater flexibility in accessing personal pension savings. Individuals are in need of profes-
sional advice to ensure that they maximise current spending and will not live in poverty
before they die. The deferred annuity has been proposed as a good retirement solution
due to several competitive advantages. First, it involves a small initial outlay because
the price incorporates the survival probability and the time value of money. Second,
a deferred annuity is designed to provide protection to those who live to the advanced
high ages, where longevity risk concentrates. Third, as the deferred annuity investment
involves only a proportion of retirement savings, individuals preserve liquidity to some
extent.
In this chapter, we proposed two decumulation strategies with the deferred annuities,
which divides the retirement period into two phases. The first phase is the fixed deferred
period during which individuals need to make active investments and consumption de-
cisions; the second phase is supported by lifetime incomes from annuity providers. In
Model M1, the choice of deferred period is exogenous. Based on the findings in Chapter
2 and Chapter 3, behavioral models such as cumulative prospect theory and the hyper-
bolic discount model suggest that annuities with longer deferred periods will be more
desirable. Therefore, in the set-up of M1, we concentrate on the purchase of a 15-year
and 20-year deferred annuity that offer protections only when individuals survive until
age 80 or 85. Our results suggest that it is optimal to allocate 21.6% in a 15-year deferred
annuity or 6.9% in a 20-year deferred annuity, which is an easy and realistic decision in
practice. Several sensitivity studies show that our proposed strategy is stable; primarily,
this is due to the cheapness of deferred annuity products.
In model M2, we aim at a more efficient strategy with the optimally chosen deferred
annuity products. Equation (4.4) has shown that the choice of the optimal deferred
period depends only on the cost of annuity and the mortality rates. This conclusion
is also confirmed in an annuity innovation study by Scott et al. (2011), who conclude
that a better annuity should contain a gap between the purchase date and the payout
date when there are positive costs. With a 10% profit loading, M2 suggests investing
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61.83% in a 6-year deferred annuity to maximise individual welfare. We have also shown
that by following M2, one can achieve highest consumption rates during retirement in
comparison with following both M1 and DCDB.
This work aims to provide optimal consumption and investment decisions for retirees in
the distribution phase of the pension plan. The recommended investment allocation in
deferred annuities and the consumption paths would help individuals reduce longevity
risk and preserve liquidity to some extent. Moreover, the proposed strategies help achieve
maximum utility within a certain set of constraints. Although we see this work as
creating important foundations, there are some areas for future extensions. For instance,
in the first phase, the only investment option allowed in our framework offers a fixed
rate of return. In future this assumption could be relaxed to allow for stochastic returns
from more risky financial asset classes.
4.A Proof of Equation 4.1 and Equation 4.2
In this section, we show the derivation of the optimal real consumption rate and optimal
wealth allocation in the deferred annuity. Recalling the proposed decumulation strategy
in a world with zero inflation can be described as the following model:
V = max
c65,c66,...
54∑
i=0
δ(i)× ip65 × u(c65+i)
subject to
d−1∑
i=0
c65+i × vi +
54∑
i=d
c65+i × vi × ip65 × (1 + L) = 1
where:
u(c) = c
1−γ
1− γ
v = (1 + r)−1
α =
54∑
i=d
c65+i × vi × ip65 × (1 + L)
Lagrangian method is used to derive the optimal path of real consumption rate c65+i
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L =
54∑
i=0
δ(i)ip65
c1−γ65+i
1− γ + λ
{
1−
d−1∑
i=0
c65+iv
i −
54∑
i=d
c65+iv
i
ip65(1 + L)
}
For i=0,1, . . . ,d-1
dL
dc65+i
= δ(i)ip65c−σ65+i − λvi = 0
c65+i =
( λvi
δ(i)ip65
)− 1
σ
c0 = λ−
1
σ
c65+i = c0v−
i
σ ip65
1
σ σ(i)
1
σ
For i=d, . . . ,54
dL
dc65+i
= δ(i)ip65c−σ65+i − λviip65(1 + L) = 0
c65+i =
(λvi(1 + L)
δ(i)
)− 1
σ
c65+i = c0 × v− iσ (1 + L)−
1
σ σ(i)
1
σ
Taking c65+i back to the wealth constraint
d−1∑
i=0
(
c0v
i− i
γ ip
1
γ
65
)
+
54∑
i=d
c0v
i− i
γ (1 + L)1−
1
γ σ(i)
1
γ ip65 = 1
c0 =
1∑d−1
i=0 v
i− i
γ ip
1
γ
65σ(i)
1
γ + (1 + L)1−
1
γ
∑54
i=d v
i− i
γ σ(i)
1
γ ip65
Assuming a rational individual uses an exponential discount function to discount future
utilities,
δ(i) = vi = (1 + r)−i
Hence, the optimal consumption rate in real terms during retirement is:
c65+i = i
p
1/γ
65∑d−1
i=0 (1 + r)−iip
1/γ
65 + (1 + L)(1−1/γ)
∑54
i=d(1 + r)−iip65
for i = 0, . . . , (d− 1)
c65+i =
(1 + L)−1/γ∑d−1
i=0 (1 + r)−iip
1/γ
65 + (1 + L)(1−1/γ)
∑54
i=d(1 + r)−iip65
for i = d, . . . , 54
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The optimal wealth allocation in the deferred annuity is:
α = (1 + L)
(1−1/γ)∑54
i=d(1 + r)−iip65∑d−1
i=0 (1 + r)−iip
1/γ
65 + (1 + L)(1−1/γ)
∑54
i=d(1 + r)−iip65
4.B Proof of Equation 4.5 and Equation 4.6
In this section, we show the derivation of the optimal nominal consumption rate and
optimal wealth allocation in the deferred annuity. Recalling the proposed decumulation
strategy in a world with positive inflation can be described as the following model:
V = max
c′65,c
′
66,...
54∑
i=0
δ(i)× ip65 × u
( c′65+i
(1 + f)i
)
subject to
d−1∑
i=0
c′65+i × v′i +
54∑
i=d
c′65+i × v′i × ip65 × (1 + L) = 1
where:
u(c′) = c
′1−γ
1− γ
v′ = (1 + rnominal)−1 = (1 + r)−1(1 + f)−1
α =
54∑
i=d
c′65+i × v′i × ip65 × (1 + L)
Lagrangian method is used to derive the optimal path of nominal consumption rate c65+i
L =
54∑
i=0
δ(i)ip65
1
1− γ
( c′65+i
(1 + f)i
)1−γ
+ λ
{
1−
d−1∑
i=0
c′65+iv
′i −
54∑
i=d
c′65+iv
′i
ip65(1 + L)
}
106
Chapter 4. Optimal decumulation strategies during retirement with deferred annuities
For i=0,1, . . . ,d-1
dL
dc′65+i
= δ(i)ip65(1 + f)−i(1−γ)c′65+i
−γ − λv′i = 0
c′65+i =
( λv′i
δ(i)ip65(1 + f)−i(1−γ)
)− 1
γ
c′0 = λ
− 1
γ
c′65+i = c′0v
′− i
γ ip65
1
γ σ(i)
1
γ (1 + f)
i(γ−1)
γ
For i=d, . . . ,54
dL
dc′65+i
= δ(i)ip65(1 + f)−i(1−γ)c−γi − λv′iip65(1 + L) = 0
c′65+i =
(λv′i(1 + L)
δ(i) (1 + f)
−i(1−γ))− 1γ
c′65+i = c′0v
′− i
γ (1 + L)−
1
γ σ(i)
1
γ (1 + f)
i(γ−1)
γ
Taking c′65+i back to the wealth constraint
c′0 =
1∑d−1
i=0 v
′i− i
γ ip65
1
γσ(i)
1
γ (1 + f)i−
i
γ + (1 + L)1−
1
γ
∑54
i=d v
i− i
γ σ(i)
1
γ ip65(1 + f)i−
i
γ
Assuming a rational individual uses an exponential discount function to discount future
utilities,
δ(i) = (1 + r)−i
Hence, the optimal consumption rate in nominal terms during retirement is:
c′65+i =
ip
1/γ
65 (1 + f)i∑d−1
i=0 (1 + r)−iip
1/γ
65 + (1 + L)(1−1/γ)
∑54
i=d(1 + r)−iip65
for i = 0, . . . , (d− 1)
c′65+i =
(1 + L)−1/γ(1 + f)i∑d−1
i=0 (1 + r)−iip
1/γ
65 + (1 + L)(1−1/γ)
∑54
i=d(1 + r)−iip65
for i = d, . . . , 54
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The optimal wealth allocation in the deferred annuity is:
α = (1 + L)
(1−1/γ)∑54
i=d(1 + r)−iip65∑d−1
i=0 (1 + r)−iip
1/γ
65 + (1 + L)(1−1/γ)
∑54
i=d(1 + r)−iip65
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The impact of the hyperbolic discount model and subjective
mortality rates on optimal decumulation strategies
Abstract
With an ongoing shift from Defined Benefit (DB) pension plan to Defined Contribution
(DC) pension plan in the private sector, investment risk and longevity risk have been
transferred from pension providers to pensioners. Professional advice on how to spend
down pension savings is in great demand. Recent studies have started to consider
the use of deferred annuities in retirement decumulation strategies (see Sexauer et al.
(2012) and OECD (2016) for example). As we know that behavioral factors play an
important role in the process of annuitisation decision making, we are interested to
examine whether pensioners with behavioral biases would follow different decumulation
strategies compared with rational pensioners. In this chapter, we examine the impact of
two factors: time-inconsistent preferences (which is captured by a hyperbolic discount
model) and subjective survival rates. Using numerical optimisation techniques and a set
of benchmark assumptions, we find that a hyperbolic discounter would like to allocate a
similar proportion of pension savings in deferred annuities as an exponential discounter
would. However, they would be interested in buying an inflation-linked annuity while
exponential discounters would prefer conventional annuities. Moreover, pensioners who
are optimistic (pessimistic) about their life expectancies would find annuities attractive
(not attractive) in general and they would like to allocate a higher (lower) proportion
of pension savings in deferred annuities.
Keywords: Deferred annuities, Decumulation strategy, Hyperbolic discount model, Sub-
jective mortality rates.
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5.1 Introduction
With an ongoing shift from Defined Benefit (DB) pension plans to Defined Contribution
(DC) pension plans in the private sector, more retirees are faced with longevity risk
and investment risk, and therefore they are in need of advice on how to best generate
retirement incomes from accumulation pension savings. A natural solution, which can
be seen as a replacement for the traditional DB pension plan, is converting the entire
pension savings into the form of an immediate annuity. Retirees as annuitants would re-
ceive either fixed or inflation-linked guaranteed incomes until the end of life. Decades of
economic analysis have proved that full annuitisation is an optimal strategy for retirees.
The result holds even when some of the axioms of expected utility maximisation break
down; Davidoff et al. (2005) point out that, when markets are complete, full annuitisa-
tion is optimal without assuming exponential discounting, the expected utility axioms,
intertemporal separability, or actuarially fair annuities. However, the fact that retirees
are reluctant to convert any of their savings into immediate annuities remains a puzzle
in the literature and in the insurance market. Davidoff et al. (2005) therefore conclude
that limited annuity purchases are plausibly due to psychological or behavioral biases.
In the previous chapters, we have introduced two behavioral models, Cumulative Prospect
Theory (CPT) and the hyperbolic discount model, and illustrated their impacts on the
demand for annuities. In Chapter 2, we find that being loss averse rather than risk
averse is a major reason driving the undervaluation of annuities. The way that indi-
viduals interpret probabilities of an event, typically the overweighting of low-probability
events and the underweighting of high-probability events, would make a deferred annuity
more desirable than an immediate annuity. In Chapter 3, we find that having decreasing
impatience would make people overlook the benefit of immediate annuities and prefer a
deferred annuity product with a longer deferred period. Thus, it has been shown that
behavioral factors in the real world would lead individuals to make a completely differ-
ent decision from what is suggested in a perfectly theoretical world. It is meaningful,
therefore, to examine what decumulation strategies during the retirement period people
would like to pursue if they are exposed to behavioral biases.
We recall that in Chapter 4, we have proposed a utility maximising decumulation strat-
egy comprising a deferred annuity purchased at retirement and optimal consumption
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and savings before the commencement of the annuity. Following the idea, two models
with different choices of deferred annuities have been set up. M1 assumes that retirees
already have preferences for the age from which they would like to receive lifelong in-
comes; this choice of the deferred period could be guided by government policy. On the
other hand, M2 assumes that retirees are able to work out an optimal deferred period
using mortality rates and profit loading; and they would use this optimal deferred annu-
ity to improve retirement planning. The merit of this design, compared to the previous
literature, is that it includes a deferred annuity as a retirement asset as part of the
retirement strategy, and achieves utility maximisation at the same time. The use of a
deferred annuity really simplifies the retirement financial planning process by converting
it from an unknown period (because of uncertain lifetime) into a fixed deferred period
(after which individuals would receive guaranteed incomes for life).
In this chapter, we are interested in two behavioral factors: the hyperbolic discount
mode (which has been introduced in Chapter 3) and subjective mortality rates. In brief,
the hyperbolic discount model captures the fact that people have time-inconsistent pref-
erences when they make intertemporal decisions. A subjective mortality rate model
reflects people’s general perception of their own life expectancies, which can be different
from life expectancies of the general public. Both factors are influential in annuitisation
decision making. To understand their impacts on the optimal decumulation strategies
during retirement, we incorporate them separately into the construction of strategies
M1 and M2. To be more specific, we seek to explore the following questions: (a) For
individuals with time-inconsistent preferences / subjective mortality rates, how much
they would like to allocate in a fixed / flexible deferred annuity product and what con-
sumption pattern they would like to follow during retirement? (b) Do retirees with time-
inconsistent preferences / subjective mortality rates pursue different annuity allocations
and consumption patterns compared with rational retirees? (c) How would the optimal
strategies change in response to retirees with different levels of time-inconsistency, or
optimistic or pessimistic retirees?
Using numerical optimisation techniques and our chosen benchmark assumptions, we
have the following major findings. A hyperbolic discounter (with time-inconsistent pref-
erence) at age 65 would like to allocate 22.97% of pension wealth in a 15-year deferred
annuity (following strategy M1) or 60.4% of pension wealth in a 6-year deferred annuity
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(following strategy M2); the allocations are similar to what we find for a rational expo-
nential discounter. However, a hyperbolic discounter would pursue a different consump-
tion pattern. A hyperbolic discounter prefers buying an index-linked deferred annuity
and following an inverted S-shaped consumption path prior to the start of the deferred
annuity; while a rational exponential discounter prefers buying a conventional deferred
annuity and following a convex consumption pattern before the start of the deferred
annuity.
Subjective mortality rates are key determinant factors for the desirability of annuities.
Basically, people who are optimistic (pessimistic) about their life expectancies would
find annuities attractive (not attractive) in general and they would like to allocate more
(less) of their pension wealth in annuity products (Following M1, our analysis suggests
allocating 25.64% for optimistic retirees and 19.71% for pessimistic retirees in a 15-year
deferred annuity). When they are allowed to flexibly decide which deferred annuity to
invest in (by following strategy M2), optimistic individuals would opt for an annuity
with a longer deferred period than pessimistic individuals.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 introduces the general hyperbolic
discount model in detail and discusses the modeling results after replacing the rational
exponential discount model with the irrational hyperbolic one. Section 3 offers a liter-
ature review on subjective mortality rates and discusses the impact of that on annuity
desirability and decumulation strategies. Section 4 provides some concluding comments
on our findings.
5.2 The impact of the hyperbolic discount model
5.2.1 An introduction of the hyperbolic discount model
In Chapter 3, we have introduced what the hyperbolic discount model is. Here we
provide a recap of the main characteristics of a general hyperbolic discount model and
also introduce an extension: quasi-hyperbolic discount model.
In dealing with economic decisions that involve outcomes occurring at different points
in time, researchers often employ a discounted utility function to model the overall
satisfaction gained from the decision; annuitisation and consumption decision is one
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example of this. In order to decide the optimal consumption rates during retirement
period, the discounted utility model combines a utility function that reflects perceived
values of outcomes and a discount function that captures the effect of the passage of
time. For future consumptions (c0, c1, ...cT ) in periods t = 0, ...T , we define
V (c0, c1, ...cT ) =
T∑
t=0
δ(t)u(ct)
where u(·) is a real valued utility function that represents preferences over outcomes
and δ(t)(δ(t) ∈ (0, 1]) is the discount function reflecting the weights of different points
in time.
In a normative framework, individuals should have stationary time preferences, which
means that the preference between two delayed outcomes does not change by going
back or forth in time, given that the time interval between the two outcomes stays
constant. The exponential discount function is used to model such cases. However,
many empirical studies on time preferences suggest a different behavior (e.g., Strotz
(1965), Thaler (1981), Benzion et al. (1989)). Thaler (1981) shows that people exhibit
decreasing impatience over time with a simple experiment in which subjects are faced
with the following two questions: A. Would you prefer one apple today or two apples
tomorrow? B. Would you prefer one apple in one year or two apples in one year plus
one day?
Assuming stationary preferences, people who choose one apple today in Question A
would make a consistent choice of one apple in a year in Question B. However, the
experimental results show that a significant fraction of subjects choose one apple today
and gladly wait one extra day in a year in order to receive two apples instead. It reflects
that people tend to act impulsively in the short-term but become more patient in the
long-term.
In response to such anomalies in perceived discount rates, Loewenstein and Prelec (1992)
propose a general hyperbolic discount model
δ(t) = (1 + µt)−σ/µ with µ > 0, σ > 0 (5.1)
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The parameter µ reflects how much the function departs from the constant discounting.
When µ approaches zero, the function leads to the limiting case of exponential discount
function, δ(t) = e−σt. Since µ remains positive, the implied discount rate between
consecutive time points decreases as time passes (t increases), reflecting the finding that
people generally become more patient to wait for rewards in the future.
An alternative simpler version of hyperbolic discounting that is also widely used is called
“quasi-hyperbolic” discounting. In this formulation, the utility of consumption during
period t(t 6= 0) is discounted by the factor βτ t. The constant factor β reflects the time
preference or myopia over the current period; while the constant factor τ represents
equal amount of discounting during each period in future. The values for discrete times
are {
1, βτ, βτ2, βτ3, ...
}
with β < 1, τ < 1 (5.2)
The quasi-hyperbolic discount model implies that people only show impulsivity in the
first period when making decisions; future rewards are discounted by an exponential
factor that grows at a constant rate with the length of the delay. This model has
initially been adopted in Phelps and Pollak (1968) to discount utilities of consumptions
of generations over time. Laibson (1997) named it “quasi-hyperbolic” and applied it to
analyse consumers’ consumption and savings decisions.
Figure 5.1 graphs the standard exponential discount function, the generalized hyper-
bolic discount function and the quasi-hyperbolic discount function. The horizontal axis
represents the time delay for receiving one unit of utility and the vertical axis represents
the present value of the utility to be received. The vertical gap between the three curves
reflects differences in the three different ways of discounting.
Comparing the exponential and hyperbolic discounting, it could be easily identified in
the figure that the exponential discount function is less convex than the hyperbolic one,
which indicates that rational individuals tend to use a smaller amount of discounting
in earlier periods and overlook the importance of future rewards. In addition, with our
parameter choices, the hyperbolic present value coincides with the exponential present
value at around time point of 20 years. It tells us that the benefits that come earlier
than in 20 years tend to be undervalued by hyperbolic discounters and the benefits that
come after tend to be overvalued. As the interest rate becomes relatively lower, which is
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Figure 5.1: A comparison of three discounting curves
Notes: We assume a constant interest rate of 3 percent for exponential discounting; µ = 1 and
σ = 0.19 for hyperbolic discounting and β = 0.7 and τ = 0.985 for quasi-hyperbolic discounting
reflected in the market today, the amount of discounting in a rational framework would
be smaller and the intersection point will move rightwards along the hyperbolic discount
curve. This suggests that more future benefits will be undervalued; an investment that
generates immediate income will become less valuable.
Both the quasi-hyperbolic and generalized hyperbolic model include dynamic inconsis-
tent preferences; however, this feature is constrained in the first period for the case
of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. A value of β of less than 1 implies that the discount
rate for the first period is greater than the long term discount rate, hence reflecting the
immediate impatience effect; after the first period, quasi-hyperbolic discounting has the
same discount factor between adjacent periods 1.
The hyperbolic discounting method has been widely applied to explain behavioral anoma-
lies in various areas. As an example, people with a problem of low self-control often gain
too much weight and find it difficult to improve their health by doing more exercise
and having a diet. These people often vow to forgo all future temptations, in exchange
1Please note that in Figure 5.1 the quasi-hyperbolic discounting curve looks linear (while it is not).
This is because the per-period amount of discounting after time 0 is very small in our example and hence
the convexity of the quai-hyperbolic discount curve is not as obvious as that of the exponential discount
curve.
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for improved health in the future; however, when they have the next meal, they can-
not resist having unhealthy fried food and sweet desserts. Presumably, they prefer this
because the instant pleasure brought by delicious unhealthy food is greater than the
heavily discounted future rewards of health. The same defective reasoning has also been
offered to account for drug addictions, procrastination, infidelity and other problems of
willpower (Frederick et al., 2002). Laibson et al. (2003) have also used a hyperbolic
discount function to explain the puzzle of simultaneously having large credit card debts
and preretirement savings. In fact, it is not rational for individuals to make purchases
using credit card and save regularly into a retirement fund because credit card debts
attract a high interest rate and pre-retirement wealth only generates a low rate of return.
However, if we assume that individuals are hyperbolic decision makers, the simultane-
ous actions seem reasonable. On the one hand, people cannot wait to do the shopping
because the satisfaction gained from making a purchase today often outweighs the dis-
counted displeasure of future payments; and as a result they build up large credit card
debts. On the other hand, people tends to use a smaller discount rate for rewards in
the distant future, which leads to a higher perceived value of the retirement fund and
thus people would find it more attractive to accumulate wealth in retirement programs.
Overall, consistent with the hyperbolic discounting method, people exhibit patience in
the long term and impatience in the short term when making investment decisions.
5.2.2 Decumulation strategy
In Chapter 4, we have proposed a decumulation strategy and examined the annuity
allocation rates and withdrawal rates in a completely rational framework (For detailed
description please refer to Chapter 4.2). The strategy is expressed in the following form:
V = max
c65,c66,...
54∑
i=0
δ(i)× ip65 × u(c65+i)
subject to
d−1∑
i=0
c65+i × (1 + r)−i +
54∑
i=d
c65+i × (1 + r)−i × ip65 × (1 + L) = 1
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where V denotes the overall expected discounted utility of the entire retirement consump-
tion stream cx. δ(i) may be interpreted as a subjective discount function for utility, ip65
as the probability of surviving for i years for a 65-year-old, u(·) as the utility associated
with the rate of consumption, r as the real interest rate and L as the profit loading
factor embedded in the annuity price.
Utility function is assumed to be a time-additive constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
function of the following form:
u(c) = c
1−γ
1− γ
where γ measures the coefficient of risk aversion.
Previously, the subjective discount function for utility, δ(i), is assumed to be the expo-
nential discount function, the same as the discount function for consumption rates and
annuity pricing. In this chapter, we explore the results when it is replaced with the
hyperbolic discount model (Equation (5.1)) and the quasi-hyperbolic discount model
(Equation (5.2)).
5.2.3 Modeling results following the general hyperbolic discount model
The results we display are based on the following assumptions. Relative risk aversion
is moderate with γ = 2 and profit loading on annuity product equals L = 10%. The
discount rate for both utility and money amount are based on exponential discounting
with a constant annual real interest rate of 3 percent. UK mortality table S2PML, which
describes the mortality experience of UK male pensioners of self-administered pension
schemes for the period from 2004 to 2011, is used to calculate the survival rate ip65 .
The parameter values in hyperbolic functions are based on a hypothetical choices-
indifferences test conducted by Abdellaoui et al. (2009), who estimate a µ of 1 and
σ of 0.19 for the hyperbolic discount model. In what follows, we provide results of the
optimal allocation, α, in the deferred annuity and optimal retirement consumption path,
cx for 65 ≤ x ≤ 119. The sensitivity of the results is also explored.
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Table 5.1: Optimal investment percentage in a deferred annuity for hyperbolic dis-
counters (M1)
Profit Loading (L) 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Deferred period (d)
5 67.27% 67.78% 68.26% 68.72% 69.16%
10 41.77% 42.34% 42.89% 43.41% 43.91%
15 22.56% 22.97% 23.36% 23.75% 24.12%
20 9.88% 10.09% 10.29% 10.49% 10.68%
25 3.19% 3.26% 3.33% 3.40% 3.47%
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a risk aversion factor of γ = 2 and a
constant real interest rate of r = 3% p.a.. Mortality rates are based on table S2PML.
5.2.3.1 M1 - the Hyperbolic discount model
In the case that retirees are guided to select a fixed deferred annuity, there are closed
form solutions for the optimal consumption path and the optimal wealth allocation in
the deferred annuity. A proof of the results can be derived with arguments analogue
to those in Appendix 4.A in previous chapter. The results displayed below can be
achieved by assuming that an irrational individual uses a hyperbolic discount model,
hence δ(i) = (1 + i)−β
c65+i = i
p
1/γ
65 v
−i/γ(1 + i)−β/γ∑d−1
i=0 v
i−i/γ
ip
1/γ
65 (1 + i)−β/γ + (1 + L)(1−1/γ)
∑54
j=d v
j−j/γ
jP65(1 + j)−β/γ
for i = 0, . . . , (d− 1)
c65+i =
v−i/γ(1 + i)−β/γ(1 + L)−1/γ∑d−1
i=0 v
i−i/γ
ip
1/γ
65 (1 + i)−β/γ + (1 + L)(1−1/γ)
∑54
j=d v
j−j/γ
jP65(1 + j)−β/γ
for i = d, . . . , 54
α = (1 + L)
∑54
i=d ip
1+1/γ
65 v
i−i/γ(1 + i)−β/γ∑d−1
i=0 v
i−i/γ
ip
1/γ
65 (1 + i)−β/γ + (1 + L)(1−1/γ)
∑54
j=d v
j−j/γ
jP65(1 + j)−β/γ
where v denotes one-period exponential discount rate, v = (1 + r)−1.
Table 5.1 displays the numerical results for the optimal fraction of wealth to be spent
on a deferred annuity for irrational retirees with dynamic time-inconsistent preferences.
The results are provided allowing for different deferred periods and profit-loading factors.
It demonstrates that it would be optimal for a hyperbolic discounter to spend 22.97%
of his pension savings in a 15-year deferred annuity when an annuity provider requires
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Table 5.2: The impact of discounting methods on the optimal investment percentage
in a deferred annuity (M1)
Deferred period (d) 5 10 15 20 25
Exponential discounting 67.62% 41.19% 21.60% 9.13% 2.83%
Hyperbolic discounting 67.78% 42.34% 22.97% 10.09% 3.26%
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a risk aversion factor of γ = 2 and a
profit loading factor of L = 10%. Exponential discounting assumes a constant real interest rate
of r = 3% p.a.; Hyperbolic discounting assumes µ = 1 and σ = 0.19. Mortality rates are based
on table S2PML.
a profit margin of 10 percent, which is a less difficult decision to make comparing with
annuitising 100% in an immediate annuity. As we mentioned in Chapter 4, this might
overcome a potential psychological barrier to invest. Looking vertically in Table 5.1,
the optimal allocation rates decreases significantly when retirees are guided to choose a
longer-term deferred annuity: a retiree who is seeking protection after age 85 needs to
spend only 10% of his retirement savings on a 20-year deferred annuity. This smaller
allocation does not imply the lower popularity of deferred annuities; however, it is simply
due to a much smaller actuarially fair annuity price (the survival rate becomes lower as
people age).
For a certain fixed deferred annuity, the profit loading has a smaller but negative im-
pact on the optimal annuity allocation. For example, Table 5.1 suggests that the real
allocation in a 15-year deferred annuity should be 21.49% (22.56%/1.05) in the presence
of a 5 percent profit loading and 19.30% (24.12%/1.25) with a 25 percent loading. The
results are in line with our expectation because people in general would be willing to
invest less in deferred annuities if they become more expensive.
Another interesting finding from Table 5.1 is that retirees are less price sensitive to
longer term deferred annuities. As the profit loading factor increases from 5% to 25%,
the optimal investment proportion in a 25-year deferred annuity increases from 3.19%
to 3.47%; while that in a 5-year deferred annuity increases from 67.27% to 69.16%. It
suggests that insurance companies could require a higher profit margin from writing
long term deferred annuity products without affecting the demand.
Table 5.2 compares the optimal allocation in a deferred annuity for exponential dis-
counters and hyperbolic discounters, from which we can find out the impact of the
time-inconsistent preference on retirement decisions. It can be seen that people who
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Figure 5.2: A comparison of optimal consumption paths for exponential discounters
and hyperbolic discounters (M1)
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a 15-year deferred annuity, d = 15, a
risk aversion factor of γ = 2 and a profit loading factor of L = 10%. Exponential discounting
assumes a constant real interest rate of r = 3% p.a.; Hyperbolic discounting assumes µ = 1 and
σ = 0.19. Mortality rates are based on table S2PML.
have a decreasing patience tend to allocate slightly more in deferred annuities than ra-
tional exponential discounters. This is mostly because hyperbolic discounters tend to
overweight benefits in the distant future, which we have explained in Figure 5.1.
The optimal retirement consumption paths to be followed for rational exponential dis-
counters and irrational hyperbolic discounters are shown in Figure 5.2. A comparison of
two sets of paths on the same scale allows us to make following conclusions. First, the
consumption path after a d-year deferred period sheds some light on retirees’ preferences
towards the form of the annuity incomes. While rational investors prefer conventional
annuities with level payments, irrational investors tend to prefer annuities with increas-
ing payments. In practice, this could be an inflation linked deferred annuity whose
payments increase with annual inflation rates. Second, prior to the commencement of
the deferred annuity, retirees tend to follow different consumption patterns depending on
the utility discounting methods. Exponential discounters can maximise overall utility if
they follow a convex-shaped decreasing consumption path; while hyperbolic discounters
would follow an inverted S-shaped decreasing consumption path. Hyperbolic discounters
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Table 5.3: The optimal investment percentage in a deferred annuity with different
hyperbolic discount factors (M1)
σ 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
α 24.01% 23.43% 22.85% 22.28% 21.70%
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a risk aversion factor of γ = 2, a profit
loading factor of L = 10% and a constant annual real interest rate of r = 3%. One factor in
hyperbolic discounting is µ = 1. Mortality rates are based on table S2PML.
tend to be impatient to obtain immediate satisfaction; thus it is not surprising to see
them spending higher amounts than exponential discounters in the first few years after
retirement.
The kink embedded in the consumption paths remains after replacing the exponential
discount model with the hyperbolic one. As we have discussed in Chapter 4, the kink
is related with the risk aversion factor and the profit loading in annuity pricing. In
Figure 5.2, the kink exists because the annuity is good value for money when it is priced
with a 10% profit margin. If annuity providers require a higher profit loading, annuity
products become less desirable; a smaller allocation in it would lead to more balanced
consumption rates over the entire retirement period.
When the hyperbolic discount parameter σ increases, it implies that individuals are
more impatient and so incomes in the near future are more heavily undervalued; this is
illustrated in Figure 5.4. This leads to the results presented in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.3.
When σ is very high at 0.3, individuals are very impatient and thus they gain higher
level of satisfaction from high spending now and in the near future. On the other hand,
when σ is 0.1, individuals experience less decreasing impatience, they have self-control
to consume at a reasonable rate in the early period after retirement so that they can
enjoy high annuity incomes at more advanced ages.
5.2.3.2 M2 - the Hyperbolic discount model
In the model M2 that we have proposed, individuals are able to work out the best de-
ferred period with information of profit loading factor and mortality rates. The optimal
age from which the annuity payment commences is
TA = min(65 + i : (1 + L)× ip65 ≤ 1)
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Figure 5.3: The optimal consumption paths for retirees with different hyperbolic
discount factors (M1)
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a risk aversion factor of, γ = 2, a profit
loading factor of L = 10% and a constant annual real interest rate of r = 3%. One factor in
hyperbolic discounting is µ = 1. Mortality rates are based on table S2PML.
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Figure 5.4: The sensitivity of the hyperbolic discounting factor σ
Notes: Hyperbolic discounting follows Equation (5.1) with µ = 1, and exponential discounting
assumes an annual real interest rate of 3%.
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Table 5.4: Optimal investment percentage (α) in a deferred annuity for hyperbolic
discounters (M2)
Profit loading (L) 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Optimal deferred period 4 6 8 10 11
Risk aversion factor (γ)
2 71.00% 60.41% 50.84% 42.14% 38.33%
3 71.11% 60.52% 50.93% 42.21% 38.47%
4 71.17% 60.57% 50.98% 42.25% 38.54%
5 71.21% 60.60% 51.01% 42.27% 38.58%
6 71.23% 60.62% 51.02% 42.28% 38.60%
Notes: Results are based on a real rate of return of r = 3% p.a. and the mortality table
S2PML. Hyperbolic discount model assumes µ = 1 and σ = 0.19.
Table 5.5: The impact of discounting methods on the optimal investment percentage
in a deferred annuity (M2)
Profit loading (L) 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Optimal deferred period (d) 4 6 8 10 11
Exponential discounting 73.20% 61.83% 51.54% 42.25% 38.20%
Hyperbolic discounting 71.00% 60.41% 50.84% 42.14% 38.33%
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a risk aversion factor of γ = 2 and a
profit loading factor of L = 10%. Exponential discounting assumes a constant annual real
interest rate of r = 3%; Hyperbolic discounting assumes µ = 1 and σ = 0.19. Mortality rates
are based on table S2PML.
and this justifies that the optimal deferred period is irrelevant with how people discount
future benefits. With the choice of the optimal deferred period (d), the same analytic
process will be implemented as in M1 to deduce the optimal annuity allocation and
consumption pattern.
Table 5.4 presents the numerical outcomes of the optimal deferred period under differ-
ent levels of profit loading and the optimal investment percentage in the corresponding
deferred annuity products. First, it is better to delay receiving annuity payment when
annuities are more expensive (increasing L); and the optimal investment in the deferred
annuity decreases correspondingly with a longer deferred period. Second, looking verti-
cally in the table, the risk aversion factor does not have a great impact on the optimal
allocation percentage; however, it still reflects the point that people who are more risk
averse would tend to allocate slightly more in a deferred annuity product that can pro-
vide a guaranteed income for advanced ages.
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Figure 5.5: A comparison of optimal consumption paths for exponential discounters
and hyperbolic discounters (M2)
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a risk aversion factor of γ = 2 and a
profit loading factor of L = 10%. Exponential discounting assumes a constant annual real
interest rate of r = 3%; Hyperbolic discounting assumes µ = 1 and σ = 0.19. Mortality rates
are based on the table S2PML.
A comparison of the outcomes of α following the strategy M2 under two different meth-
ods of discounting is offered in Table 5.5. One may notice that hyperbolic discounters
would not always spend more on deferred annuity products than exponential discounters.
They would spend more on long-term deferred annuities but less on short-term deferred
annuities; the break-even point is between 10-year and 11-year deferred period. This
makes sense intuitively because individuals with time-inconsistent preferences overvalue
benefits in distant future while undervalue benefits in near future. For a short-term
deferred annuity, most benefits are greatly undervalued and hence are less valuable for
people with irrational preferences 2.
A comparison of the optimal retirement consumption paths for rational exponential dis-
counters and irrational hyperbolic discounters is provided in Figure 5.5. Two conclusions
can be drawn. First, hyperbolic discounters prefer an annuity with increasing nominal in-
comes while exponential discounters prefer an annuity with level nominal incomes. This
is because exponential discounters evaluate future payments using the same method as
2The conclusion holds in general because hyperbolic discounters always undervalue benefits in the
near future more than exponential discounters, however, the break-even point relies on the assumptions
for the hyperbolic discount factor σ and interest rate r.
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Table 5.6: The optimal investment percentage in a deferred annuity with different
hyperbolic discount factors. (M2)
σ 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
α 61.99% 61.12% 60.23% 59.34% 58.43%
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a risk aversion factor of γ = 2, a profit
loading factor of L = 10% (which suggests an optimal choice of a 6-year deferred annuity) and
a constant annual real rate of return of r = 3%. One factor in hyperbolic discounting is µ = 1.
Mortality rates are based on the table S2PML.
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Figure 5.6: The optimal consumption paths for retirees with different hyperbolic
discount factors (M2)
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a risk aversion factor of, γ = 2, a profit
loading factor of L = 10% and a constant annual real interest rate of r = 3%. One factor in
hyperbolic discounting is µ = 1. Mortality rates are based on the table S2PML
an annuity-pricing actuary; however, hyperbolic discounters assign much higher weights
to incomes in the distant future. Second, prior to the start of the deferred annuity,
hyperbolic discounters tend to spend more in the first few years after retirement than
exponential discounters, which leads to lower consumption rates for hyperbolic discoun-
ters in their age 70s.
Table 5.6 and Figure 5.6 show the impact of different levels of time-inconsistent prefer-
ences on the strategy M2. For those who are more impatient to receive benefits immedi-
ately (with a greater σ), they tend to allocate less money in deferred annuity products.
As we have explained above, for the case of a small profit loading (10% in this example),
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Table 5.7: Optimal investment percentage in a deferred annuity for Quasi-hyperbolic
discounters (M1)
β 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
τ
0.95 18.80% 18.93% 19.04% 19.13% 19.21%
0.96 19.92% 20.06% 20.17% 20.26% 20.34%
0.97 21.08% 21.22% 21.33% 21.42% 21.50%
0.98 22.27% 22.41% 22.52% 22.61% 22.69%
0.99 23.50% 23.64% 23.75% 23.84% 23.92%
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a risk aversion factor of γ = 2, a
constant annual real interest rate of r = 3%, a profit loading of L = 10%, and a deferred period
of d = 15. Mortality rates are based on the table S2PML.
the optimal choice of a short-term deferred annuity (a 6-year deferred annuity in this
example) is not attractive for impatient retirees. In terms of the optimal consumption
path during retirement period, more impatient hyperbolic discounters would consume
at a higher rate in the early years after retirement; and this will be at the cost of lower
consumption rates in advanced ages in retirement.
5.2.4 Modeling results following the quasi - hyperbolic discount model
In this section, we use the quasi-hyperbolic discount model as the subjective discount
model for utilities to identify the optimal decumulation strategy. Assumptions are the
same as in Section 2.3. In the following, we conduct a sensitivity analysis on the quasi-
hyperbolic parameter values to identify the preferences for people with different levels
of impatience. In addition, we give a comparison of the impacts of quasi-hyperbolic
discounting and exponential discounting. The analysis is conducted for strategy M1 and
M2 respectively.
5.2.4.1 M1- the Quasi-hyperbolic discount model
Table 5.7 shows the optimal investment allocation in deferred annuities under different
possible values of quasi-hyperbolic parameters. Recalling the quasi-hyperbolic function
in Equation (5.2), β controls the extra amount of discounting for the first period relative
to subsequent periods; while τ is the discount rate for each period. A β of 1 means the
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Figure 5.7: The optimal consumption paths with different quasi-hyperbolic discount
factors (M1)
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a 15-year deferred annuity, d = 15, a
risk aversion factor of γ = 2, a profit loading factor of L = 10% and a constant annual real
interest rate of r = 3%. One factor in quasi-hyperbolic discounting is τ = 0.97. Mortality rates
are based on the table S2PML
quasi-hyperbolic discounting coincides with standard exponential discounting. Looking
horizontally in the table, it can be seen that β has very limited influence on the invest-
ment in annuities, which is because deferred annuities do not involve any payments at
age 66. Therefore a quasi-hyperbolic discounter would not allocate a significantly dif-
ferent percentage of wealth in a deferred annuity comparing with a rational exponential
discounter. On the other hand, the investment allocation is very much influenced by
the time-consistent discount rate τ . The increase of τ represents a smaller amount of
discounting for utility in each period and so people would view future benefits as more
important. This is the reason that allocation in annuities is increasing with the value of
τ .
Figure 5.7 demonstrates a set of optimal consumption paths that involve with a fixed
15-year deferred annuity following different assumptions for β. Since β affects only the
value of consumption in one year’s time, the optimal consumption paths show differences
only at the beginning of retirement. As retirees become more impatient (β decreases),
they tend to consume more at age 65.
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Figure 5.8: The optimal consumption paths with different quasi-hyperbolic discount
factors (M1)
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a 15-year deferred annuity, d = 15, a
risk aversion factor of γ = 2, a profit loading factor of L = 10% and a constant annual real
interest rate of r = 3%. One factor in quasi-hyperbolic discounting is β = 0.7. Mortality rates
are based on the table S2PML
Figure 5.8 shows the optimal consumption path for different values of τ . An interesting
finding is that people require different types of annuity payments when they use different
discount rates for future benefits. If τ stays at 0.97, which means people discount future
utilities in the same way as annuity pricing (with the assumption of 3 percent interest
rate, one period discount rate is 0.9709), they would prefer a conventional annuity with
level payments. As τ increases, people adopt a smaller amount of discounting for each
period and hence they place more value on future income. As a result, they would prefer
annuities with increasing payments, which could be an inflation-linked annuity. However,
to afford such an inflation protected annuity product, they have to sacrifice consumption
in the early years after retirement. In contrast, as τ decreases, a greater amount of
discounting applies and hence people tend to allocate more spending in the earlier years
during retirement. When τ becomes smaller than 0.97, quasi-hyperbolic discounters
would enjoy a decreasing consumption pattern; annuities that offer decreasing payments
would become preferred.
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Table 5.8: Optimal investment percentage in a deferred annuity for Quasi-hyperbolic
discounters (M2)
β 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
τ
0.95 56.09% 56.49% 56.83% 57.10% 57.34%
0.96 57.41% 57.81% 58.13% 58.40% 58.63%
0.97 58.72% 59.11% 59.43% 59.69% 59.92%
0.98 60.02% 60.40% 60.71% 60.97% 61.19%
0.99 61.31% 61.68% 61.98% 62.23% 62.45%
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a risk aversion factor of γ = 2, a
constant annual real interest rate of r = 3%, and a profit loading of L = 10% (where a 6-year
deferred annuity is optimal). Mortality rates are based on the table S2PML.
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Figure 5.9: The optimal consumption paths with different quasi-hyperbolic discount
factors (M2)
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a risk aversion factor of γ = 2, a profit
loading factor of L = 10% (a 6-year deferred annuity is optimal) and a constant annual real
interest rate of r = 3%. One factor in quasi-hyperbolic discounting is τ = 0.97. Mortality rates
are based on table S2PML
5.2.4.2 M2- the Quasi-hyperbolic discount model
The impact of the quasi-hyperbolic discount model on strategy M2, which is illustrated
in Table 5.8, Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.10, is similar to that for strategy M1. To conclude,
first, retirees following the quasi-hyperbolic way of discounting would invest a similar
percentage of wealth in deferred annuities as those who follow the exponential way of
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Figure 5.10: The optimal consumption paths with different quasi-hyperbolic discount
factors (M2)
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a risk aversion factor of γ = 2, a profit
loading factor of L = 10% (a 6-year deferred annuity is optimal) and a constant annual real
interest rate of r = 3%. One factor in quasi-hyperbolic discounting is β = 0.7. Mortality rates
are based on table S2PML
discounting. Second, a quasi-hyperbolic discounter tends to spend a significant higher
amount at the beginning of the retirement due to high impatience for immediate benefits.
Third, the type of preferred annuity depends on the relative differences between the
discount rate for utilities and that for pricing. If the amount of periodic discounting for
utilities is smaller than that for money amount, an inflation linked style deferred annuity
will be preferred.
5.3 The impact of subjective mortality rates
5.3.1 Literature review on subjective mortality rates
As we know, the mortality rate is one of the most fundamental factors in the process of
retirement planning, because every decision is based on how long a person is expected
to live. At the population level, there are published mortality tables in each country for
different cohorts and different groups of people (e.g. male and female); these national
life tables and those produced for insured populations (for example, by the CMI, in
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the UK) are the basis of insurance product pricing. However, when we move down to
the individual level and talk about how an individual make a decision, the individual’s
opinion on his/her mortality rate might be different from published mortality data. This
could be because individuals possess some private information regarding their lifestyle,
health status or genetic disorders, which makes them more/less likely to die compared to
the general public. It can also simply due to different personalities of being optimistic
or pessimistic. In literature, some researchers (e.g. Hurd and McGarry (2002)) have
concluded that subjective survival probabilities have a potential use in intertemporal
decision making under uncertainty and more precisely, in forming a forward-looking
retirement decision. Therefore, we intend to use the concept of subjective mortality
rates to analyse optimal retirement strategies.
Previously, there have been several studies on mortality perceptions, carried out by
economists, psychologists and some social scientists. Subjects tend to be faced with
questions on their opinions towards survival rates. For example, typical questions in
these studies are the age they expect to live and/or the probability that they will survive
to a specified age. In some surveys, individuals’ opinions towards desired lifespan or
population lifespan will be asked as well. For example, the surveys may ask subjects the
age that they wish to live to and/or the age that a person of the same age and sex would
expect to live to. In addition to the opinions, lifestyle information of each individual
are collected so that researchers can establish the link between subjective mortality
perceptions and some risk factors such as social class, smoking, alcohol consumptions and
parents’ longevity. O’Brien et al. (2005) offer a summary of previous surveys, describing
in detail the questions asked and the results obtained. In the following paragraphs, we
review three major studies in the literature.
An early study of Hamermesh (1985) analyses responses to a questionnaire that is de-
signed to elicit subjective expectations and probabilities of survival. The questionnaires
are sent to two groups of respondents: one group is a set of 650 white male academic
economists whose ages ranging from 26 to 65 and the other group is 975 people chosen
randomly from the telephone directory who were aged between 20 and 70. In the ques-
tionnaire, the respondents are asked how old they expect they will live to be and the
subjective probability of living to at least age 60/80.
A major finding is shown in Table 5.9. Comparing x+esx (the age to which people expect
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Table 5.9: Expected age at death
economists sample telephone directory sample
age 26-39 40-65 26-39 20-39 40-70 20-70
x+ esx 75.91 76.41 76.19 75.81 77.74 76.79
x+ e0x 73.49 75.47 74.60 73.24 76.56 74.92
Notes: x denotes the respondents’ current age. x+ esx is the age to which they expect to live
and x+ e0x is the age of death from published life tables. Source: Hamermesh (1985)
Table 5.10: Average probabilities of living to age 75 or 85
Men Women All
To 75 To 85 To 75 To 85 To 75 To 85
HRS data 0.62 0.39 0.66 0.46 0.65 0.43
1990 life table 0.60 0.26 0.75 0.45 0.68 0.36
Notes: Source: Hurd and McGarry (1995)
to live) with x+e0x (the age of death from published life tables) allows us to deduce that
people expect themselves to live longer than the then current actuarial life expectancies.
Hamermesh (1985) concludes that on average the subjective probabilities are consistent
with published life tables and people actually extrapolated the improvement in longevity
over time.
Another evaluation of the subjective probabilities of survival that is conducted by Hurd
and McGarry (1995) is based on data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS).
HRS is a panel survey on Americans over age 50. It asks respondents to indicate on a
scale of 0-10 the chances that they will live to be 75/85 or more. 0 means absolutely
no chance to survive till a specified age and 10 means absolutely certain to survive until
a specified age. After rescaling to [0,1], the answers can be treated as the subjective
probability of surviving. Table 5.10 demonstrates the probability of surviving to age 75
and age 85. From the table we can see that subjective probability of surviving to age
75 for all (both men and women) is close to the average in the 1990 life table; but the
probability of surviving to age 85 for all is higher than that from the 1990 life table.
The results suggest that men substantially overestimate the probability that they will
survive to 85, and women underestimate the probability that they will live to 75.
An interesting longitudinal survey, which examines whether mortality experience over a
period is predicted by mortality perceptions at the beginning of the period, is analysed
in Hurd and McGarry (2002). In their analysis they use data from the first two waves
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Figure 5.11: Mortality perceptions by age
Notes: Source: O’Brien et al. (2005)
of the HRS. They find that the subjective survival probabilities from the first wave data
can predict actual survival into the second wave: the subjective survival probabilities
reported in wave 1 of the HRS by those who were alive during the second wave were
about 50% higher than the probabilities reported by those who died between the two
waves. Therefore they conclude that the subjective survival probabilities include an
expectational element rather than a simple measure of health status - since the latter
showed no significant difference between the two groups .
A survey of over 3500 individuals in Great Britain was conducted by O’Brien et al. (2005)
to discover the mortality perceptions of people in different age groups in the UK. In order
to avoid the problem of focal-point responses: 0 and 1, in answering the questions of
survival probability, this survey simply asks people the age to which they expect to live.
The results are compared with the estimates from the Government Actuary Department
(GAD), which include an allowance for future mortality improvement, so that we can
find out whether British people are optimistic or pessimistic regarding longevity. The
negative figures displayed in Figure 5.11 show that both females and males underestimate
their life expectancies compared with the estimates from the GAD. On average, males
underestimate by 4.62 years and females underestimate by 5.95 years. Findings from
O’Brien et al. (2005) suggest that people are pessimistic about life expectancies, while
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findings from Hamermesh (1985) and Hurd and McGarry (1995) suggest that people
are optimistic. This is because O’Brien et al. (2005) compare subjective opinion with
forecast figures, which already incorporate the mortality improvement, while Hamermesh
(1985) and Hurd and McGarry (1995) compare it with current life tables from that time,
which do not include any allowance for future mortality improvement.
Following Gan et al. (2005), an individual’s subjective survival rate is described as
tPx = exp{
∫ t
0
−ψµx+rdr} (5.3)
where µx+r denotes the instantaneous hazard rate at age x+r and ψ denotes individual
optimism index.
When ψ equals 1, the survival rate predicted by Equation (5.3) will be the same as in
the published life tables. Therefore, parameter ψ basically measures whether people are
optimistic or pessimistic relative to the actual mortality rates. If ψ is less than 1, the
person is optimistic about his life expectancy because the perceived mortality rates are
lower. On the other hand, ψ being greater than 1 indicates the person is pessimistic. In
this section, we will examine two cases below to test the sensitivity of the results to the
choice of ψ.
ψ = 0.8, the person is optimistic about his life expectancy
ψ = 1.2, the person is pessimistic about his life expectancy.
5.3.2 The impact of subjective mortality rates on the attractiveness of
annuities
With subjective mortality rates, we can work out a revised price for annuity products.
This revised price is the maximum acceptable price (reservation price) that an individual
would like to pay. If an individual believes he might live for a shorter period than
others, it is easily imagined that he would be willing to buy an annuity only if it has a
low price. After comparing this price with the actuarially fair price, we could determine
whether annuity products in the market are desirable for people with subjective mortality
perceptions to purchase.
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Figure 5.12: The Relative Price Difference (R) of immediate annuity and deferred
annuities for a 65-year-old
Following Chapter 2, we calculate the ratio R, which is the relative difference between
reservation price and fair price.
R = Reservation Price−Actuarially fair price
Actuarially fair price
A positive R suggests an annuity is attractive to purchase. On the other hand, a nega-
tive R suggests people would like to pay a lower-than-market price on annuities; hence
annuities are not attractive. The modeling results in terms of R can also be interpreted
as how much more or less than market price one would be prepared to pay for an annuity.
To produce modeling results, we assume a constant interest rate of 3 percent and the
S2PML as the published mortality table. Figure 5.12 displays the attractiveness of
immediate annuities (d = 0) and deferred annuities (d > 0) for retirees at age 65. It
can be seen that people who are optimistic about survival rates find annuities attractive
to purchase; while people who are pessimistic about their survival rates find all types
of annuities not attractive at all. In addition, as the deferred period (d) increases,
optimistic individuals tend to find deferred annuities more desirable while pessimistic
individuals find deferred annuities less desirable. Therefore, optimistic individuals tend
to invest in long-term deferred annuities. Moreover, if a person who has pessimistic
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Table 5.11: Optimal investment percentage in a deferred annuity (M1)
Life table Optimistic Pessimistic
ψ = 1 ψ = 0.8 ψ = 1.2
Deferred period d
5 68.12% 70.00% 66.41%
10 41.98% 45.01% 39.31%
15 22.41% 25.64% 19.71%
20 9.72% 12.29% 7.78%
25 3.13% 4.60% 2.17%
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a risk aversion factor of γ = 2, a
constant annual real interest rate of r = 3%, and a profit loading of L = 10%
Table 5.12: A summary of consumption paths in Figure 5.13
Life table Optimistic Pessimistic
Max consumption 6.71% 6.35% 7.03%
Min consumption 5.60% 5.50% 5.66%
Max - Min 1.11% 0.85% 1.37%
Consumption gap 14.21% 10.16% 18.42%
views on mortality rates decides to buy an annuity, an immediate annuity starting at
age 65 would be preferred.
5.3.3 The impact of subjective mortality rates on decumulation strate-
gies
Detailed descriptions of the decumulation strategies M1 and M2 have been provided
in Section 2.2. Previously, modeling results are based on the mortality rates from the
published table S2PML. In this section, we will replace it with a new survival rate
function (5.3) so that we can find out the impact of subjective mortality rates on our
proposed retirement strategies M1 and M2. The benchmark assumptions will be the
same as described in Section 2.3.
Table 5.11 demonstrates the optimal investment percentage in a fixed d-year deferred
annuity following strategy M1. It offers a comparison of the results for optimistic indi-
viduals and pessimistic individuals. It is clear that people who are optimistic regarding
their life expectancies would like to invest a greater percentage of wealth in deferred
annuities. This is consistent with our conclusion that optimistic individuals tend to find
annuities more desirable to purchase.
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Figure 5.13: The optimal consumption path following M1 for retirees with subjective
mortality rate
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a 15-year deferred annuity d = 15, a
risk aversion factor of γ = 2, a constant annual real interest rate of r = 3%, and a profit
loading of L = 10%
Figure 5.13 shows the optimal consumption paths for people with different mortality
perceptions and Table 5.12 offers a summary of the consumption paths. it is interesting
to note that people with optimistic views on survival rates tend to have lowest consump-
tion rates during the entire retirement period than people with neutral or pessimistic
views on survival rates. This is because those with lighter subjective mortality rates
expect themselves to have a longer life expectancy; they need to consume at a lower
rate and save for the future in preparation for surviving a long period during retirement.
Moreover, we identify a smaller consumption gap at the transition point (when annu-
ity payments commence) for optimistic individuals, which implies that individuals who
believe they will live longer after retirement tend to follow a more stable and smooth
consumption path.
Table 5.13 demonstrates the optimal investment percentage in an optimally chosen de-
ferred annuity following strategy M2. As we have shown (in Chapter 4) that the optimal
deferred period is determined by the mortality rates and the profit-loading factor, holding
different opinions on mortality rates would lead to choices of different types of deferred
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Table 5.13: Optimal investment percentage (α) in a deferred annuity (M2)
Profit loading (L) 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
Life table Optimal deferred period 7 9 10 11 12Optimal allocation 56.92% 47.26% 43.04% 39.03% 35.21%
Optimistic Optimal deferred period 8 10 11 13 14Optimal allocation 54.36% 45.56% 41.72% 34.10% 30.79%
Pessimistic Optimal deferred period 6 8 9 10 11Optimal allocation 60.43% 49.85% 45.23% 40.84% 36.68%
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a risk aversion factor of γ = 2 and a
constant annual real interest rate of r = 3%.
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Figure 5.14: The optimal consumption path following M2 for retirees with subjective
mortality rate
Notes: Results are based on the following assumptions: a risk aversion factor of γ = 2, a
constant annual real interest rate of r = 3%, and a profit loading of L = 10%
Table 5.14: A summary of consumption paths in Figure 5.14
Life table Optimistic Pessimistic
Max consumption 6.85% 6.44% 7.23%
Min consumption 6.53% 6.14% 6.89%
Max - Min 0.32% 0.30% 0.34%
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annuity. With a fixed profit loading factor, Table 5.13 shows that people who are op-
timistic about their life expectancy tend to choose an annuity with a longer deferred
period than those who are pessimistic about their life expectancy. The corresponding
optimal investment allocation is linked with the deferred period. With a 10% profit
loading, optimistic individuals would invest 54.36% in a 8-year deferred annuity, while
pessimistic individuals would invest 60.43% in a 6-year deferred annuity.
Figure 5.14 shows the optimal consumption paths for people with different mortality
perceptions and Table 5.14 offers a summary of the consumption paths. Similar conclu-
sions can be drawn as for the model M1. Consumption rates for optimistic individuals
are below those for pessimistic individuals at all ages. This is because optimistic indi-
viduals believe that they are less likely to die and they need to prepare for the long term
future. In addition, optimistic individuals prefer more stable and smooth consumption
path during retirement stage. As introduced in Section 5.3.1, people normally underes-
timate their life expectancies compared with figures that include an allowance for future
mortality improvements. Therefore, an insurance company could launch a relatively
short term deferred annuity; according to our modeling results, a pessimistic individual
would prefer a 6-year deferred annuity when the profit loading is 10%.
5.4 Conclusions
In recent decades, data on assets and members in DB and DC pension plans confirms the
increasing prominence of DC plans. In many OECD countries, almost all new schemes
introduced are DC schemes. For existing DB pension schemes, they are sometimes closed
to new members; or they can be closed to all members, in which cases all assets in DB
plans stop accruing. In countries like Netherlands and the United States where DB plans
have been running for many decades, the total value of assets in DB plans continues to
grow but at a slower pace than assets in DC plans (OECD, 2016). In a pure DC scheme,
individuals bear investment risk and longevity risk; therefore, professional advice is in
demand so that that pensioners understand how to generate reasonable incomes from
accumulated DC savings to support the entire retirement life.
This chapter focuses on optimal decumulation strategies and can be seen as an exten-
sion of Chapter 4. In this chapter, we aim to find out the implications of two behavioral
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factors, time inconsistent preferences and subjective mortality rates, on the two decu-
mulation strategies (M1 and M2) introduced in Chapter 4. In two separate sections,
we have replaced the exponential discount model with the hyperbolic discount model,
and replaced reported mortality rates with a subjective rates model, in the utility max-
imisation framework with budget constraint. Primary findings are as follows (results
introduced are based on our benchmark assumptions).
First, a hyperbolic discounter with decreasing patience over time would tend to invest
22.97% of pension wealth in a 15-year deferred annuity (following M1), or invest 60.4% of
pension wealth in a 6-year deferred annuity (following M2); this recommended allocation
is similar to our findings for exponential discounters (see Chapter 4 for more details).
Despite these similar allocations, the preferred annuity type for hyperbolic discounters
and exponential discounters are different. Hyperbolic discounters, who tend to overvalue
incomes in the distant future, would prefer an inflation linked annuity while rational
exponential discounters would prefer a conventional annuity with level payments.
Second, a quasi-hyperbolic discounter, who simply shows impatience in the first year,
tends to spend a significant higher amount at the beginning of the retirement than a
exponential discounter. The preferred type of annuity depends on the relative differences
between the discount rate for utilities and that for annuity pricing. If the discount rate
for utilities is smaller than that for money amount, an inflation linked deferred annuity
will be preferred; in the opposite case, an annuity that provides decreasing incomes will
be preferred.
Third, subjective mortality rate is shown to be an influential factor in an annuity pur-
chase decision. People who are optimistic (pessimistic) about their life expectancies
would find annuities attractive (not attractive) and allocate a higher (lower) proportion
of pension savings in a fixed deferred annuity. In M2, when individuals are allowed to
select the optimal deferred period of an annuity, optimistic individuals would choose
annuities with longer deferred periods, and hence invest a smaller proportion of savings,
than pessimistic individuals.
Overall, the behavioral factors we have studied in this chapter do not greatly affect the
optimal allocation in the deferred annuities; however, they do play important roles in
the optimal consumption/drawdown patterns.
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General Conclusions
This thesis has been devoted to the understanding of the annuitisation decision and the
use of annuity products in decumulation solutions for the post-retirement period. We
have introduced behavioral factors based on subjective values of annuity products in
order to determine whether people would be interested in purchasing an annuity with
an actuarially fair price. Two behavioral factors have been studied: cumulative prospect
theory (CPT) and the hyperbolic discount model. They both suggest a high demand
for deferred annuity products. Hence, we propose a decumulation strategy with the
involvement of deferred annuities. By following this strategy, retirees receive adequate
longevity protection from a pre-determined certain age. It simplifies their investment
decision-making process by turning the investment horizon from an uncertain period –
because of having no prior knowledge of age of death – into a fixed period. The fixed
period is the time between the retirement age and the point when the annuity payments
commence. We have identified the optimal proportion of pension savings to be allocated
into the deferred annuities and also the optimal consumption path (decumulation path)
to be followed during retirement.
In Chapter 2, we use CPT to find out the perceived value of an annuity and hence work
out the maximum price that people would like to pay for an annuity. By comparing this
with the actuarially fair annuity price, we can determine whether an annuity purchase
will be made. We show that being loss averse rather than risk averse is the major
reason (within this framework) that stops people from buying an annuity; people would
be willing to pay only a lower price because they exaggerate the expected losses from
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an annuity investment in the early years. Furthermore, the behavioral tendency of
overweighting low-probability events leads to the low demand for immediate annuities
(because of overweighting the low probability of dying soon after age 65) and suggests
a possible high demand for long-term deferred annuities (because of overweighting the
low probability of surviving to an advanced old age, e.g. age 90).
In Chapter 3, we analyse the annuitisation decision using another behavioral model, the
hyperbolic discount model. Using the same techniques as in Chapter 2, we find that the
presence of time-inconsistent preferences in the process of making an intertemporal deci-
sion can explain the low demand for immediate annuities. Moreover, it again uncovers a
possible high demand for long-term deferred annuities. Two types of deferred annuities,
a working age deferred annuity (WADA) and a retirement age deferred annuity (RADA)
are studied, and the results show that hyperbolic discounters, both at working age and
in retirement, would find annuities with a longer deferred period more attractive.
Chapter 4 focuses on deferred annuity products and explores its best use in the DC
decumulation process during retirement. We propose allocating a proportion of pension
savings to either a fixed long-term deferred annuity or an optimally determined deferred
annuity in order to receive protection against (tail) longevity risk. Using numerical
optimisation techniques and a set of benchmark assumptions, we make the following
suggestions: (i), a retiree who worries about tail longevity risk and wants to retain a
certain level of liquidity is advised to spend 21.6% on a 15-year deferred annuity or
9.13% on a 20-year deferred annuity; (ii), a retiree who simply wants to use annuities to
maximise overall satisfaction from retirement consumption is advised to spend 61.83%
on a 6-year deferred annuity and to follow a decreasing consumption path until the start
of annuity payments. A sensitivity analysis is conducted and suggests that the above
recommended percentages are very stable relative to the desire for smooth consumption,
the existence of state benefits and the bequest motive.
Chapter 5 extends the research questions in Chapter 4 into the area of behavioral factors,
aiming to find out whether people would follow different decumulation strategies during
retirement given that they are exposed to behavioral biases of having time-inconsistent
preferences or having subjective opinions on their future mortality rates. The results
suggest that hyperbolic discounters would invest a similar proportion of pension savings
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in deferred annuity products, but prefer inflation-linked payments rather than level pay-
ments. Moreover, retirees who are optimistic (pessimistic) about their life expectancies
would find annuities attractive (not attractive) in general and they tend to allocate more
(less) of their pension savings in annuity products.
The advantages of deferred annuities have been discussed extensively in recent years: by
delaying the payments for a few years, people access longevity protection at a fraction
of the price required for an immediate annuity product. This defines a fixed period
over which people need to make drawdown decisions and helps maintain liquidity to
some extent. Second, planning ahead to receive protections for advanced ages could be
more likely to help individuals achieve optimal retirement spending, due to the fact that
people tend to experience cognitive impairment as they reach advanced ages. A study
shows that 20 percent of retirees in their 80s have been fully diagnosed with dementia
and 30 percent have severe cognitive impairment (Laibson, 2009). Furthermore, our
proposed strategies are in line with the OECD roadmap for the good design of defined
contribution pension plans (OECD, 2012); one of the recommendations is:
For the payout phase, encourage annuitization as a protection against longevity
risk. A certain level of annuitization of balances accumulated in DC pension
plans should be set as the default mechanism for the payout phase, unless
pay-as-you-go public pensions or the old-age safety net already provide for
sufficient regular pension payments. A combination of programmed with-
drawals with a deferred life annuity (e.g. starting payments at the age of
85) that offers protection against inflation could be seen as an appropriate
default.
Despite the deferred annuities’ strengths, there are firstly still regulatory barriers re-
garding offering deferred annuity products. For example, in the U.S., one concern is
the Required Minimum Distributions (RMDs), which is the minimum amount that is
required by law to be withdrawn annually from a retirement plan after pensioners reach
age 7012 . It is only recently (2014) that deferred annuities purchased within qualified de-
fined contribution plans1 have been allowed to count towards the minimum distribution
requirement if the annuity payments begin by age 85 and the annuity premium does not
1401(a), a 403(b) plan, a governmental 457(b) plan or a traditional IRA.
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exceed the minimum of 25% of pension savings or USD 125, 000 (OECD, 2016). More-
over, the EU-wide Solvency II regulation that came into effect from 1 January 2016 has
introduced stringent capital requirements for insurance companies. For life insurance
companies that write long-term deferred annuity business, it is difficult to predict liabil-
ities in the distant future and hence they cannot perfectly match their liabilities. This
results in life insurance companies needing to hold more capital for deferred annuities
and leads to increases in the deferred annuity price. Practitioners have expressed the
same view in terms of the price of buying out the DB pension liabilities, especially for
deferred members. In 2015, PwC predicted that the new regulatory regime Solvency II
could increase the cost of a pension buyout by 10% in a worst-case scenario (Cheong,
2015).
Another challenge for deferred annuities is the difficulty that the public has in under-
standing these products. The increased complexity of annuity products requires better
communication of product features and risks to consumers so that consumers fully under-
stand the products that they are purchasing. Therefore, the role of the financial advisor
in helping customers to select the retirement products that are the most suitable be-
comes more important. Buying deferred annuities as the default option for a proportion
of one’s pension savings is also recommended as some pensioners may otherwise not con-
sider buying annuities to protect themselves against outliving their resources. However,
experience in the U.K. suggests that default options should be considered with caution.
One concern is that the inertia to go with the default option may cause disengagement
from the decision making process and stop people from shopping around for a better
deferred annuity deal. Another concern is that for pensioners whose pension account
balances fall below a certain amount, annuitisation would convert savings into a very
small amount which may not be enough for minimum living costs and may affect their
subsequent entitlement to welfare benefits (OECD, 2016).
There are several areas where the work of this thesis can be extended. First, the op-
timal retirement strategy proposed in Chapter 4 is based on an assumption that the
only available investment choices are annuities and risk-free savings. In the real world,
some retirees may like to access some riskier asset class such as equities to benefit from
higher expected return; this is because the investment horizon for retirees is medium
to long term and wealthier retirees have the ability to take higher risk. Therefore, the
proposed retirement decumulation strategy could be extended to allow for a risky asset
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class and we could then work out the optimal allocations and withdrawal strategies.
Second, our current analysis is based on an assumption of fixed interest rates. These
could be replaced by a stochastic interest rate model to achieve a more realistic retire-
ment solution. Third, the proposed strategy is a static one-time decision at retirement
without further rebalancing of the portfolio. Due to the movements in insurance and
financial markets, the recommended retirement strategy could involve several rebalances
of the portfolio, which could either be triggered by market movements or the elapsing of
specific time periods, e.g. 5 years. A rebalanced portfolio could be helpful in adjusting
risks and receiving benefits; for example, retirees would be suggested to underweight eq-
uity allocations in market downturns; and they can purchase additional annuities when
interest rate is high and annuities are cheap. However, transaction costs that come with
rebalancing will also need to be considered.
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